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CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA

Islamism and the Quest for Hegemony in Indonesia

Luqman Nul Hakim

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For Ishtar, Arkan and Winda



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Yogyakarta
20 February 2022

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CHAPTER 1

Islamism in Indonesia: Setting the Stage

Once widely considered as an exemplar *par-excellence* for democratisation in postcolonial Muslim-majority countries, democratic contestation in contemporary Indonesia is characterised by the mobilisation of Islam and practices of exclusionary politics. This trend is particularly salient in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that has placed Indonesia at the centre of global attention. Prompted by an allegation of blasphemy against Islam, the *Aksi Bela Islam* (Actions for Defending Islam) rallies and xenophobic sentiments pave the way for the dramatic defeat and subsequent jailing of the incumbent governor, the ethnic Chinese and Christian Basuki 'Ahok' Tjahaja Purnama.[1] It is also noticeable that the politics of the 2017 Jakarta election severely polarises society, especially among Muslims. They are divided into conflicting camps of so-called tolerant-pluralist Islam versus intolerant-radical Islam. This

[1] While most pollsters considered unbeatable prior to the election, Ahok's political fortune was in tatters following his fateful words about a Koranic verse of Al-Maidah of 51 that concerned whether Muslims could support non-Muslim leaders. This speech, made in the Seribu Island of North Jakarta, triggered accusations of blasphemy against Islam. This event subsequently became a pretext for the mobilisation that drew hundreds of thousands of participants in the capital city of Jakarta and dramatically changed political configuration during the election. The detailed analysis of this event, as a paradigmatic case, is presented in Chapter 6.

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antagonistic pattern continues in many public debates on various socio-political issues. Moreover, it has also visibly constituted political blocs of constituency in the 2019 Presidential race where the tolerant-pluralist supposedly supported the victorious President, Joko Widodo, while the intolerant-pluralist backed his opponent, the right-wing candidate Prabowo Subianto. More than two decades after the transition from the authoritarian regime, it becomes apparent that Islamic politics have profoundly dominated the practice and discourse of democracy.

For some scholars and pundits, the *Aksi Bela Islam*, as integral into the project of Islamisation of politics, is alarming as the movement indicates the strength of the intolerant and conservative Islamists. They conceive this phenomenon as fundamentally endangering the consolidation of a democratic and multicultural society (e.g. Fealy, 2016; Harsono 2017; IPAC, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2019). For others, the mobilisation of Islam is a product of competing elites' instrumentalisation of Muslim constituency to either take or maintain their power over the state and its resources (Hadiz, 2017a, b). The mainstreaming of conservative Islam and its electoral mobilisation, as vividly shown in *Aksi Bela Islam* and during the 2019 Presidential election, have led some scholars to be pessimistic about the trajectory of Indonesian democracy. Notwithstanding their different perspectives and concerns, they suggest that Indonesia is now experiencing a democratic setback and regression (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Hadiz, 2017a, b; Hefner, 2018; Lindsay 2018; Power & Warburton, 2020).

This debate prompts us to raise further intriguing questions to reassess Islamic politics and the workings of democracy in contemporary Indonesia. Why has democratic contestation in Indonesia been increasingly overwhelmed by identity politics, with Islam as its prime signifier? Why does the participation of Islamic forces in the democratic processes and institutions not result in a more noticeable moderation of Islamic politics? Why have tolerance and intolerance markers increasingly become the primary categories which define two mutually negating constituencies? Why do the practices of Islamic politics tend to be divisive and fragmented, and why have they never been a collective force for challenging the dominant order? With regard to Islamic politics, these questions call for a further theoretical and empirical investigation of the contentious aspects of the relationship between Islam and democracy in a broader historical setting. Such inquiries are even more urgent against

the backdrop of the global rise of populist politics in the era of neoliberal globalisation, in which Indonesia is not an exception.

This book emerges out of the dissatisfaction with the mainstream explanations regarding Islamic politics in Indonesia. Situated within the discursive settings of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and neoliberal democracy, scholars on Indonesian politics at home and abroad are greatly concerned with Islamic radicalism and its more assertive role in dealing with public matters. Often placed under terrorism studies, the question of Islam and politics is seen through the lens of violence by usually emphasising Islamic distinctive ideology, organisations and networks (e.g. Abuza, 2003, 2007; Barton, 2004; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; Fealy, 2004; ICG, 2002; Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Ota et al., 2010; Ramakhrisna & Tan, 2003; van Bruinessen, 2002). Within the global promotion of neoliberal democracy in the post-Cold War, and especially after the GWOT, diverse articulations of Islam in politics are frequently treated as a threat, if not anathema, to democracy. Hence, the complex relations and dynamics between Islam and democracy become reduced to the question of whether or not they are compatible. Through dominant discourses, such as multiculturalism, tolerance and deradicalisation, the practices of Islamic politics are seen as a problem and an object of intervention rather than political agents whose distinct articulations have, in fact, been greatly conditioned by democratisation.

From the outset, this book discards the understanding of the dynamic relations of Islam and politics in such a dichotomic and monochromatic fashion. Instead, this study draws inspiration from scholarly traditions which situate Islamic politics in a broader social, economic and political change (e.g. Hadiz, 2016; Halliday, 2005; Ismail, 2006; Roy, 1994; Sayyid, 1997, 2014; Sidel, 2006; Zubaida 1993). Like other political forces, Islamic politics has evolved in, and been influenced by, complex contestations and structural conditions. As such, this book seeks to investigate the nature and trajectories of Islamic politics and how they shape and are being transformed by political contestations and coalitions with multiple forces both within and beyond Islamists throughout Indonesia's modern political history.

The book employs Islamism as a conceptual category to capture the diverse nature and trajectories of Islamic politics. Indeed, Islamism is not a concept developed from Islamic theological narratives per se, but it also refers to the complex relations between Islam, Muslims and power (Martin & Barzegar, 2010). Inspired by the traditions of the Political

Discourse Theory (PDT), developed by political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001; Laclau, 1990, 1996), Islamism here is understood as a political discourse that attempts to centre Islam within the political order (cf. Ismail, 2006; Sayyid, 1997). Similar to the concept developed by Olivier Roy in his classic work, *The Failure of Political Islam* (1994), Islamism is indeed a political project. But, in stark contrast to his orientation, Islamism here does not restrictedly refer to the revolutionary projects for seizing state power. As a political discourse, Islamism can be appropriated by diverse social agents of distinctive interests and agendas which are organised around the signifier of Islam. Islamism, therefore, can be articulated through and manifests in different forms ranging from the assertion of Muslim subjectivity, collective actions to reconstruct Islam-based society, to projects for the Islamisation of the state through either democratic or violent means.

Consequently, it is not necessary here to differentiate between Islamic politics whose objectives are the Islamisation of the state and those that emphasise the privatisation of Islam (Ayoob, 2008; Martin & Barzegar, 2010; Volpi, 2010). For quite a long time, scholars have often conceived of these two forms of Islamic politics in a binary opposition or seen them as evolutionary. By focusing on its struggles to capture the state, for example, Roy (1994, 2002) argues that the projects of Islamism had failed in Muslim-majority countries, and their purveyors had subsequently transformed their Islamisation agenda into what he called *neo-fundamentalism*. Others also observe the shifts in attitudes and strategies of Islamism in different manifestations, for example, from the doctrine of *jihadism* to *Salafism* (Kepel, 2014) or from projects for an Islamic state to building a society based on Islamic morality (Bubalo et al., 2008). For these scholars, Islamism has shifted into a new form, called post-Islamism (Bayat, 2013).

By conceptualising Islamism as a discourse, however, the book does not treat the distinction of Islamism and post-Islamism in such a way that the former is seen as political while the latter is non-political. In fact, as Bayat (2005, 2013) rightly argues, the advent of post-Islamism does not mark the end of Islamism. Instead, the processes of Islamisation and post-Islamisation can simultaneously take place. From this vantage point, this study does not establish qualitative differences between the many faces of Islamism. Its ultimate target is to investigate the ways their different and often conflicting articulations of Islam are conditioned by the broader socio-political changes and are constitutive to Indonesian politics.

In so doing, the analysis of this study portrays the relationship between Islam and politics as a form of hegemonic struggle. Offering a post-structuralist reading on Gramsci's renowned notion of hegemony, PDT proponents expand this concept by arguing that hegemonic struggles can be organised by any forces and not necessarily on the plane of class-based politics (Laclau, 1990, 1996, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). More specifically, as explained in Chapter 2, the concept of hegemony here captures two inter-related spheres. Firstly, it is an ontological framework that perceives social formation and transformation as ultimately a contingent outcome of political struggles. Secondly, it refers to the practice of linking together diverse demands among social groups by creating a particular political project under the banner of *ummah*, or the community of believers, to improve their social position and struggle for an alternative order.

By using a lens of hegemony, the analysis of this book is premised on the contention that Indonesia is a political construction, whereby Islam has become one of the major discourses in defining and shaping Indonesia's nation-state throughout history. As argued throughout this book, the nature and trajectories of Islamism are less driven by different interpretations of religious doctrines, cultural norms or the imperative of institutions. But, different projects of Islamism and their quest for hegemony are contingent on the outcomes of the socio-political changes and contestations that involve multiple political forces, both within and beyond Islamists, in the given historical conjunctures.

More specifically, by focusing on the praxis of Islamism, the book seeks to examine the social conditions and contradictions that might be possible for Muslims to articulate different projects of Islamism. Hence, diverse articulations of Islamism are indeed historical, from which one can distinguish their respective ideological underpinnings, social coalitions and dynamic nature. From the perspective of the hegemonic struggle, we could examine that the political struggles among Islamists and beyond in defining and transforming Indonesia's nation-state, through either collaboration or fierce contest, contribute to their different identities, strategies and coalitions. As such, the book seeks to understand the extent to which a distinct model of social and power relations that is emerging from actual historical processes and characterise the practices of Islamism and Indonesian politics from one historical period to another.

In this light, this book begins with exploring Islamism as a political force in its historical context. This allows us to go beyond the

liberal notion of Islamism that generally prescribes the separation of religion from politics and treats Islamism as an object of intervention. However, historicising the different practices of Islamism is not conducted merely to establish a chronological timeframe. We conceive of historical periods as discursive settings, defined by distinct issues, actor constellations and structural conditions. These characterise the different practices of Islamism in influencing, or being transformed by, the formation and transformation of Indonesia's nation-state. The articulations of Islam are diverse in each discursive setting, ranging from economic, social, cultural to political demands. Moreover, there are different vehicles for politically enacting and advancing their agenda, including both peaceful and violent means, within and outside state parameters.

Like other political discourses, such as nationalism and communism, Islamism has been a political force and played a constitutive role in the nation-state formation and transformation. Its prominent role has spanned from the era of anti-colonial movement and early nation-state projects to the current period of democratisation. Accordingly, the book structures the relations between Islamism and Indonesia's nation-state in three discursive settings, namely anti-colonialism and early nation-state building, modernisation projects and New Order authoritarianism and post-authoritarian democratisation. In the first discursive setting, Islamism manifested in two identifiable agendas: an anti-colonial outlook and a distinct ideological force that significantly defined the contending visions for the formation of Indonesia's nation-state in the early post-Independence era.

Following this, circumscribed by the Cold War global setting and in the destruction of communism at home, the discourse of modernisation and developmentalism had become a central signifier in transforming Indonesia from emphasis on political contestation to economic development and depoliticisation of citizenship. Within the New Order developmentalist discourse, where technocracy and suppression of dissents became the new technology of control, Islamism was contained into the domain of culture to provide ideological support for modernisation. Yet, the New Order developmentalism hegemony was never fully all-encompassing as discontent among Muslims began to emerge in the last period of New Order authoritarian rule. The re-emergence of Islamic politics of this era, as elaborated in Chapter 4, played a significant role in ousting the regime.

Following the fall of the authoritarian regime and the rise of post-Cold War neoliberal globalisation, the articulations of Islamism revolve around democratisation discourse in which identity politics becomes a new way of organising demands. With regard to Islamism, democratisation discourse has brought about paradoxical results. While political liberalisation opens a terrain for Islamists to play a greater role in the political arena and civil society, the merging discourse of neoliberal democracy and GWOT put Islamism under scrutiny. Consequently, Islamism is often seen as an obstacle, or threat, to democratic transition and consolidation, rather than as a collection of social agents whose different projects have been made possible by democratisation. By emphasising different projects of Islamism in transforming the nation-state in three discursive settings, this book offers a new reading of Indonesia's socio-political history from the praxis of Islamism.

Islamism and the Epistemological Critique

In the last two decades, political debates and contemporary studies on Islamism in Indonesia have been situated within the changing national and global circumstances, notably in the context of post-authoritarian democratisation and of the GWOT global campaign. Following the fall of New Order regime in 1998, Islamism began to play a role to participate in political and societal arena. Political liberalisation facilitated the emergence of Islamic parties and organisations with diverse agendas in the political and public spheres. Concurrently, much attention to Islamism also came from the GWOT's imperatives that promote alarming accounts of the dangers of the Islamisation of politics. One cannot ignore the interplay of these two contexts that characterise the contradictory nature of Islamism in democratising Indonesia. On the one hand, Islamism is seen as integral to the democratisation of nation-state building and a legitimate vehicle to articulate popular demands. On the other hand, key actors in the global liberal order after 9/11 are overtly suspicious, if not hostile, to the role of Islam in the political arena and public sphere. Between these contradictory pressures, the securitisation of Islam goes together with depoliticisation where Islamism is strictly confined into the domain of ideology and culture.

Against this backdrop, this book argues that dominant studies on Indonesian Islamism, as discussed below, are deeply entrenched in liberal epistemology, either consciously or by implication, as their approach

advocates securitisation and culturalisation of Islam. As rapidly developed and disseminated within the global web of post-9/11 knowledge production, the liberal epistemology has characterised global studies on the relations between religion and politics, into which the Indonesian experience is taken as empirical confirmation and policy prescription (Abuza, 2007; Barton, 2004; Ramakhrisna & Tan, 2003; cf. Volpi, 2010). Driven by this mindset, the discussions on Islam and the current state of Indonesian democracy and its trajectories are often explained from ideological and cultural standpoints (e.g. Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; Ota et al., 2010). They do not take Islamism as a discourse or political force that is integral to the nation-state's formation and transformation. Consequently, the answer to the misleading question as to whether Islam is compatible with democracy or otherwise is confirmed by employing dubious parameters of violence, intolerance and presumed threats to national unity.

Dominant approaches to contemporary Islamism and politics in Indonesia can be divided into three broad camps: ideological, cultural and institutional. As delineated below, these three approaches spring from the liberal underpinnings of religion in political and public affairs. These traditions construct Indonesian Islamism in seemingly different narratives but separate Islam from Indonesian's political history and promote the depoliticisation of citizenship through Islamic articulations. Worse still, they treat Islam as a mere cultural entity championed as a beacon of liberal democracy, as indicated in the most celebrated discourse on multiculturalism and tolerance in both national policy making and foreign policy branding.

Islamism as Ideology

By reinforcing security-oriented narratives, ideological approach to Islamism generally focuses on Islamists' violent and anti-democratic features by linking them to certain interpretations of Islamic doctrines (e.g. Ota et al., 2010) or transnational Islamist networks (ICG, 2002; Ramakhrisna & Tan, 2003; Singh, 2007). This approach gains popularity soon after the Bali bombing in October 2002 that took 202 lives, and when the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organisation, considered an offshoot of the Al-Qaeda network in Southeast Asia, attracted global attention. More specifically, academic and public discourse began to use the concept of Islamic radicalism as an analytical category to account for the relationship between Islam and politics in Indonesia (Barton,

2004; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; Fealy, 2004). As Asad (2007, 9) shows, the emergence of Islamic radicalism also reasserts the notion of *jihad*, often seen as Islamists' practical ideology of violence. *Jihad*, he further argues, has increasingly become a new basis for explaining the different orientations of Islamism. Not surprisingly, following the GWOT, scholarships on Islamism in Indonesia and beyond are often subsumed under the studies of violence and terrorism, instead of the area studies or political sciences (e.g. Abuza, 2003; Frisch & Inbar, 2008).

However, Islamic radicalism itself is an elusive and contested concept, understood with different contents and orientations. For example, while recognising the fluid boundaries among Islamist groups in Indonesia, Fealy (2004, 105) suggests that one can distinguish Islamic radicalism from the rest by employing the two following criteria. The first is the demand for comprehensive implementation of sharia and the rejection of Pancasila[2] as the foundation of the state. The second feature is that they are reactive, verbally or even using physical violence, against what they consider as corrosively secular and liberal—broadly labelled as 'Western,' anathema to Islam. In other words, Islamic radicalism is entirely about ideology and intolerant acts.

As a response to those who emphasise the importance of global-regional networks of terrorism (e.g. ICG, 2002; Singh, 2007), van Bruinessen (2002) argues that the genealogy of contemporary Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has ideological and historical roots in some forms of Islamism in the early postcolonial period. Notwithstanding the different historical context of their emergence and development, he further argues that the precursors of Islamic radicalism can be traced back to the *Darul Islam* (DI, the Abode of Islam) and the Masyumi party. DI was an Islamic state based in West Java—not then recognised as part of the Indonesian republic—declared by Kartosuwirjo through a violent

[2] Pancasila is the ideological foundation of Indonesia, comprising of five principles: belief in One God, Humanity, the Unity of Indonesia, Democracy and Social Justice. Pancasila is basically a political consensus among different political forces, especially between the Islamic nationalist and secular nationalist camps, in making Indonesia's nation-state. However, Pancasila itself had been articulated by dominant forces with different agendas and orientations from one period to another. Such articulations range from a political consensus during the nation-state formation, an instrument to regulate society for modernisation agenda in the New Order to multicultural aspirations in the era of democratising Indonesia.

revolution in 1949 after a tumultuous negotiation process on Indonesian sovereignty with the colonial power. Meanwhile, Masyumi was the Islamic party that advocated the aspiration for an Islamic state through parliamentary politics. Although the Indonesian government decisively crushed DI movements and disbanded the Masyumi party in 1960, as further discussed in Chapter 3, van Bruinessen argues that many radical Islamist groups took inspiration from and declared themselves the heirs of DI and Masyumi.

The dominance of ideological approaches has brought about the essentialisation of Islamism. Generally, they use violence as a parameter for categorising and profiling different forms of Islamism. The issue is whether certain Islamist groups have propensities towards violence and/or are linked to global terrorist networks. In the case of Indonesia, as discussed later, the categorisation of radical and pluralist Islamism has been pursued by constructing the former as a threat to nation-state unity, democratic consolidation and multiculturalism. In the context of power struggles within democratising Indonesia, the polarisation of Muslims along radical and pluralist lines has also shaped the configurations of contemporary Indonesian politics. The essentialist understanding of Islamism, for instance, becomes apparent in the way its proponents discuss the influence of radical Islam in electoral democracy, as shown in the cases of the 2017 Jakarta election and 2019 Presidential election (cf. Lindsay, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2019).

Islamism as Culture

Cultural approach to Islamism has typically anchored their explanations in a unitary understanding of religion and politics, whereby 'Western secularism' is constituted as a prescriptive referent for categorising the different forms of Islamism (Asad, 2007; Esposito & Vol, 1996; Ismail, 2006). At the one end, the clash of civilisation thesis perceives Islamism as no more than cultural resentment that is essentially anti-modernity and anti-democracy (Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 1990, 2002). Bernard Lewis, for example, argues that the deep resentment among Islamists is a product of prolonged historical encounters and conflict between Islamic civilisation and the West. In his belligerent analysis, this anti-Western outlook results from a feeling of humiliation and deprivation experienced by global Muslims who felt that their dominant civilisation had been overwhelmed and replaced by Western powers, 'whom they regarded as their inferiors'

(Lewis, 1990, 59). Other variants (Nasr, 2009; Tibi, 2009), however, place more emphasis on the struggles of 'moderate' Muslims to nurture a liberal democratic agenda and pluralism, which are primarily presented in an overly cultural essentialist fashion. Therefore, the debates on Islamism are preoccupied with the dichotomies of moderate and radical Islam. Such a distinction is understood mainly in cultural terms with little political explanation of their emergence and contestation.

It is noteworthy that the prominence of culture-oriented scholarships is also inseparable from trends in global governance logics of the post-Cold War agenda. Replacing the central position of ideology during Cold War global politics, democratisation studies treat culture and identity as either dominant category of explanation or target of disciplinary intervention. In the context of Indonesia, cultural approach to Islamism has extensively characterised democratic transition by introducing 'civil' and 'uncivil' categories. In such a construction, the latter is perceived as incompatible with and even essentially threatening democratic transition and consolidation (e.g. Beittinger-Lee, 2009; see also Hefner, 2000; Liddle & Mujani, 2013, 29–30). As a matter of fact, the culturalist approach has significantly contributed to the depoliticisation of Islamism by containing its diverse articulations into cultural talk and, consequently, depriving them of their political agency.

Cultural approach to Islamism, once popularised in the matrix of modernist-driven of the New Order era, regains currency after 9/11, where violent manifestations of Islamic terrorism are predominantly explained from cultural lenses (Asad, 2007; Mamdani, 2004). However, the approach puts less emphasis on the geopolitical dynamics or structural contexts which influence the changing Islamist articulations. Such 'cultural talk' of Islamism, as Mamdani rightly states, prescribes Islam to be 'quarantined and the devil exorcised from it' (2004, 24). By turning religion into a new political category, the juxtaposition of moderate and radical Islamism is now securitised under the binary categories of good and bad Muslims (Mamdani, 2002, 2004).

The dominance of cultural approach in Indonesian scholarship and policy making has also characterised debates on Indonesian foreign policy, especially around the promotion of 'Islamic moderation' as diplomacy branding in the GWOT era (e.g. Hoesterey, 2018). Here, the central issue resurfaces the question of what kind of Indonesian Islam is to be projected into the international community (e.g. Sukma, 2003). The insertion of Islamic moderation as Indonesian foreign policy agenda emerges as

balancing efforts in managing the US pressure for Indonesian support for the GWOT campaigns and the growing anti-US unilateral policies among Islamists at home. Islamic moderation is further projected as a new branding of Indonesian diplomacy to seek influence as response to protracted conflicts in Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. In fact, conceiving political instability in these regions through cultural terms inevitably downplays other explanations, such as the geopolitical dynamics and political economy of the conflicts.

Interestingly, the cultural approach to Islamism affects the politicisation of Islam for power contests in electoral practices, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. More specifically, the promotion of Islamic moderation in domestic politics and foreign policy branding effectively excludes 'radical' Islamists in politics while at the same time providing an avenue for garnering support from so-called moderate-pluralist Islamist groups. When this twofold process is integral to electoral mobilisation, the radical-moderate category propagated by the proponents of cultural approach has not only served as instruments to exclude the 'radical' Islamists by pushing them away from the political arena. But, more significantly, this process turns Islam into a central category in contemporary practises of Indonesian democracy, as it characterises electoral constituencies and polarises national elite formation.

Islam and Institutionalism

Institutionalist approach offers rather different interpretations of Islamism. It emphasises the significant role of institution or political regime in defining a variety of Islamic articulations. In Indonesia, the approach gains more traction in democratic transition studies, which generally associate the rise of Islamism to the transformation of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy (e.g. Abuza, 2007; Bubalo et al., 2008; Liddle & Mujani, 2013). The first version of this approach takes the state's capacity as the basis for explaining the phenomena of Islamism and its violent articulations. By reviving the neo-Weberian notion, Abuza (2007), for example, argues that Islamist violent articulations are treated as symptoms of the inadequate capacity of the state in managing political conflicts and its failure in asserting its legitimate monopoly over violence. This approach prescribes strengthening the state and the rule of law to prevent Islamist groups from occupying the political arena and public sphere. In turn, such a tendency has a strong

propensity to reconsolidate nationalist-conservative forces and introduces draconian measures. This disciplinary measure, as evident in earlier phase of democratisation, does not only targets radical Islamist groups but also extended to broader political oppositions and insurgent movements, such as the reintroduction of large-scale military campaigns against secessionist struggle in Aceh and Papua.

Another institutionalist model, the so-called inclusion-moderation thesis, seeks to capture moderation processes experienced by Islamists in democratisation. Its proponents claim that their participation in democracy will 'normalise' Islamism, thus leading to political moderation. Here, normalisation is defined as 'a process whereby Islamists become integrated members of political system, operating by the rules and norms of democracy, developing more transparent leadership and party structure and expanding the bases of their membership' (Bubalo et al., 2008, iii). This approach, for example, explains how Islamism is convincingly capable of transforming their core value and agenda as compliance to liberal democracy. The Islamists need to take internal reform, such as ideological revision, as a prerequisite for participating in electoral politics. This is, however, understandable partly due to the electoral constraints of the existing political system which prevent political parties from developing rigid ideological platforms (Ufen, 2011, 86–87). Consequently, the electoral system prevents national Islamic parties, whose social bases are primarily concentrated in certain regions, from scaling up to the national level (Buehler, 2009, 51–56; also 2012).

Moreover, some analysts revisit the inclusion-moderation thesis to explain the changing nature of Islamist agenda as undertaken by *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS, Justice and Prosperity Party) before the 2004 election (Bubalo et al., 2008; Buehler, 2012; Permata, 2008; Tomsa, 2012). Emerging out of a clandestine Islamist movement in the 1980s and bringing Islamist projects into post-authoritarian Indonesia, this party has officially put aside its Islamist agenda and subsequently declared itself as an open party. Instead of advancing Islamist agenda, PKS then incorporates mainstream issues such as good governance and anti-corruption. For the analysts, the main drivers for this transformation are the pressure to expand its electoral base and to erase the stigma that the party allegedly has a hidden agenda of Islamising the state.

The noticeable shortcoming of the institutional approach is its apparent lack of interest in unfolding the complex genealogy and context of different forms of Islamism. The analysis strictly limits its scope to those

Islamist articulations in compliance with electoral governance. As result, the analysis deliberately excludes Islamist articulations which adopt non-electoral routes and strategies . In fact, diverse articulations of Islamism and their strategies—through either political parties or Islamic movements—are constitutive to the dynamic of democracy and the practice of Islamism itself. This is vividly shown in the *Aksi Bela Islam* rallies, comprising Islamic parties and organisation of various ideological and sociological background. The *Aksi Bela Islam* has successfully stood as a solid electoral bloc within societies without being completely linked to Islamic political parties. By seeing the moderation of Islamism as a direct consequence of its participation in electoral democracy, the institutional approach fails to comprehend why Islam has become a central category for contending elites to mobilise electoral constituencies. The approach is not equally sufficient to explain why populist politics, which encouraging the politicisation of Islam and the mainstreaming of conservative Islam, comes to dominate current practices of Indonesian democracy.

New Departures: From Political-Economic Conditions to Hegemonic Struggles

The approach adopted in this book sheds a somewhat different light on Islamism, conceived as a political discourse, in the formation and transformation of Indonesian nation-state. It is not our intention to entirely undermine contemporary studies that have disclosed and delineated a variety of aspects integral to Islamism. Instead, our book stands as critical reading on various perspectives on Islamism, by arguing that the relationship between knowledge and reality is always productive, as two main interconnected components, in constructing a distinct discourse. Consequently, systematic knowledge of Islam or, more precisely, the epistemology of Islam, embeds in the ways global power and knowledge production are mutually reinforcing. One of the major tasks of hegemony analysis is to disclose supposedly neutral assumptions within scholarship and, simultaneously, to provide an alternative narrative of Islamism in Indonesia.

Taking Islamism as a form of hegemonic struggle, in contrast to the three approaches mentioned above, requires deeper examination of the role of power in the (re)production of discourse. Without adequate consideration on the constitutive nature of power for explaining the emergence and trajectories of Islamism, the dominant approaches tend to

essentialise and reify religion. As consequence, Islamism has strictly been reduced to ideology, culture and effect of institutional arrangements. For the hegemony analysis, thorough interrogation of the constitutive nature of power is central to unmask the ideological underpinnings and power constellations within which religion is politically conceived and directed in specific discursive settings.

Insufficient attention to the dimension of power will, directly or indirectly, depoliticise Islamism. In such globalised scholarship, Islamism is treated as an ideological object of disciplinary intervention to serve the functioning of the post-Cold War neoliberal order (Chomsky, 2004; Mamdani, 2004; Zizek, 2008). Conceived as a central prerequisite for democratisation, the culturalist approach often ends up with prescribing the domestication of Islamism, to be reoriented as mere cultural entities, instead of as a mode of political agency. One can also find the tendency of neglecting the productive nature of power in shaping the trajectories of Islamism and democracy within institutional approach, especially in the inclusion-moderation thesis. Its central premise takes democracy as a 'non-political' framework rather than a discursive terrain wherein social groups can articulate their respective agendas and collective interests. From this vantage point, the moderation of Islamism, or widely labelled the post-Islamism phenomenon, is seen as an inevitable consequence of their participation in electoral democracy instead of as contingent outcome of complex contestations within given historical circumstances.

Political Economy of Islamism

By and large, the theoretical gap left by the three approaches, which disqualifies the dimension of power in the dynamics of Islamism, has been filled by the contribution of political economy approach. This approach emphasises structural crisis within contradictions of capitalism that induces Muslims to actively participate in democratic politics. In his study of the Arab world, for example, Ayubi (1991, 165–166) suggests that Islamism is an expression of class interests. Circumscribed within authoritarianism and the neoliberalisation of the Middle East in the 1980s, Islamism resurfaced against the backdrop of the state's failure in providing welfare and political participation. Generally, political economy approach conceives Islamism as both product and mode of the agency undertaken by excluded Islamists. As a collective movement, they articulate their grievances and pursue their specific interests and agenda by

instrumentalising Islam before the state and the public (see Anderson, 1997; Ayoob, 2008).

In a quite different direction, advocating the oligarchy thesis, Hadiz (2017a, b) argues that the mobilisation of Islam in Indonesian politics is a product of the ability of the competing elites to instrumentalise the social agents of Islamism for their electoral interests. It also applies to the Islamists whose interests are being articulated in their alliance with the competing elites. In the tradition of political economy, unlike the liberal notion of Islamism, the ultimate issue is not about the dangers of the merging of Islam and politics. Rather, Islamism is just a form of politics whose social agents make use of Islam as their language of struggle and mobilisation. In a nutshell, contrary to the *Islamisation of politics* thesis put forward in ideological and culturalist approaches, Islamism is explained here from the *politicisation of Islam* standpoint.

While political economy approach has been abundantly employed in the context of the Middle East and North Africa, this is not the case regarding the study of Islamic politics in Indonesia. By infusing such scholarly traditions, Hadiz (2014, 2016; Robison 2014) thus suggests that Islamic politics in Indonesia and beyond can be seen as an expression of new forms of populism, responding to the contradictions resulting from capitalist development and the pressures of economic globalisation. Hadiz thus defines Islamic populism as the merging of interests, grievances and aspirations among a cross-section of social classes, especially from the urban poor, urban middle class and peripherialised groups of the bourgeoisie. Unlike older forms of populism, whose social bases are rooted in the traditional urban and petty bourgeoisie, the new populism emerges from more complex social bases and coalitions associated with neoliberal globalisation (Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz & Robison, 2012; see also Colas, 2004; Wilson, 2015). In this light, the trajectory of Islamic politics lies in 'the way the social landscape is reshaped by distinct phases of social and economic changes and how Islamic politics becomes grafted onto different conditions and agendas, whether to preserve or reshape the social order' (Hadiz & Robison, 2012, 138).

Indeed, political economy approach provides a valuable explanation of socio-political changes, especially those arising from structural crises and shifting social bases that create available options for coalitions and contestations. For the proponents of this approach, Islamism during the New Order (1966–1998), as explicated further in Chapter 4, is seen as the product of the destruction of communism in the 1960s. They argue

that the absence of the Left has made possible for Islam as a major ideological vehicle that can be instrumentalised for voicing dissent associated with capitalist development and the authoritarian regime (e.g. Hadiz, 2014; Hadiz & Robison, 2012). In fact, associating the rise of Islamism exclusively with the destruction of the Left is not a uniquely Indonesian phenomenon as this took place in other Third World countries, albeit to different degrees and with different manifestations.[3] While the political economy approach has provided a structural context for analysing the dynamics and trajectories of Islamism, its attention to the practices of the diverse forms of Islamism, including their emergence and struggle as distinct political projects, remains under-theorised. As delineated below, such a gap discloses a theoretical space to advocate a hegemony analysis of Islamism.

Islamism as Discourse

This study contends that Islamism is not an ideology but a political discourse. Here, Islamism refers to a variety of practices in which Muslims articulate diverse demands through the signifier of Islam, and how they develop distinctive political projects to challenge the existing social order. As argued in the preceding sections, Islamism has played a role in forming and transforming Indonesia's nation-state from colonial times to the present. From the standpoint of hegemony analysis, as elucidated in the Political Discourse Theory (PDT), all social orders are contingent on the outcomes of constant contestation of different political projects. The formation of social order, therefore, is neither complete nor unchanged. In short, the contingent and unstable nature of social order is the required conditions for the possibilities of hegemonic struggle and social transformation.

Conceiving Islamism as a discourse calls for further theorisation of the relation between Islam and politics. Inspired by Sayyid (1997), such relationship is not as direct and monolithic as ideological and cultural approaches propose, nor it is as instrumental as political economy approach firmly maintains. But, such relationship is constitutive, wherein 'both Islam and the identity of Islamism are transformed as Islamists

[3] For example, see Colas (2004) for the case of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; Toor (2011) for Pakistan; Zubaida (2011) for the Middle East.

attempt to articulate Islam to their political project' (Sayyid, 1997, 46).[4] Therefore, the articulation of Islam as a political category is not due to the ideological imperative to unify religion and politics (*ad-din wa daulah*). Instead, it is the function of how Islamists constitute Islam as a master signifier, a surface of inscription that enables social agents of Islamism to construct and organise claims, interests and identities by advancing distinct political projects (Sayyid, 1997). Here, the key is the ways by which different actors relate to what it signifies and how the contestations and coalitions are forged in such processes.

In this vein, Islamism, as Roy (1994) rightly argues, is also understood as a political project. But unlike Roy, the project is not treated here only as a revolutionary struggle to seize state power (see also Ismail 2006; Sayyid 2007). Indeed, as Gramsci (1971) suggests, there are different paths to advance political projects and bring about social transformation. For Gramsci, the capture of the state can be the outcome of hegemonic politics. This requires a long process of intellectual and moral reforms and political struggles to delegitimise the governing model of a particular social order and articulate a different vision of organising state and society. Hence, the separation between the categories of Islamism and post-Islamism is unnecessary, since the former is regarded as more political while the latter dissociates the religious sphere from politics.[5] While they may apply different strategies and orientations, both seek to articulate Islam with struggle for social transformation. Hence, Islamism

[4] Sayyid (1997, 41–49) develops this distinct concept of Islamism as part of his critiques against the tendencies of essentialism in both orientalism and anti-orientalism camps. The former denotes Islam as an attribute with a historical essence, while the latter considers that there is no such thing as Islam but only the contextual application of this term. Yet, Sayyid does not utilise this concept as an analytical category for country-based political dynamics. He is more interested in using it in a broader unit of analysis—Islamic politics and the global order as primarily characterised by the crisis of Eurocentrism (see also Sayyid, 2007). His concept that brings forth the constitutive nature of Islam and politics is helpful in the context where the studies of Islamism in Indonesia are mainly approached by the contrasting thesis of 'Islamisation of politics' and 'politicisation of Islam.'

[5] Regarding the Islamist political project, Roy (1994) argues that the Islamists have lost their revolutionary characters in seizing the state power [awkward]. They turned to be 'neo-fundamentalist,' defined as moral-driven activism that focuses on the Islamic moral issues rather than creating new political forms or Islamic regimes. For him, this new tendency only operates at the level of the social and personal, not the political sphere. Unlike Roy, Bayat (2005, 2013) develops the concept of post-Islamism, by using Iran as a historical reference, as a condition of 'resecularising' religion. He further states that:

and post-Islamism, as a matter of fact, are political (e.g. Ismail, 2006, Chapter 6; Sayyid, 1997, 2014).

Following the analytical model developed in the PDT tradition, Islamism is not an epiphenomenon or mere consequence of structural conditions. As Sayyid (1997, cf. Laclau 2000) contends, the objective presence of Islam cannot in itself account for Islamism. Instead, the central issue here is the *degree of politicisation*. With this in mind, what matters are the practices of organising demands and dissent among the diverse social groups and the struggles to reshape the dislocated social order. Therefore, one cannot determine the outcome of a structural crisis in advance. The main reason is that (re)constituting a new social order is always contingent on the hegemonic struggles of competing political forces—instead of being determined exclusively by a given structural condition. In other words, the hegemony approach complements the *logic of necessity* tendencies in the structuralist analysis with a *logic of contingency*.

By envisaging Islamism in terms of hegemonic struggles, in contrast to the proponents of the so-called post-hegemony turn in social movement theories (e.g. Day, 2005; Tormey, 2015), this study highlights the importance of engaging the state. Here, the state is not an amalgam of institutions and actors governing a particular territory and population, but a site, and at the same time a contingent outcome, of various political articulation in which certain practices and struggles are constituted and contested (Finlayson & Martin, 2006, 155, 161; Hay 1996; Laclau 1975). Engaging the state is central and indeed unavoidable as the political space for the operation of political struggle (cf. Mouffe, 2009). Such a process typically entails constructing and modifying interests, identities and relationships among the social agents of Islamism that shape the contestation and coalition in the course of their struggles.

Guided by this conceptual formulation, this book establishes Islamism in the context of nation-state formation and transformation. The issue at stake is how different forms of Islamism have defined and shaped the

> The advent of post-Islamism does not necessarily mean the historical end of Islamism. What it means is the birth, out of the Islamist experience, of a qualitatively different discourse and politics. In reality, we may witness for some time the simultaneous process of both Islamisation and post-Islamisation. (Bayat, 2005, 5)

power configuration across Indonesia's political history. Ultimately, as this book focuses on the praxis of various forms of Islamism and their hegemonic struggles, the central question is not whether or not they are hegemonic—i.e. capable of totalising and universalising its project in Indonesian politics. But, the task of the analysis is as follows. Firstly, to explain how social agents of Islamism develop and attempt to advance their projects to signify and define Indonesia, including their partial successes and failures over time. And, secondly, to show how the dynamics of their struggles have produced far-reaching consequences in shaping the practices of Islamism and characterising the current Indonesia.

Outline of the Book

This book is presented in seven chapters. Following this Introduction, the subsequent chapter addresses the main theoretical issues surrounding the concept of hegemony and links these debates to studies of Islamic politics. It outlines how this concept has been understood in contentious ways, particularly as an analytical framework for studying Islamism and Indonesian politics. More specifically, it unpacks the theoretical development of the concept of hegemony, following the Political Discourse Theory (PDT) traditions that are primarily associated with the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.

The discussion of Islamism in the formation and transformation of Indonesia's nation-state becomes the core of the three subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 examines the genealogies of competing projects in the making of Indonesia under anti-colonialism and nation-state building. It is worth noting that broader socio-political changes in late nineteenth-century colonial Indonesia had paved the way for the emergence and development of anti-colonial movements. These forces were organised mainly through three central political discourses, namely Islamism, communism and nationalism. While anti-colonialism became the hallmark of these three forces, their respective demands, aspirations and strategies were starkly different. As a result, the contestations between these forces affected the dynamics of decolonial movements and their different visions for defining postcolonial Indonesia.

For example, as early as the 1930s, debates between the so-called Islamic nationalist and secular nationalist camps had mainly dealt with the idea of a postcolonial political community. The issue at stake was whether Indonesia would be based on the identity of the *ummah* or *bangsa*

(nation). When Indonesia adopted Pancasila (the Five Principles) as its ideological foundation of the new nation-state after the Independence, Islam was only one among other elements constituting this new social order. These contestations continued in the early period of Independence within different political settings, from the Parliamentary Democracy (1949–1957) to the corporatist state model of the so-called Guided Democracy (1957–1965). Throughout this period, political experiments for maintaining the unity of Indonesia by simultaneously managing political differences often concluded in a political stalemate, if not a severe crisis. Competition to control state power, especially between social agents of Islamism, communism and nationalism, failed to be controlled through democratic mechanisms and, subsequently, Soekarno's corporatist model. This crisis peaked in the aborted coup in September 1965, in which communism was severely implicated.

Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship between Islamism and the New Order state (1965–1998). As a distinct discursive period, the New Order reflected a series of interconnected events, policies and resistances within which Islamism was embroiled. Therefore, Islamists were not merely outsiders or challengers but were integral to the discursive formation and development of the New Order. Established as an anti-thesis to Soekarno's Old Order, the hegemony of the New Order developmentalism was mainly achieved by constituting 'Pancasila democracy' as a master signifier. Here, Pancasila democracy served as a horizon for social groups to articulate welfare, political stability and social harmony—constructed effectively for discrediting Soekarno's Old Order. Pancasila democracy ultimately became the governing instrument and rationality for restructuring state-society relations around state-led development agendas. In fact, the transformation was mainly driven by the dominant strands of modernisation theory that linked economic growth to security and stability. Through these processes, Islamism was domesticated in the domain of culture, and its agencies and subjectivities were constructed to defend the appeal of the New Order modernisation projects.

When the New Order hegemony began to falter in the 1980s, partly due to the socio-economic crisis of the post-oil boom period, political resistance grew increasingly widespread. More specifically, the decline of the New Order with respect to Muslims took place when the government introduced the *asas tunggal* Pancasila (the sole foundation) policy, banning all political parties and organisations from using ideological platforms other than Pancasila. The *asas tunggal* policy polarised Islamism,

which had previously been relatively unified under the New Order developmentalism. As response to the policy, the Islamists articulated Islam differently and developed divergent, often conflicting, strategies towards the New Order state. Tantalisingly, the crisis of New Order developmentalism significantly transformed Islamism from operating as a defence of modernisation to a mode of identity politics. Here, the Islamist groups constructed Islam as a political basis for their efforts to improve their social position and to alter existing power relations in the last years of the New Order regime. Fostered by the 1998 Asian crisis and the regime repression, the coalition of oppositions grew across the country under the banner of *reformasi*. However, they focused exclusively on overthrowing President Soeharto rather than building a common political agenda as an alternative to the New Order.

The failure to build a hegemonic bloc to replace the *status quo*, especially among Islamists, in the post-Soeharto era is further addressed in Chapter 5. This chapter investigates the dynamics of Islamism and democratisation in post-New Order period. Following Soeharto's fall and with support from international donors, the democratisation discourse became ascendant and was constructed as the cornerstone for transforming Indonesia from authoritarianism to democracy. Indeed, political liberalisation, as integral to democratisation agenda, has provided Islamism with a more significant and even legitimate role in the political and public spheres. But, the windows of opportunity offered by democratisation do not necessarily facilitate the making of an adequate representation vehicle for the sociologically diverse *ummah*. Such a tendency has particularly been evident in the case of electoral politics and decentralisation.

Islamists' failure to build a hegemonic force in the democratisation era has brought about profound consequences. Firstly, the inability of Islamic parties to represent the complex demands of the Islamists in society has prompted the rapid emergence of other Islamist articulations, including those that utilise violent means. Therefore, the proliferation of Islamist groups, often conflicting with each other and claiming themselves to be the 'truest' form of Islam, does not mark the strength of Islamic politics. Rather, it is a symptom of its hegemonic failure. Secondly, due to their relatively weak social base, all Islamic parties tend to build consensus and compromise with other forces, including the New Order's old forces and networks. Such a consensus has effectively erased ideological differences between political projects attempting to define post-New Order

Indonesia. With regard to Islamism, the disappearance of this ideological frontier has constituted Islam as a 'floating signifier' that can be easily appropriated by different groups with different agendas and interests, as shown in the politics of sharia laws whose proponents are not necessarily linked to Islamic parties.

Chapter 6 highlights the workings of democracy in a situation where neither Islam nor other forces are hegemonic in navigating the trajectory of Indonesian democratisation. More specifically, it explores the fragmentation of Islamism in the post-New Order against the backdrop of the dominance of neoliberal democracy and the GWOT, which promote the depoliticisation of Islamism. As elsewhere in the world, depoliticising trends resulting from neoliberal democracy have created favourable terrain for populist articulations claiming to represent neglected and unheard social groups. In the context of Indonesia, 'the populist moment' has constituted Islam as a viable discourse to construct 'the people' based on *ummah* identities and appealing to those marginalised by the rapacious elites. Hence, the prevalence of Islamist discourse and mobilisation in the current era is not antithetical to democracy. But, it springs directly from the actual practices of two decades of democracy in Indonesia.

The analysis in this chapter shows that the centrality of Islam as political discourse in power contests is symptomatic of the crisis of democratic representation and the fragmentation of Islamism. Due to its fragmented nature, Islamist 'populist' politics cannot effectively transform itself into a cross-cutting alliance for representing the diverse demands and dissent of the *ummah*. Using the case of the 2017 Jakarta elections and its subsequent political events, this chapter reveals that the construction of *ummah* subjects is still narrowly directed towards the purposes of electoral politics (hence, the term '*electoral ummah*') and towards maintaining patronage networks. Consequently, the fragmented Islamist populist movement can be easily captured by contending elites. They fail to develop a counter-hegemonic force significantly capable of challenging the oppressive power structures, perceived and experienced by the deprived *ummah*. Lastly, the concluding chapter summarises the key arguments and findings. It also identifies theoretical and political implications of the hegemony approach for debates on Islamism in Indonesia and, more broadly, on the relationship between Islam and politics for comparative studies.

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CHAPTER 2

Islamism and the Politics of Hegemony

The central premise of this book is that theoretical debates on hegemony allow for an understanding of Islamism and its trajectories in Indonesia. Focusing on how Islamism has shaped Indonesia's nation-state formation and transformation, the hegemony analysis of Islamism goes beyond the liberal notion that prescribes the separation of religion from politics. Yet, of course, hegemony has been theorised in different and contentious ways. This chapter examines the main approaches to hegemony by linking them to the discussion on Islamic politics, but the main emphasis is on those developed around Political Discourse Theory (PDT). Following the insights from political theorists such as Laclau, Mouffe and others (Butler et al., 2000; Critchley & Marchart, 2004; Howarth, 2014; Laclau, 1990; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Sayyid, 1997; Smith, 1998), hegemony here refers to two spheres, which are inexorably intertwined. Firstly, hegemony is an analytical category applied to comprehend social transformation that emphasises the significance of *the political*. Its main claim is that social transformation is the historical outcome of power struggles among competing forces with multiple political projects. Secondly, hegemony refers to the practice of constructing alliances by linking together different sets of demands of social agents to wage a political project for the purpose of reshaping a given social order. Hence, the politics of hegemony is something to be constructed.

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By conceiving of Islamism as a form of hegemonic struggle, this chapter argues that the nature and trajectories of Islamism are less rooted in, and thus driven by, different interpretations of religious doctrines, cultural norms or the imperatives of institutions. By contrast, Islamism and its quest for hegemony in Indonesia are contingent on the outcomes of socio-political changes and contestations, which involve multiple forces, both among and beyond Islamists, in given historical conjunctures. Within this distinct framework, the areas of investigation are twofold. The first area of investigation concerns the extent to which socio-political conditions have historically forged distinct strategies of Islamism and the configuration of contestations and coalitions. The second area explores the ways Islamists' hegemonic struggles have altered, and have been shaped by, specific relations of power that, in turn, characterise Indonesian politics and the practices of Islamism.

The debates addressed in this chapter focus on the logic of hegemony for understanding social transformation and how the politics of hegemony operates. In PDT, hegemony is not treated as a mere analytical category, but it becomes the ontology of the social, that is, the very logic of social formation and its transformation (Laclau, 2000, 44; 1990). Therefore, this framework locates the comprehension of Islamism within the broader socio-political history, particularly on how it has shaped the formation and transformation of Indonesia's nation-state. Crucially, conceiving of Islamism in this way is imperative for linking Islamists' hegemonic struggles within certain discourses that greatly influence the changing nature of governing and of organising state-society relations. Such a theoretical position, of course, differs from the so-called post-hegemony theories. The proponents of the latter claim that current social changes are no longer achieved through the taking or influencing of state power and, thus, propose a politics of withdrawal from state institutions (e.g. Day, 2005; Tormey, 2015).

The theoretical framework employed in this book emphasises the discursive dimension of hegemonic struggles that make it significantly different from those that emphasise political strategy or organisation, as abundantly found in the studies of Islamic politics from the perspectives of social movement theory. By appropriating the notions of 'the relative structurality' of discourses, that the articulations of certain discourses are always relatively embedded in the existing structure of power relations, this framework helps to link discursive formations of hegemonic struggles to specific socio-political circumstances (Barros, 2005). As will be

examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, different articulations of Islam in certain historical periods are greatly conditioned by how Islamist political discourses and the social position of the Islamists are differently structured in a particular social order (cf. Sayyid, 1997, 42–43). Thus, the different forms of Islamism, including their distinct projects, vehicles and strategies, are not coming out of nowhere, but are constituted within the power structure in a given historical context.

The Ontology of the Social: Hegemony and Social Transformation

Theoretical debates about power, representation and social change have given the concept of hegemony currency in political studies (Howarth et al., 2000; Martin, 2002; Mouffe, 1979). At the outset, however, it is worth noting that the use of this concept here is different from its common use in International Relations (IR). Within IR, hegemony refers to the notion of a single superpower and the maintenance of post-Cold War global politics (see, for example, Clark, 2011; Chomsky, 2004). Instead, here hegemony is specifically employed to comprehend conditions for social change and the roles of social agents in that transformation. Its underlying logic is that conflict is the very heart of politics in the formation and transformation of social order (Marchart, 2007; Mouffe, 2005). Historically, the concept of hegemony emerges as a critique of some 'forms of deterministic and mechanistic Marxism in which change is seen as unproblematically brought about by the laws of history working independently of political movements and human will' (Bocock, 1986, 11).[1] By introducing the notions of hegemony, the PDT

[1] Laclau's theoretical project of hegemony is to primarily develop Marxism by criticising its tendencies of economic essentialism. By developing Gramsci's theory, he moves further from the economic logic of hegemony to give primacy on its political logic and contingent nature. Laclau claims that the 'laten notion' of hegemony that prioritises the political logic of explanation can even be found in Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights*: For the revolution of a nation and the emancipation of a particular class of civil society to coincide, for one estate to be acknowledged as the state of the whole society, all the defects of society must conversely be concentrated in another class, a particular estate must be looked upon as the notorious crime of the whole society, so that liberation from that sphere appears as general self-liberation. For one estate to be *par excellence* the state of liberation, another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of oppression (Marx & Engels, 1975, 184-185).

proponents attempt to supplement the *economic logic of necessity* with a *political logic of contingency* in explaining social change (Bobbio, 1979; Laclau, 2000; Mouffe, 1979; Thomas, 2009).

More specifically, PDT develops hegemony primarily as the ontology of the social, that is, the logic based on the idea that political relations are embedded in the formation of the social order and its transformation (Laclau, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). The central premise is that such processes are always political acts and, as such, involve the exercise of power. Like Foucault (1980; 1972), Laclau and Mouffe do not comprehend power narrowly as something to which people possess and exercise over others. Rather, they emphasise the constitutive function of power in producing social order and change (Finlayson & Valentine, 2002; cf. Newman, 2004). By conceiving the dynamics of social order as historical outcomes of struggles, politics is ultimately about how the social order is constantly constituted by excluding other possibilities of organising society. Consequently, politics 'is not just a surface that reflects a deeper social reality; rather, it is the social organisation that is the outcome of continuous political processes' (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, 36).

In PDT analysis, hegemony and deconstruction are conceived as inseparable, as 'two sides of a single operation,' to explain social formation and its transformation (Laclau, 1993, 281). Borrowing Derrida's notions of deconstruction (1976), Laclau and Mouffe suggest that the boundaries between *the social* and *the political,* or between what seems natural and what is politically contested in a particular social order, become indistinguishable and unfixed (2001, 122–127; Laclau, 1993, 545–546; 1990; Sayyid & Zac, 1998). Within this system of thinking, hegemony naturalises particular articulations in the constitution of *the social*, while deconstruction shows its undecidability and contingent nature (Laclau, 1990, 89–91; Torfing, 1999, 103). As such, the existing social order is contingent, as it results from institutionalised hegemonic struggles and, thus, is always susceptible to be challenged by others, the counter-hegemonic forces. It is precisely within such contingent circumstances that political struggles to challenge and reshape the given structure of power relations are made possible in the first place. In PDT, hegemony is not about forging an alliance among existing social agents with their respective interests and identities,, but it rather involves the production of new collective subjects. Hence, the politics of hegemony is not amalgamative but constitutive (Sayyid, 1997, 93).

Contentious Issues

Hegemony is considered as a contentious concept and has been frequently a target of critique. Joseph (2002), for instance, points out that this concept is 'one-sided' in that it is seen as a 'product of social agents' that is separated from a structural basis. He argues that '[i]f the concept of hegemony is restricted to this agential approach, then a mistaken view of history and politics emerges that sees important social processes as simply the products of significant social actors or groups' (2002, 1). This argument, however, is rather misplaced, as alliance building in the politics of hegemony is undoubtedly not an aggregation of fully autonomous individual actors or groups. Instead, it is a political project that emerges from, and develops within, specific historical conditions whose ultimate purpose is to transform the structure of power relations in a given social order. By emphasising contingent and constitutive features, the PDT's conceptualisation of hegemony has, in fact, allowed the exploration of the formation and transformation of social order by dissolving the static opposition between agency and structure (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Sayyid & Zac, 1998).

Furthermore, the concept of hegemony, mainly its association with the politics of representation, has also been challenged by a new theoretical tradition in social movement and cultural studies, one that is interested in so-called post-hegemony (Day, 2005; Lash, 2007; Thoburn, 2007; Beasley-Murray, 2010; Tormey, 2015). Its proponents generally claim that current developments in global capitalism have made the sovereignty of state power irrelevant and social resistance more autonomous and self-organised. For them, post-hegemony represents a radical break from the 'politics-as-usual,' whereby the representation and representative politics model are now replaced by a 'horizontal' style of politics (Arditti, 2007, 205–226; Tormey, 2015, 9, 35). A farewell bid to theories of hegemony, for example, is strongly echoed in Richard Day's *Gramsci is Dead* (2005). Day argues that contemporary capitalist globalisation has resulted in diverse forms of resistance, labelled as the newest social movements. By this term, he refers to such movements as that of the *asembleistas* in Argentina, the Landless People's Movement (LPM) in South Africa and Zapatista villagers in Chiapas, Mexico. Instead of applying *counter-hegemonic* strategies, he claims, these movements operate *non-hegemonically*. For Day, the newest forms of movements 'seek radical change, but not through taking or influencing state power, and in so

doing they challenge the logic of hegemony at its very core' (Day, 2005, 8).

Mirroring Hardt and Negri's concept of the *multitude* (2004; 2017), Day's objection to the logic of hegemony is that political blocs and social changes should still be achieved 'through the processes of representation' (Day, 2005: 75; see also Tormey, 2015). According to Hardt and Negri (2017), the political movements of today are no longer dominated by the notion of *the people* that requires a unity of collective will to influence state power. In Day's own argument, such movements refer to 'those who are striving to recover, establish or enhance their ability to determine the conditions of *their own* existence, while allowing and encouraging others to do the same' (2005, 13, emphasis in the original). Such a trend is prominent in a time of *Empire*, which is defined as conditions where national-based state sovereignty experiences transformation, as the world is increasingly organised through a single logic of integration (Hardt & Negri, 2000). Following this transformation, they argue, movements can no longer be conceived in terms of an authority that is representative of the people, but rather the new context calls for novel forms of non-representative politics.

Crucially, Laclau and Mouffe (2001) share similar assessments with the proponents of new social movements. They all agree that the current development of global capitalism has resulted in more local but widespread resistance. Their struggles are not necessarily on the plane of class-based politics but involve a plurality of demands and aspirations. Yet, there are stark divergences between them. In contrast to Hardt and Negri and others, Laclau and Mouffe's conceptualisation of hegemony primarily lies in recognising and establishing a link between the various demands that form the basis for subsequent transformations into alliances that challenge the existing social order (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 127–136; Stavrakakis, 2014). From this vantage point, the politics of hegemony does not necessarily eliminate the heterogeneity of demands among social groups. Rather, these differences are transformed into a joint political project through which their new collective identities and interests are reconstituted.

Another point of debate pertains to the importance of engaging the state. By emphasising the capacity of spontaneous and self-organising politics, the purveyors of post-hegemony launch a politics of withdrawal from state institutions (cf. Mouffe, 2009, 230; Tormey, 2015). For PDT, without engaging and challenging the existing order, or if we choose to

escape the state entirely, we only leave the door open for other forces to take over. Here, the movements around the Arab Spring represent a paradigmatic example. Scholars and media pundits widely celebrated these movements as the newest form of revolutionary movement. For example, Hardt and Negri (2011) argue that the multitude of uprisings expresses 'democracy's new pioneers' in the Arab world. Notwithstanding their success in removing some of the dictators, the lack of a hegemonic political agenda has prevented the Arab Spring from bringing about substantive changes (see, for example, Bayat, 2017). Referring to the case of Egypt in post-Mubarak politics, the 'self-limiting revolutions' of Arab Spring, as Bayat cogently argues, have taken place where:

> [R]evolutionaries remained outside the structures of power because they were not planning to take over the state; when, in the later stages, they realised that they needed to, they lacked the resources—unified organisation, powerful leadership, strategic vision, and some degree of hard power—that would be necessary to wrest control both from the old regimes and from free riders who had been reluctant to join the uprisings when they began but were organisationally ready to take power (2017, 169).

The concept of hegemony has also gained more traction following the trends in contemporary democracy studies that consider the constitutive nature of representation for the practices of democracy (e.g. Brown, 2015; Isin, 2015; Mouffe, 1992; 2005; Saward, 2010). The current global crisis of representative democracy indicated by, for example, a common distrust towards democratic institutions does not necessarily mean the death of the politics of representation altogether (e.g. Tormey, 2015). Writing in the context of Western Europe, Mouffe (2005) argues that such a crisis is primarily associated with the outcome of the 'consensus of the centre.' This term refers to the increasing convergences between the Left and Right parties under neoliberal hegemony that resulted in the disappearance of any alternative projects to neoliberal globalisation.

The absence of alternative political projects has created a favourable terrain for the rise of populist politics, which is now increasingly common in developed and developing countries (e.g. Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Hadiz, 2016; Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009). Yet, the forms and agendas of populism are certainly varied, depending on the ways that hegemonic

struggles for reshaping the social order took place. Populism is often marked by anti-democratic practices and has a right-wing character, as exemplified by the dramatic rise of Trump in the United States and the Brexit phenomena in the United Kingdom. This trend is mainly evident when hegemonic struggles, the acts to bring together a series of heterogeneous demands and to construct the people's unity, use xenophobic rhetoric and exclusionary strategies. In contrast, the experiences of populist movements like *SYRIZA* in Greece (e.g. Katsourides, 2016) and *Podemos* in Spain (e.g. Errejon & Mouffe, 2016; Iglesias, 2015) clearly show different pathways for breaking the consensual politics of 'the establishment,' notwithstanding their limited success. For political theorists like Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is politically strategic as an effort to reclaim democratic spaces, which are now often occupied by right-wing populism (cf. Mouffe, 2018). Therefore, rather than celebrating the end of representation and hegemonic politics, they assert that this concept is becoming more critical and strategic in the era of populist politics than ever before.

Politics of Hegemony and the Studies of Islamism

Hegemony has also been understood differently in the ways its logic operates. As Anderson (1976, 14) demonstrates, the initial use of this concept, which appeared in the writings of Plekhanov and Axelrod in the late 1880s, specifically meant a political strategy. Hegemony here refers to the Russian working classes' collective strategy to build political alliances with other groups in their struggle against Tsarism. In the same vein, Lenin also conceived hegemony essentially as a political strategy involving a temporary coalition of social forces under the leadership of the working class through the vanguard party. Such an alliance is strategic as the ultimate objective is to take over state institutions and replace them with a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (Anderson, 1976, 16–17). Within these initial usages, hegemony is formulated primarily as a political strategy and alliance whose purpose is to take over state power.

The conceptualisation of hegemony that places an emphasis on a political strategy of building alliances and organisational capacity is generally adopted in studies of Islamism that employ social movement perspectives, especially the so-called resource mobilisation theory. Even though Lenin is infrequently cited as their main inspiration, the proponents of this theory (e.g. Tilly, 1978; Cohen, 1985; see also della Porta &

Diani, 2006; Buechler, 2000) conceive organisations as the ultimate means for mobilising collective actions.[2] They typically argue that '[w]hile grievances are ubiquitous, movements are not. As a result, there must be intermediary variables that translate individualised discontent into organised contention' (Wictorowicz, 2004, 10). Institutions such as mosques (Ismail, 2006a, for the case of Tunisia and Algeria), university campuses and professional associations (Wickham, 2002, in the case of Egypt's Muslim Brothers), and charity organisations (Clark, 2004) are often depicted as effective venues for Islamist recruitment and mobilisation.

In the case of Egypt, Islamist mobilisation and politicisation of such institutions in the 1970s and 1980s took place in the context of authoritarian politics and the state's failure in providing basic welfare (Wickham, 2002, 6; Anderson, 1997; Ayubi, 1991). This situation was complicated by a profound demographic change that brought about the emergence of the *lumpen intelligentsia*, which became the main component for Islamist mobilisation (Wickham, 2002, Chapter 3; Roy, 1994; Ibrahim, 2002). This term refers to a considerable number of educated youths in Egypt during the 1970s-1980s, due to Nasser's policy to widen access to higher education, but who could not be absorbed into job markets and are thus socially and economically marginalised. In Indonesia, during the height of authoritarianism in the 1980s, the suppression against student movements and organisations forced university students to use mosques and *halaqah* (discussion circles) as central venues for Islamist recruitment (Damanik, 2002; Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Machmudi, 2008). In this era, the student-based Islamic propagation forum called the *Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (FS-LDK, forum for Coordination of Campus Predication), the embryo of the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and other contemporary Islamist movements, was established. Writing on such Islamic social institutions as clinics and charity organisations in Egypt,

[2] Indeed, there are some variants within the organisation and resource-based social movement theories. For example, McCharty & Zald, (see Buechler, 2000, 35–36) highlight the importance of organisations of movement in an economic tone and, consequently, perceive social movement organisations operating like firms competing for resources and participants. Charles Tilly (1978; see also Buechler, 2000, 36–37), by contrast, focuses on the dimension of power struggle. He mentioned four elements as prerequisites for collective action to take place: the group interests (the gains and losses the groups receive from their engagement with the movement); the intersection of networks and organisation; resource mobilisation under the group control; and the opportunities to wage a struggle.

Jordan and Yemen, Clark also argues that these institutions 'represent an alternative organisation of state and society—a potentially revolutionary one—based on Islam' (2004, 6).

Such organisation-oriented approaches emerge as a response against the studies of Islamism, which perceives Islamic politics as a result of a structural breakdown, whether in politics, economics or culture. These theories conceive Islamism as a product of grievances and a state of deprivation that manifested in Islamists' response to the crisis (Ayoob, 2008). As Bayat (1998, 137) and Wickham (2002, 4–7) mentioned, the dominant studies on Islamic social movements depart from two structural factors, the cultural economy and political economy. The former comprehends Islamist activism as a cultural response against continuing domination of the West in Muslim societies spanning from the colonial period until the present day. The latter sees Islamic activism as an Islamist response against postcolonial secular governments which fail to provide welfare and social equity for their citizens. In contrast, organisation-based social movement theories account for Islamic activism as being more driven by the organised mobilisation of resources than merely a manifestation of grievances and disappointments.

Indeed, a meso-level analysis of the politics of hegemony is helpful in order to comprehend the mobilising patterns of Islamism. However, focusing on organisations or institutions as a primary explanation is problematic. Firstly, Islamism's organisational forms and changing strategies are not isolated from the broader socio-political circumstances. As Hadiz rightly argues, the vehicles of Islamism are 'largely contingent on how social alliances come to be built to represent the interests of an increasingly diverse *ummah*—the community of believers—in modern and profane competition over power and resources' (2014, 42; see also Hadiz & Robison, 2012, 140–141). Secondly, the organisational approach provides insufficient explanations for maintaining the coherence of diverse, even conflicting, interests and identities among the movement's participants. Following the logic of hegemony approach adopted in this study, the alliances and coalitions are not the sums of individualised cost–benefit calculations, and there are no pre-constituted interests. Instead, the coherence of social coalitions is continuously constructed through contestations and the making of collective identities in the course of their political struggles (cf. Ismail, 2004; Bayat, 2005).

Gramsci's Breakthrough

At this stage, Gramsci's conceptualisation of hegemony is instructive. Unlike Lenin, Gramsci's later works do not exclusively conceive of hegemony as a temporary alliance between distinct class forces through the vanguard party for revolutionary purposes (Gramsci, 1971; Mouffe, 1979). Rather, it serves as a concept to understand how certain power relations are maintained and transformed. His primary focus is not the organisation of a class alliance but the dimension of moral, intellectual and political leadership to bring about social transformation. By this, he argues that 'the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'dominant' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership' (1971, 161). By introducing the category of intellectual and moral leadership, the practice of hegemony, as Barrett notes, can be seen as '*the organisation of consent*—the processes through which subordinated forms of consciousness are constructed without recourse to violence or coercion' (1991, 54).

Gramsci subsequently introduces two forms of hegemonic politics: transformative and expansive hegemony (1971, 55–59, 106–114, 129–133). The former involves 'the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile' (Gramsci, 1971, 58–59). This process entails a passive revolution as class alliances are integrated and incorporated into a system of power to prevent them from being oppositional. A clear example of this tendency is, as it will be discussed in Chapter 4, the accommodation of the New Order authoritarian regime towards the Muslim middle class in the 1990s when President Soeharto faced declining support from his traditional allies in the military (Hefner, 1993; Porter, 2002). Through various state-corporatist schemes, the principal objective of accommodating these Islamist groups is 'to recruit strategic members of the rising middle classes into the regime and convince them that the existing corporatist structures served their career ambitions and interests' (Porter, 2002, 27).

By contrast, expansive hegemony includes the production of a more solid consensus resulting from the merging of diverse interests of the popular classes by the hegemonic class that would ultimately establish a more genuine 'popular will' (Gramsci, 1971, 59; Mouffe, 1979, 182–183). Unlike the *war of manoeuvre* strategies that primarily involve

taking over state power, expansive hegemony relates more to the method of a *war of position*. To illustrate this distinction, Bayat's comparative analysis of Islamism in Egypt and Iran in the 1980s is useful (Bayat, 1998). In contrast to Iran's experience, where Islamists ultimately took over state power through a revolution, Egypt's Islamists under Mubarak's rule successfully influenced change on the societal level but failed to challenge the regime decisively. He subsequently dubs the former as 'revolution without movement' and 'movement without revolution' for the latter.

Following Gramsci's logic of hegemony, political transformation is not just about capturing the state power but, more importantly, about winning society by institutional, intellectual and moral hegemony (Mouffe, 1979, 178–185; Femia, 1981, 23–60). By advancing such dimensions, the Gramscian approach to Islamism (e.g. Bayat, 1998; 2005; Butko, 2004; see also Ismail, 2006a) has generally transcended the limitations found in Roy's 'failure of political Islam' thesis, which emphasises on taking over the state as the ultimate target of Islamism (1994). As a hegemonic project, as Butko mentioned, Islamist movements 'desire not only the seizure of political power but also to establish a genuine revolutionary movement through the creation of a new society' (2004, 42). Nevertheless, there are no linear and teleological stages in which hegemony over society is the backdoor to state power and *vice-versa*. It largely depends on the degrees of politicisation, how a particular force constructs a common political agenda and represents the vast array of diverse social demands. The failure of such politicisation, even when a particular force has occupied the position of power, like in the case of President Morsi of the Muslim Brothers in the post-Mubarak era, is doomed to be quickly challenged by other counter-hegemonic movements (Bayat, 2013).

In contrast to Orthodox Marxist traditions, Gramsci develops the concept of hegemony to explain the processes in the superstructure for the production of people's consciousness (Bobbio, 1979, 21–47; Mouffe, 1979, Martin, 2002; Thomas, 2009). By so doing, meaning-making serves as a critical element to neutralise existing power relations so that these relations are ultimately accepted as common sense and thus become unquestioned. Through meaning production, people can be mobilised in the name of 'collective will,' regardless of their actual differences in terms of, for example, class or ethnic identity, by building a particular historical bloc to wage a struggle for changing given power structure.

Therefore, hegemony should be 'no longer defined as an alliance of pre-constituted identities, but rather as a process of production of a new collective identity' (Torfing, 1999, 108).

For Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Gramsci's incorporation of the notions of intellectual and moral leadership and the historical bloc is genuinely a watershed moment. In so doing, Gramsci attempts to dissolve the strict distinctions between base and superstructure in Marxian traditions, where the former determines the latter, to explain social change (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 67; Bobbio, 1979). According to Laclau and Mouffe, this theoretical leap has opened up broader fields of political-ideological struggles and paved the way for developing the logic of contingency in conceptualising hegemony (Mouffe, 1979, 10; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 65–71).

Yet, the tendency for essentialism is still found in the Gramscian model of hegemony (see Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 69; Barret, 1991, 51–80; Mouffe, 1979, 183–185). For example, Gramsci stated that 'though hegemony is ethical–political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity' (1971, 161). Thus, Gramscian hegemony is still necessarily grounded on a fundamental class, understood as an *objective* group to which people belong, and that the working class has a privileged status to bring about social change. In this view, class hegemony is not seen entirely as a result of political struggle but has its own ontological status, that the economy essentially determines hegemonic politics in the last instance. Consequently, social formation and transformation are thus structured around a single hegemonic centre, the working-class position (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 136–138).

Against this backdrop, the PDT proponents conceptualise hegemony by, first of all, recognising the plurality of the social demands and advancing them in such ways to promote a political struggle (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 97–105; Sayyid & Zac, 1998; Howarth, 2000; Torfing, 1999; Smith, 1998). This theoretical project calls for a particular social ontology that emphasises the importance of *the political*. In doing so, they conceive social formation and transformation as socially and politically constructed through contingency logic. Politics of hegemony can only operate in the context where the social order is always becoming, opened and incomplete (cf. Connolly, 2011). In this viewpoint, the politics of hegemony can be seen as a form of articulation that brings together

different identities and interests into a common project and creates an alternative to the given social order.

Up to this point, there is an apparent convergence between Gramsci and the PDT proponents in conceiving hegemony as a general category for explaining social change. Nevertheless, the way they conceptualise social subjects differs significantly. This divergence primarily starts from their different treatment of politics. For Gramsci, politics is understood as a vehicle of the working class for societal and political transformation, whereas Laclau and Mouffe conceive politics as the reproduction of the social (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Laclau, 1996, 43). From this vantage point, all social groups are considered particularities within a society structured around specific interests and aspirations. Without necessarily privileging the working class as the ultimate subjects for social change, all particularities, such as those organised around such signifiers as gender, environment, ethnicity and religion, are qualified to wage hegemonic struggles. Their struggles ultimately depend on the politicisation among certain social groups so that they can 'take up representation of the universality of the community conceived as a whole' (Laclau, 2001, 5–6).

Dislocation, Islamism, Hegemony: Towards a New Framework

Yet, several conceptual issues need to be further elaborated in order to study Islamism from the lens of hegemony. These are, respectively, the questions of subjects of Islamism, the conditions of their emergence and their distinct forms of Islamist project. In PDT and poststructuralism in general, the concepts of a subject have been among their central theoretical elements (Foucault, 1982; Laclau, 1990; 1996; Butler, 1997; Finlayson & Valentine, 2002). Like structuralism, PDT perceives that there is no given social actor or subject with embedded 'human essence,' as unified individuals who possess capacities of reason, consciousness and action. But, their agencies are always constructed and situated in specific conditions (cf. Sayyid & Zac, 1998, 249–267; Howarth, 2000). Unlike the structuralists, however, these subjects are also not seen as, to borrow a Marxian term, 'the bearers of objective structure.'

Instead, PDT comprehends subjects as subject positions within particular discursive structures (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 115).[3] Since there are always contending discourses in the (trans)formation of social order, individuals or groups inevitably occupy different and sometimes confronting positions and agencies in that process (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 125; Laclau, 1990, 112). From this vantage point, the subjects of Islamism are not primarily identified by predetermined identities and interests but are constituted discursively in specific historical settings. Muslims may occupy different subject positions and agencies depending on the configuration of discourses. Therefore, the analytical focus of this study is about the way particular discourses constitute the distinct forms of subject positions of the Islamists and how contestations and coalitions are forged through their political struggles.

More specifically, PDT conceives the contingent character of a social formation, or the distinction between 'the social' and 'the political,' in the Husserlian senses of 'sedimentation' and 'reactivation' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Laclau, 1990, 146; Marchart, 2007, 138–142; Sayyid & Zac, 1998). In such a formulation, *the social* refers to the terrain of sedimented discursive practices, while *the political* is the moment of the institution of the social and the reactivation of the contingent nature of every social formation (Laclau, 1996, 43, 61). Accordingly, the sedimentation here refers to the conditions in which certain practices or discourses have become seemingly natural and unquestioned, whereas reactivation is the process of questioning such sedimented practices. Hegemony in PDT tradition is thus predicated on the ultimate impossibility of the closure of social formation. By this, the social is never so sedimented that the moment of reactivation becomes impossible, nor can it achieve a moment of original institution by constituting itself totally from the beginning.

Social transformation, or a moment of reactivation, is associated with a structural dislocation. This occurs when the plurality of demands and

[3] In a rather different treatment, Butler (1997, 10) argues that subjects always occupy a site of ambivalence, by which they are an agency but simultaneously become a terrain of subordination and discipline. Therefore, as Finlayson and Valentine (2002, 15) argue, '[s]ubject are not so much things either determined or determining, but more effects of forces that are always open-ended.' Laclau (1990; 1996; 1994) had further developed the conceptualisation of subjects. By appropriating Lacanian psychoanalysis, he conceived subjects as the place of lack, meaning that it is beyond positive 'being' nor a complete position in a discursive structure. Rather, subjects are always in the process of becoming and never complete, as continuous attempt to fill the void or to overcome its lack.

aspirations cannot be absorbed or accommodated in the existing power structure. Dislocation triggers social agents to establish different forms of identification and articulate their diverse demands for the new struggle to reconfigure the dislocated order. As Hay (1996) argues in the concept of 'crisis narrative,' such a dislocation is not necessarily defined through objective factors but, more importantly, as the perception of the needs of particular groups for rapid recovery and how the struggle for a new power configuration will improve their position. Therefore, the imposition of such demands and struggles is always a political act (Laclau, 1990, 27–31; see Sayyid, 1997, 23–26; Howarth, 2000, 109–111; Dyrberg, 2004, 241–255). In this sense, Laclau argues that:

> We thus have a set of new possibilities for historical action which are the direct result of structural dislocation. The world is less given and must be increasingly constructed. But this is not just a construction of the world, but of social agents who transform themselves and forge new identities as a result (1990, 40).

It is important to note that dislocation is always historical and influenced by the concrete material basis that inhibits the formation and transformation of social order. (Panizza, 2005, 11–13; Barros, 2005). The dislocation sources may include economic and political crises that open up the possibility for social change. As it has happened in many historical experiences, economic and political crises are frequently followed by the emergence of collective demands for shaping the existing order. For example, the crisis of the Welfare state in Europe in the late 1970s paved the way for the Thatcherite hegemony, which held together various movements and aspirations that articulated such notions as a free market, competitive individualism and a strong but minimal state (Hall, 1983, 19–39). In Indonesia, Soeharto's New Order also emerged from a complex economic and political crisis in the 1960s. By articulating the discourses of political stability and economic growth as a new governing paradigm, the new regime reorganised the state and society relations under the logic of technocratic developmentalism (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003; see also Moertopo, 1972).

Rapid social transformations prompted by modernisation, urbanisation, uneven development and neoliberal globalisation may also foster dislocation. Some scholars (Bayat, 2005; Ismail, 2006a, b; Hadiz, 2016),

for example, have observed the link between dislocatory effects of urbanisation and Islamist mobilisation. Studying Islamism in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, Ismail (2006a, b) stated that massive urbanisation and neoliberal economic policies since the 1980s have generated informal housing communities among the urban poor. They developed a distinct solidarity mechanism that effectively disengaged from the state. In Algeria, this condition reinvokes the idea of the *Oulad al-Houma* (children of a quarter), a form of collective identity and solidarity built around family and neighbourhood networks, where mosques and other informal activities subsequently become the main spaces of Islamist movement (Ismail, 2006a, b, 123).

In the case of Indonesia, Hadiz and Robison (2012, 138–139; Robison, 2014, 28–34; see also Hadiz, 2016) demonstrate how social and economic changes have transformed a particular social landscape that ultimately influences the evolution of Islamic politics. They identify three main forms of Islamism. The first form initially emerges during the colonial and early postcolonial period as a response to defending small properties. Their social bases are traditionally rooted in the resentment of rural landowners and the petty bourgeoisie. In the following stage, the rise of Islamic politics is situated in the Cold War authoritarian regime and economic globalisation that have resulted in the continued marginalisation of some elements of the middle classes and urban poor. They argue that the absence of the Left in the country, following the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the mid-1960s, made Islam the most viable ideology to voice dissent against the authoritarian regime. The latest form of Islamism is situated within the market economy. It is more rooted in urban educated middle-class professionals whose primary aspiration is to build Islamic ideals by embracing democracy, good governance and economic liberalisation.

Another historical condition for structural dislocation is the exhaustion of existing ideologies or the moment when political vehicles are no longer representative of certain social groups. This resembles Gramsci's notion of the crisis of authority, which he defined as a situation when 'the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e., where it is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant'…; this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and that they no longer believe what they used to believe previously' (Gramsci, 1971, 275–276). In this sense, the rapid emergence of Islamism in Indonesia in the 1980s, at the heyday of authoritarianism, was not only the outcome of modern and

educated youths who found their aspirations hardly accommodated by state power. It was also triggered by the exhaustion of the existing Islamic vehicles that these youths considered ineffective for political bargains with the regime to improve their political-economic position.

Furthermore, the changing sociological conditions of social agents of Islamism also significantly influenced their distinct aspirations and strategies. In the 1980s, a new generation of Islamists emerged, and they are more rooted in secular-university campuses than traditional-based *pesantren*, or Islamic seminaries. This phenomenon was partly a result of state-sponsored Islamisation when the government introduced religious instruction in the 1960s as a mandatory subject from primary to higher education levels. The prominent Islamists emerging from this generation were the *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, which is believed as the precursor of the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), and *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI). Rather than promoting a more discipline-based and traditional way of learning Islam, these new Islamist generations rely more on various Islamic short courses, reading materials translated into Indonesian from Arabic (and to an extent, from Persian), and, more recently, the internet. They have also employed different methods of activism that have been adopted by the Muslim Brothers, such as the so-called *usroh* system (literally, 'denoting a family') and running various social and charitable activities (e.g. Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Machmudi, 2008). However, scholars often see the rise of these Islamist groups and their new expressions as mere 'splinter groups' influenced by various Islamist ideologies imported from the Middle East (Azra, 1999; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; van Bruinessen, 2004).

To summarise, the centrality of dislocation to understand the politics of hegemony is twofold. Firstly, dislocation crucially undermines the sedimented or hegemonic practices of specific social order. Secondly, it facilitates social agents to reconfigure diverse demands by constructing new political projects to reshape the existing social order (Laclau, 2014, 1990). Crucially, dislocation serves as nothing less than a prerequisite of politics, the moment of reconstituting *the social*. Nevertheless, despite what structural dislocation may tell us about the disruption of the existing social order, it does not directly explain which political forms will subsequently emerge. In PDT, the reason lies in the postulation that the outcomes of hegemonic struggles cannot be predetermined. Therefore, it is instructive to analyse how dislocations have actually become the

conditions of possibilities for the emergence and development of particular political projects and how the contestations and social coalition are constituted in their struggles for hegemony.

Discourse as Conceptual Category

Laclau and Mouffe's concept of discourse is crucial to uncover how social agents construct articulatory practices to respond to dislocated social orders (Laclau, 1993, 541–547; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 93–148). Unlike Foucault's early works and other discourse theories, Laclau and Mouffe reject a strict dichotomy between discursive and non-discursive practices (see also Glynos et al., 2009; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). As such, PDT claims that there is no ontological difference between the linguistic and behavioural aspects of social practices. However, asserting the discursive character of an object does not necessarily mean placing the existence of social phenomena into question (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, 82). To use their simple illustration, an earthquake as an event 'objectively' takes place, independently of our will. But its specificity as an object may be constructed differently—seen as, for example, natural phenomena or the wrath of God—depending on the structuring of a discursive formation. Thus, 'what is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but [it is a] rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 108; see also Howarth et al., 2000, 3–4; Howarth, 2000).

More specifically, Laclau and Mouffe define articulation as 'any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practices' while discourse refers to 'the structured totality resulting from articulatory practices' (2001, 105). Thus, the relations between discourse and articulation are constitutive. Articulations are produced within a discourse, and, at the same time, they also shape and modify the discourse in particular ways. It is worth noting that articulations of certain discourses cannot follow any predetermined course as a monolithic and unified ideology. Discourse, in fact, is not an already-fixed ideology to which the meanings of an action or statement can be directly attached. Instead, it is an ideological praxis. By this, it is called discourse insofar as it is articulated and practised by which its dynamics are certainly contingent on the socio-political circumstances.

As stated earlier, a discursive approach to hegemony does not perceive that social agents have already possessed fixed identities and interests. Instead, it is through articulating certain political projects that their identities and interests are reconstituted and modified. Within such processes, social agents will 'retroactively create the interests they claim to represent' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, xi). Therefore, as discussed in subsequent chapters, the different articulations of Islamism and their associated political projects are always historical. Their diverse agenda and strategies are not exclusively derived from 'the essence' of Islam but continuously redefined following their struggles and contestations.

Nevertheless, we need to address several theoretical issues for developing a discursive framework for hegemony. For PDT, structural dislocations are considered a crucial moment that opens up the possibilities for discourses to (re)emerge. But how can one account for the fact that a particular discourse has more chance to succeed than others? To avoid the charge of randomisation (e.g. Geras, 1987; Meiksins-Wood, 1986), Laclau develops the category of availability and credibility of discourses (1990, 66; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). He introduces these concepts to assert that discourse may emerge and prevail not because of its intrinsic quality but simply because it is the only coherent structure that provides alternatives to the dislocated social order (Laclau, 2000, 44–59).[4] However, Laclau and Mouffe do not sufficiently provide tools to utilise these concepts for explaining the unevenness of discourses in empirical situations. This, as Sayyid (1997, 75) also points out, has become a source of confusion for many analysts.

Against this backdrop, Barros introduces the notion of 'relative structurality' of discourses. He suggests that the emergence of discourse is inevitably embedded within the existing social circumstances (2005, 250–273). This is because structural dislocation is never total, and the reconfiguration of a social order never produces something completely new. He stated that '[t]here will always remain traces of the relative structurality of the dislocated order into which the new demand anchors its

[4] Laclau does not associate the category of availability and credibility of discourses with the quality of their contents but merely in their connection with the situation of crisis or dislocation. By frequently using Hobbes' state of nature as an illustration, he argues that if a severe form of dislocation occurs, the mere availability of a particular discourse is 'enough' to ensure its victory (Laclau,s, 1990, 66; cf. Sayyid, 1997, 74–77). In this case, the credibility of a discourse is less associated with the contents for reorganising the social order but because of the fact that without it there is only disorder.

commanding pretensions' (2005, 252). It follows that particular demands or discourses that attempt to reconfigure the disorganised order have always been circumscribed and relatively structured in specific historical contexts. Consequently, the availability of discourses is uneven due to the historical specificity of their emergence. The unevenness among discourses, which is precisely the result of historical legacies, constitutes spaces for waging a hegemonic struggle (see Laclau, 2000, 54; 2001, 5–8). Barros explains further that:

> The new order is never completely new because it takes place in a political space in which there is always a relative structuration: the dislocation of a structure does not mean that everything becomes possible or that all existing symbolic frameworks of meaning melt into air. Thus, a particular dislocation might have had a multiplicity of origins and could be more or less deep in its effects depending on the context in which it emerges (2005, 252).

Furthermore, Sayyid (1997, 74–77) further explains how a discourse could potentially emerge as hegemonic. He argues that 'the availability of a discourse is not the same as the objective existence of a discourse' (1997, 75). The discourse of Islamism, for example, is not analogous to the presence of Islamic teachings, symbols or repertoire. As a discourse, Islamism could not be perceived as an unopened book waiting to be excavated and instrumentalised. Accordingly, the presence of Islam cannot automatically account for Islamism. But, the availability of Islam and the making of its political project are not necessary but contingent outcomes. Following Sayyid (1997, 2014), Islamism becomes available insofar as social agents articulate it to make sense of dislocated orders and organise new demands. If Islamism then serves as a 'master signifier,' a surface of inscription for multiple demands among different social agents, it would have a chance to be a hegemonic discourse.

Linking Discursive Formation to Structural Conditions

Theoretical interventions made by Barros and Sayyid are crucial for developing a framework of hegemony that links its discursive formation to the structural conditions. Barros's emphasis on the relative embeddedness of the discourse in certain structural conditions allows us to identify the historical emergence of particular articulations and their social agents.

Meanwhile, Sayyid's assertion on the specific notion of the availability of discourse helps comprehend the specificity of articulations, i.e. how diverse social demands are organised around particular discourse as a distinct political project. Therefore, it is instructive to investigate how social changes have produced specific impacts on different social groups and how a specific discourse is utilised to organise new collective demands and identities. Outlining such specific context of articulations is indispensable to empirically analyse the configuration of social agents, their identities, interests, strategies, contestations and coalitions in advancing distinct projects for hegemonic struggles.

In so doing, different forms of Islamism in Indonesia, including its trajectories, vehicles and strategies, can be identified from their relative embeddedness, both historically and sociologically, in the structures of power (see Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz & Khoo, 2011, 471). Consequently, there has been no single and unified construction of a hegemonic project among Islamist groups in Indonesia from the first instance. This is primarily because they represent various demands and aspirations which are continuously being shaped by socio-political changes. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, Islamist groups which are relatively well anchored in state power tend to advance the demands of the *ummah* by participating in post-Soeharto democratic politics, even if such strategies are not always successful. Meanwhile, those with limited attachment to state power attempt to achieve their political struggles outside state parameters by building transnational outlooks or employing varying degrees of violence or even through clandestine networks of terror (cf. Hadiz, 2014a, 42–65).

By envisaging the logic of hegemony as outlined in this framework, the ultimate task is to constitute a cross-cutting alliance that was developed through ethico-political leadership among different social groups under the banner of the *ummah*. Instead of an empirical entity, the *ummah* should be better understood as a discursive formation whose specific meaning and what it signifies may differ from one context to another. So, the *ummah*, constructed as a political project of Islamism, becomes a master signifier through which different visions of Islamism will compete to claim. Given that the interests and demands of social groups which potentially constitute this *ummah* are complex and perhaps, in many ways, contradictory, the competition among Islamists is unavoidable. Their success or otherwise in their struggles for hegemony will characterise Indonesian politics and the practices of Islamism itself.

Furthermore, the emergence and development of discourses are inherently *political*. This is mainly because discourse formation always involves drawing political frontiers between 'us' and 'them' (cf. Howarth, et al., 2000, 3–4). In this line of argument, the concept of social antagonism is crucial. Social antagonism is constituted when particular social groups are unable to ultimately achieve their demands and identities due to the presence of others (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 25). For example, the right-wing populist discourse in Western Europe is generally organised around the frontiers between the European and the immigrants. Here, the latter is perceived as the cause of the crisis experienced by the former, while their presence is regarded as preventing the 'completion' of the identity of being European (e.g. Yilmaz, 2016; Mouffe, 2005, 50–71).

By the same token, the Islamist discourse of the *ummah* in Indonesian politics excludes others that hamper the possibility of constructing an *ummah*-based political community. Depending on the discursive settings, the excluded others can refer to such entities as the colonial power during anti-colonial struggles, the bureaucratic-military regime of the New Order, the ethnic Chinese, LGBT rights advocates and even other non-mainstream Muslims like Ahmadi and Shia communities. Indeed, social antagonism, its formation and changing relations, does not emerge because of any intrinsic features but ultimately is an outcome of political construction in given discursive configurations. Rather than operating uni-directionally, however, social antagonism may take place in multiple forms: 'any position in a system of differences, insofar as it is negated, can become the locus of antagonism' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 131).

Laclau and Mouffe subsequently introduce the notions of 'equivalence' and 'difference' to capture the making of particular linkages among different and antagonistic social groups (2001, 127–134). By emphasising the dimension of the political, the discursive approach to hegemony is built on the central idea that the plethora of social demands among antagonistic groups cannot be eliminated, for example, through aggregation or consensus. Instead, it has to be politicised by constructing a chain of equivalence among different particular struggles. As Laclau outlines (1996, 41–42), this politicisation involves two intertwined elements that make the politics of hegemony possible. Firstly, recognising the plurality of political projects establishes the differential character of the demands or mobilisation of their respective struggles. Secondly, the creation of the equivalence of all these demands in their opposition to the existing system.

Building such an equivalential chain among different demands calls for creating a new political project that a common opposition must antagonise. In such a process, the particular struggles do not simply remain themselves but constitute an arena of universalising effects (see Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 136). Such struggles are considered hegemonic when they also present themselves as realising the demands and agendas waged by the broader groups. In this sense, the construction of a hegemonic force—or a chain of equivalence with universalising effects—is not simply achieved by a negotiated agreement among social groups. More importantly, it requires a more robust kind of communitarian unity capable of maintaining the coherence of such equivalence and becoming a common aspiration for all the groups, notwithstanding their different identities and interests. Laclau calls this process the production of a tendentially 'empty signifier,' which refers to the struggles of creating a communitarian order that is still an absence or unfulfilled reality (1996, 36–46; 2000, 56–57). In the discourses of Islamism, for example, the idea of the *ummah* has symbolically united their various struggles and becomes, as Said mentioned (1981, 61), an 'Islam of dreams'—an imagined communitarian order which Islamists are attempting to materialise (cf. Mandaville, 2001; Sayyid, 2014).

Following this line of argument, the degree of hegemonic success heavily depends on the possibility to expand and maintain such chains of equivalence. What is required is not merely just building a simple system or institution of political alliance. Instead, it is also necessary that such a process involves the transformation of antagonistic relations by creating a sense of collective will and shared identity (cf. Howson, 2007, 241). And, this 'sameness' is also discursively constituted and unified through the struggles against 'the external others.' Nevertheless, the chain of equivalence is also precarious. For example, the democracy discourse in Indonesia in the late 1990s had become a central nodal point among a wide array of movements, regardless of their 'original' interests and identities, to undermine the New Order regime (see Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Aspinall, 2005). As explicated in the following chapters, such an equivalential chain among pro-democracy movements was immediately replaced by the chains of difference after Soeharto's fall. Here, pro-democracy movements could not establish a relatively coherent position in the democratisation era to build a political bloc to replace the New Order's structure of power.

Thus, the hegemonic project of Islamism does not only require a sense of internal homogeneity within its alliance, but its relation to external others also influences such coherence. For instance, in its early years, Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was a vocal advocate of the European Union (EU) membership, democratisation and neoliberal policies. As Zubaida (2011, 185) argues, EU membership was seen as a means to effectively weaken the military's grip on Turkish politics and prompt greater democracy, from which the Islamists would benefit. However, the party's endorsement of democratisation does not necessarily mean that AKP commits to such an agenda. The government's harsh response against the protesters in the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations and subsequent repression of the press has amply demonstrated its anti-democratic character (see Tugal, 2016; Moudouros, 2014). Here, AKP's agenda for democratisation is better seen as a strategy to weaken Kemalist hegemony and broaden its social base (cf. Celik, 2000, 201).

Islamism in Indonesia has not experienced such fruitful trajectories in the democratisation era. Instead of being a horizon for strengthening and expanding chains of equivalence, the democratisation discourse in the post-Soeharto's authoritarianism has brought about severe fragmentation among Islamists. Such a condition significantly contributes to the poor performance of Islamic parties in elections and the polarisation of Islamist movements. As discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, the chance to expand the Islamist social base has been strictly limited. It thus fails to build a hegemonic bloc that can claim to represent Muslims' interests and identities. The failure of Islamist hegemonic struggles to signify post-authoritarian Indonesia has brought about far-reaching impacts, especially on the workings of Indonesian democracy and the practices of Islamism itself. The prominence of Islamist mobilisation for power struggles in contemporary Indonesia is symptomatic of the fragmentation of Islamism and the fundamental crisis of representation in neoliberalising democracy practices. Crucially, the hegemonic failure of Islamism explains why the populist articulations of Islam can be easily appropriated and captured by competing elites for electoral purposes rather than a political force to challenge the structure of domination that, in the eyes of Islamists, has marginalised broad segments of the *ummah*.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored theoretical debates on hegemony and social changes by linking them to the studies of Islamism. In contrast to post-hegemony advocates who treat contemporary political movements as self-organising, the approach of this study envisages an understanding of social changes as historical outcomes of political struggles. The framework outlined in this chapter emphasises the importance of engaging the state, conceived as an arena and, at the same time, the relative outcome of such struggles. From this vantage point, the central task of the politics of hegemony is to build political linkages upon the plethora of demands among different social agents and transform them into a political alliance to reshape the existing structure of power relations in both state and society. Hence, the hegemonic project of Islamism is neither a set of ideological contents nor organisational models but rather a mode of representing the plurality of demands among broader social agents by forging a distinct political project, a 'collective will.'

Using a discursive approach to hegemony, we can understand different trajectories of Islamism from the practices of constructing a cross-cutting alliance among diverse social groups, developed through ethico-political leadership, under the banner of the *ummah*. Unlike approaches that envisage hegemony as a political strategy or highlight the importance of organisation for collective action, this study examines the hegemonic struggles of Islamism from two perspectives. The first investigates the way different social agents articulate Islam as a response to socio-political change, and the second explains how the discourse of Islamism is used to forge collective demands and identities for waging a hegemonic struggle.

The framework of this book also suggests that the emergence and development of Islamism are always circumscribed within specific historical settings. It allows us to outline how Islam is articulated as a set of political projects to reshape the existing structure of power relations and the extent to which they shape or are being transformed by historical conditions. The linking of specific discursive formations to structural conditions renders it possible to empirically identify the configurations of social agents, their strategies, contestations and coalitions, throughout their hegemonic struggles. With this in mind, we will further investigate how social changes have produced dislocations that impacted Islamist groups and how the discourse of Islam is appropriated for organising collective demands and political struggles in different conjunctures

of Indonesia's socio-political history. For this reason, the next chapter will specifically discuss the genealogy of Islamism, as a particular political force, in the making of Indonesia during the late colonial era and early postcolonial context by highlighting the historical specificity of its emergence and development.

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CHAPTER 3

Islamism and the Making of Indonesia

Islamism is integral to the making of Indonesia. As experienced in many postcolonial Muslim-majority societies, different forms of Islamism have influenced trajectories of their nation-state formation and transformation—albeit with mixed results. As a political discourse, Islamism has thus been historically rooted and, therefore, inseparable from politics. This chapter discusses the genealogies of the competing discourses in the formation of Indonesia's nation-state, emphasising those organised around the signifiers of Islam. More specifically, it explains their emergence and development and how associated contestations and coalitions are forged within two defining discursive settings of this historical conjuncture: anti-colonialism and nation-state building.

It is noteworthy that broader social changes and dislocations, especially those associated with the expansion of capitalism and the introduction of the Ethical Policy, had altered the political landscape in colonial Indonesia in the late nineteenth century. Such processes had facilitated the rise and development of various discourses of different projects for anti-colonial struggles and, subsequently, postcolonial nation-state formation. Available discourses were mainly centred around three categories, namely Islamism, communism and nationalism. This chapter suggests that the different strategies of encounter with the colonial power and the

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dynamics of these contending narratives significantly influenced postcolonial Indonesian politics, from nation-state formation to the present day. In a nutshell, this chapter investigates the socio-political conditions for different articulations of Islam and how they shaped and were transformed by contestations and coalitions forged throughout the late colonial period and beyond.

As with other Muslim-majority countries across the globe, structural dislocations associated with the collapse of European colonial power and the contested vision for a free nation had opened the way for a contest between two distinct and seemingly incompatible articulations. The issue at stake was whether the postcolonial political community would be organised around the signifier of the *ummah* or the nation or *bangsa* (cf. Mandaville, 2014, 64; Sayyid, 2014). To comprehend the dynamic relationship between Islamism and formation Indonesia's nation-state, therefore, we need to see different projects of Islamism as contingent outcomes of political struggles, initially waged against the encroachment of colonial power and, later, in the competition to 'define' postcolonial Indonesia.

Nevertheless, two distinct features significantly characterised the emergence and dynamics of Islamism in Indonesia's early political history. Firstly, the Islamist aspiration for the *ummah* from the outset, crucially, did not involve a transnational community but was set mainly within the framework of the nation-state. Yet, unlike the Turkish experience with the Kemalist hegemony that constructed the 'new Turkey' identity, by negating the Ottoman legacy of a fragmented *ummah*, the early formation of Indonesia's nation-state was signified by contestations between diverse articulations of *ummah* and *bangsa*. In contrast to the postcolonial Malaysian experience, where Islam was relatively accommodated, relations between Islam and the state in Indonesia were more contentious, achieved through contestations in different political frameworks (cf. Khoo, 2014; Noor, 2013).

Secondly, beyond merely an ideological or *aliran* (political stream) divide in Indonesian society, contestations between so-called Islamic nationalism and secular nationalism discourses in postcolonial Indonesia are directly linked to political struggles to attain state power. As this chapter discusses, the secular nationalism discourse did not necessarily construct Islam as the 'antagonistic other' for a new nation-state. The secular nationalism discourse primarily framed Islam as a mere element, not a primary one, for organising the new nation-state. In the early

nation-state building projects, the nationalism discourse became hegemonic and thus gained broad appeals among social groups. Its hegemonic status was primarily achieved through universalising a political vision that Indonesia should be based on multicultural unity at the expense of Muslim majoritarianism.

This chapter shows that the political history of postcolonial Indonesia is about pursuing an ambiguous political project, that is, maintaining the unity of the nation-state and managing political differences. The rifts among competing discourses in signifying Indonesia manifested differently in the post-Independence era, especially in the periods of the Parliamentary Democracy (1949–1957) and the so-called Guided Democracy (1957–1965). In the first period, the discursive contestations and political struggles to achieve state power took place through the central role of political parties and parliamentarian politics. After dismantling political parties, which were seen as sources of instability and disintegration, President Soekarno sought to manage political differences by establishing a corporatist political model centred around himself. By accommodating the forces of nationalism, communism and Islamism into its power structure, Guided Democracy provided space for managing political contestation by 'returning' to the politicisation of identities. Yet, such experimentation proved to be a failure by the mid-1960s when the contestations between these forces became increasingly uncontrollable. The far-reaching consequences and the legacies of social conflicts of these periods continue to influence the dynamics of Islamism and contemporary Indonesian politics.

Dislocations and Anti-Colonial Discourses: Islamism, Communism, Nationalism

This section discusses the socio-political changes and dislocations that facilitate the rise and mobilisation of anti-colonial movements. These transformations inform their respective social bases, interests and demands, and the dynamics of contestations and coalitions in the course of their struggles. Until the early nineteenth century, following the deeper consolidation of Dutch colonial power, anti-colonial mobilisation waged under the banner of Islam emerged in many episodes of local resistance, albeit at different scales and relatively contained in certain areas (Ricklefs, 2012). The most renowned uprisings which seriously challenged Dutch colonial power were arguably manifested in the Java War (1825–1830)

led by Prince Diponegoro and the long-lasting Aceh War (1873–1904) in Northern Sumatra (Alfian, 1987; Carrey, 2008; Reid, 1969). In the early twentieth century, anti-colonial movements in Indonesia proliferated. They developed their distinctive ideologies and strategies by drawing inspiration from people's movements in other parts of the globe, like the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (1917), the fall of the Ottoman caliphate (1924), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the rise of Sun Yat-Sen's Kuomintang and the Qing dynasty's fall (1912) in China and the nationalist movements in British India.

Interestingly, while Islam had been in the archipelago far before the colonialism era, the rapid spread of this religion and the strengthening of its political agencies had been mainly a response to the encroachment of colonial power. For example, W.F Wertheim (1956) argued that such a context eventually led Muslims to take part in anti-colonial resistance and, later, nationalist movements. In the early periods of anti-colonial struggles, Islam had increasingly become a rallying point that linked together people's grievances against the colonial power. In other words, Islam served as a viable discourse that could effectively separate political frontiers between the 'infidel' colonial power and the 'Muslims' who were ruled.

However, the hegemonic position of Islamism in voicing anti-colonial struggles faced severe challenges, initially from the forces organised through the discourse of communism and, later, nationalism. As we shall see, the contestations between these anti-colonial discourses had been significantly constitutive to the making of Indonesia. Indeed, such contestations reflected their respective social bases, interests and demands through which they ultimately formed different political projects, including the strategies for mobilising people and challenging colonial power. As discussed in the following sections, the dynamics of Islamism throughout this period were shaped by competition with other political forces. In the colonial era, their struggles were directed towards dismantling colonial power. Later, competition among these forces took place in attempts to gain control over the postcolonial state power, where they proposed different governing models and imagined political communities for the newly established nation-state.

Islamism and Anti-Colonial Outlooks

Anti-colonial articulations of Islamism in the nineteenth century took shape in the context of rapid socio-political changes in the archipelago. These were mainly associated with the consolidation of the colonial empire, Dutch colonial policies and the modernisation impulse introduced by a new generation of Muslims. Since the sixteenth century and even before the arrival of European colonial power, Islamisation of native rulers had effectively constituted *ulama* or religious clerics as an increasingly important class in both royal domains and societies (e.g. Ricklefs, 2012). This was so because the converted rulers had to rely on the *ulama* to legitimise and maintain their power. Meanwhile, the *ulama* gradually made inroads to aristocratic power by assuming such positions as counsellors, religious judges or religious teachers.

As Benda (1955b, 14–15) argued, this social formation significantly influenced the emergence of two contrasting forms of Islamist articulations in dealing with a colonial power that often utilised native rulers for *divide et impera* (or divide and rule) policies. The first form, the legal and administrative, tended to work with and was even accommodated into the power structure. The other form, on the contrary, operated outside the parameters of 'the state' and tended to build more cosmopolitan networks. The position of the former initially became ascendant, especially when the colonial power instrumentalised native rulers to deepen their grip on power in the colony. Subsequently, the *ulama* accommodated by the native rulers lost much of their legitimacy, because of their role in colonial rule (Laffan, 2003; Ricklefs, 2012). Their dependence on the colonial power, compounded with socio-economic hardships experienced by the people, paved the way for alienated Muslims to constitute a form of Islamic politics with an anti-colonial outlook.

The development of Islamists' anti-colonial outlook also drew strength from their contact with global networks, especially the Hijaz (now Saudi Arabia). The connection of Indonesian Muslims with the Middle East was mainly built through the *hajji*, pilgrims to Mecca. Between 1858 and 1859, Indonesian pilgrims increased from 100 to 3,000 per annum (Laffan, 2003, 38). Encounters with the wider Muslim world became more intense following the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and

this helped the spread of anti-colonial sentiments.[1] Adopting Anderson's concept of 'imagined communities,' Laffan (2003) shows that such encounters had facilitated the construction of the *bilad al-Jawa* (i.e. the lands of Indonesia and Malaya as known in the Hijaz), imagined as a new political entity, constructed against the 'infidel' colonial rulers. Hence, it was the prototype of a 'nation' (cf. Keddie, 1969).

More specifically, Islamic reformism promoted by returned *hajjis,* which initially took the form of Islamic orthodoxy and the purification agenda, soon forged political movements. Often, the Dutch colonial power and native rulers or *adat* chiefs were constructed as enemies deemed responsible for the declining *ummah*. A prominent manifestation of this Islamic politics was the Padri movement in West Sumatra, claimed by historian Anthony Reid as 'the first clear evidence of the new Muslim dynamism in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia' (1967, 272; see also Mandall, 2018). The Padri movement was initially a puritanical aspiration to reform Minangkabau society led by the groups of *hajji* who returned to West Sumatra in 1803/4 (Rickelfs, 2001, 182). As Dutch military intervention took the side of the *adat* chiefs, the Padri movement found broader appeal by representing broader interests than their initial agenda of religious purification. In Java, the Rifaiyah movement, initiated by Ahmad Rifai (or Ripangi, 1786–1875), who spent eight years in the Hijaz, also gained broad support in the North Coast of Java. His popularity was mainly because of his outspoken criticism of *adat* and local *ulama* who worked for Dutch interests (see Laffan, 2003, 31–32; Ricklefs 2012, 15–16; Steenbrink, 1984, 109–113).

Islamic militancy and its strong connection with the Middle East immediately caused growing concern among Dutch colonial administrators (Benda, 1955b, 17–19; Reid, 1967). As early as the 1850s, they realised that pacification by military forces was no longer sufficient to counter rapid socio-political changes in the colony. This was particularly the case after the Padri War (1821–1838) and Java War (1825–1830), which led to the eventual bankruptcy of the East Indian Company (VOC, *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie,* established in 1602). Dutch administrators began to contain Islamic militancy and the threat of what they called ideas of Pan-Islamism. From the 1860s, the Dutch placed more

[1] For example, between 1870 and 1880, many Javanese students studied at the Sawlatya *madrasa,* established by Muhammad Kayrnawi of Delhi (1818–1890), an Indian 'rebel' *ulama* who sought refuge in the Hijaz. See, for example, Laffan (2003, 38).

restrictions on the *hajji*, followed by the establishment of a consulate at the Hijaz in the 1870s. Under pressure from religious parties in the parliament of their home country, the Dutch for the first time subsidised the operation of Christian missions as a strategy to counter Islamisation (Benda, 1958, 339; Ricklefs, 2012, 12–13). While Dutch-sponsored Christianisation expanded very slowly, and was relatively confined to the areas which had not previously been Islamised, these measures were often counterproductive (Wertheim, 1956, 204–205).

The appointment of C. Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), a prominent Dutch Arabicist and Islamologist, as the advisor of the newly created Office for Native and Arab Affairs (*Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken*) in 1889 was a watershed in colonial policies. From the outset, Hurgronje was critical of the existing Dutch policies towards Islam. For example, he argued that the idea of Pan-Islam, the importance of which had been exaggerated by Dutch administrators, was not a political reality. He argued that the Ottoman caliphate itself had put it 'in the museum of (its) political antiquities' (Benda, 1958, 341). He also opposed intolerant measures towards Muslims in the colony and, in turn, proposed to provide Western education for them. He believed that such education would create a new Westernised Muslim class that would exorcise the danger of Islamic militancy (Benda, 1958, 343–344; Reid, 1967, 283).

Furthermore, to control the subjects in the colony, the Dutch colonial power advocated the policies of legal pluralism rather than implementing a single (modern) Dutch law (Cribb, 2010, 49; van der Kroef, 1953, 61–64). As such, colonial Indonesia was administered through separate legal codes, based on an existing stratification policy of Europeans, foreign Orientals and natives that was strongly defined in terms of racial and religious markers. This racial classification dated back to the legal code known as the *Bataviasche Statuten*, issued in 1642 and implemented in the whole Dutch colony under the Minister of Colonial Affairs of the Netherlands, Dirk Fock (1848–1945) (see Cribb, 2010; Fasseur, 1994; van der Kroef, 1953). It is also important to note that although such a legal system formally terminated following the Indonesian Independence in 1945, its social impacts have remained until the present day. For example, as discussed further in the following chapters, the constructions of the *ummah* among Islamists often refer to the concepts of *pribumi* (the native), with respect to which the ethnic Chinese (foreign oriental) is politically constructed as its antagonism.

Comparing Dutch colonial policies with those of British India under Sir Henry Maine (1882–1888), Mamdani (2012) shows that Hurgonje's visions significantly transformed colonial rule. They shifted colonial policies from merely instrumentalising local elites to controlling the population as a whole through various stratified policies. To use a Foucauldian term, this kind of biopolitics systematically transformed a mode of control from *divide et impera* to disciplinary system over colonial subjects, including the Islamists, to be compatible with colonial order. Hence, the colonial policies under Hurgronje no longer rested on the 'divide and rule' strategy, but primarily on 'define and rule' (Mamdani, 2012, 42).

At the start of the twentieth century, the Dutch colonial government ruled the colony by advancing slogans of associationism, which was regarded as a new pathway to bridge the gulf between rulers and ruled. This new era, described by Furnivall as the age of 'expansion, efficiency, and welfare' (2010, 225–256), is characterised by such watchwords as *progress* and *emancipation*. The cornerstone of this transformation was the so-called Ethical Policy, which was adopted by the Dutch colonial government in 1901. Following the dominance of the liberals in the Netherland's political scene, this policy was claimed to be adopted as a response to the miseries caused by exploitation in the colony under the *Cultuurstelsel* (forced cultivation) system (1830–1870) that was implemented immediately after the Java War (Furnivall, 2010, 225–256; Ricklefs, 2001, 193–205; Shiraishi, 1990; van der Kroef, 1953, 52–85). Strongly echoing the motives of liberal morality, in his speech before the Netherland's parliament, A.W.F. Idenburg, the then Minister of the Colonies, who subsequently became a Governor-General in Jakarta (1909–1916), stated that:

> Egoism is not the basic principle of our colonial policy, but higher motives. Power is not its legal basis, but the moral mission of a more advanced people toward less advanced nations, who are not of a lesser species than the western peoples, but who join with them in the single organism of humanity.' (cited via Schmutzer, 1977, 16–17)

It is noteworthy that the Dutch adopted the Ethical Policy when private capitalism became influential in directing its colonial policies (Booth, 1998; Furnivall, 2010; Lindblad, 1998). Industries in the colonial home country began to see Indonesia as a potential market and production base. There was an influx of foreign capital, from both

the Netherlands and internationally, especially for the extraction of raw materials in Java and the outer islands (Booth, 1998; Furnivall, 2010, 309–324; Lindblad, 1998). Such development had inevitably required Indonesian labour for modern enterprises. And, to sustain industrial growth, the capitalists urged the colonial state to drive its policies towards modernisation and welfare. Under the Ethical Policy, there was a massive extension of the state apparatus and a proliferation of functions that served bureaucratic tasks and, more importantly, the colonial state's surveillance under the framework of *rust en orde* (tranquility and order).[2] As such, the Ethical Policy was no more than a new model of capitalism, justified by liberal humanitarian values and guarded by bureaucracy and security apparatuses. This policy had brought about far-reaching contradictions, resulting in the emergence of anti-colonial sentiments and mobilisations, as discussed below.

The rapid expansion of modern education, mostly in urban areas, was the hallmark of this era. It significantly reconstituted the social bases of anti-colonial struggles (Noer, 1973; Ricklefs, 2012, 14–15; Shiraishi, 1990, 28–29; van der Kroef, 1953). Crucially, Western education challenged the central position of the rural-based *pesantren* or Islamic seminaries. This education was imperative to generate the well-trained workforces that were required to take up jobs in the bureaucracy and private companies and 'uplift' the natives in the spirit of 'association between the East and the West' (Shiraishi, 1990, 28). More importantly, the education policy created significant new members of the middle class, known as *kaum muda* (the youth), who had better social and economic positions than their predecessors (Shiraishi, 1990). This group subsequently played a leading role in anti-colonial movements, whether in the camps of Islamism, communism or nationalism.

Regarding Islamic politics of this era, the modernisation impulse also emanated from a connection to Cairo-based Islamic reformism (Azra, 2004a; Ali, 2016; Kersten, 2017; Laffan 2003; Noer 1973; Latif, 2008). The most distinctive feature of this reformism laid in its positive attitudes towards modernity, seen as the only way to improve the position of the *ummah* under the Western colonial order. Its proponents, including Muhammad Abduh, a disciple of the Islamic reformist and Pan-Islamist, Jamaluddin Al-Afghani, also sought to 'purify' Islam from corrupting

[2] See Pramoedya Ananta Toer's novels the so-called Tetralogy of Buru, especially the last volume *Rumah Kaca* or Glass House (2006).

influences deemed responsible for the backwardness of the *ummah*. As such, they dreamed of a new Islamic civilisation that relied primarily on *ijtihad* or independent rationality (Laffan, 2003, Ch 6 and 10). It was only by adopting modern science and technology, they argued, that Islam could reduce the gulf between the West and the East.

Modernisation among a new generation of Muslims had significantly shaped Islamic movements in the colony, at least in two aspects. Firstly, it led to the proliferation of Islamic periodicals that signified the connection between Indonesian-Malay Islam and Cairo, and gradually redirected Islamic movements towards anti-colonial struggles.[3] Secondly, rather than relying on a 'populist' model of the previous era that was narrow in scope, Islamic movements took the form of modern organisations. Thus, the Islamic organisations like Muhammadiyah (founded in 1912), Sarekat Islam (1912), Tawalib of Sumatra (1919), Jamiatil Khair (1905) and Al-Irshad (1913) of Arab communities (Laffan, 2003; Noer 1973, Chapter 1) emerged as new political vehicles in this period.

If the previous manifestation of Islamism took the form of peasant resistance centred on local *ulama,* political Islam was now prominently urban-based and utilised modern organisational vehicles. As mentioned, their urban characteristics corresponded with the expansion of capital that led to the development of industrial centres and infrastructure (cf. Furnivall, 2010; Lindblad, 1998). The 'age of capital,' as Shiraishi aptly described it, resulted in the rise of non-agricultural economic activities, market expansion and business competition and, most notably, the considerable growth of the interconnected cities (Furnivall, 2010; Lindblad, 1998; Shiraishi, 1990, 8–27; van der Kroef, 1953). For instance, following its inauguration in 1870, the railway system, initially built to transport sugar from private plantations to the port city of Semarang,

[3] Rashid Rida's famous periodical *Al-Manar* (founded in 1898) had stimulated Muslim intellectuals in Southeast Asia to develop their publications. The project began with the publication of *Al-Imam* (1906–1908), led by Tahir Jalaluddin in Singapore, followed by *Al-Munir* (1911–1915), based in West Sumatera led by Abdullah Ahmad. From the outset, *Al-Munir* was instrumental in cultivating an embryonic sense of Indonesia-ness. Together with Tjokroaminoto, the future leader of the Sarekat Islam, Abdullah Ahmad set up another newspaper, *Al-Islam* (1916–17), that focused on a nation-wide readership, declaring itself as the 'organ for Indies Muslim nationalists' (Laffan, 2003, 178). During the nationalist movement in the 1930s, Islamic media such as *Pedoman Masyarakat* and *Panji Islam* had been the central stage for the vision of a Free Indonesia. See, for example, Laffan (2003), Latif (2008), Kersten (2017).

had effectively linked all the major cities in Java by 1894 and facilitated people's mobility (Mrazek, 2002; Shiraishi, 1990, 8).

Following the implementation of the Ethical Policy, the position of local aristocrats continuously declined, replaced by new generations of educated youths, the so-called *kaum muda* (see, for example, Benda 1966; Sutherland, 1979). Nevertheless, the *kaum muda* was immediately frustrated by the fact that the promise of upward mobility was blocked by the racially stratified social order enacted and maintained by the Dutch colonial government—'where natives were natives, however well educated' (Shiraishi, 1990, 30). In the context of the stratified racial identification of Europeans, foreign Orientals and natives (*inlander* or *pribumi*), the *kaum muda* politicised the ambivalent category of the 'native' as a new political subject (cf. Bhabha, 1994; Kapoor, 2008; Mamdani, 2012). As Anderson argues, the category of natives 'always carried an unintentionally paradoxical semantic load' (1983, 122). While the colonialists utilised it to signify the inferiority of colonised subjects, the natives could develop a social coalition regardless of their class or ethnic differences within the conditions of common inferiority and misery.

The cultivation of native identities created a new basis for solidarity which turned this newly educated class into the spokespersons for anti-colonialism (Shiraishi, 1990, 30–31). Anderson highlights the importance of this consciousness and identification for the constitution of an imagined community. He states that:

> [B]y a sort of sedimentation, *inlander*—excluding whites, Dutchmen, Chinese, Arabs, Japanese, '*natives*,' *indigenes*, and *indios*—grew even more specific in content; until, like a ripe larva, it was suddenly transmogrified into the spectacular butterfly called 'Indonesian'. (Anderson, 1983, 123)

During the so-called Pergerakan period (the Movement, 1912 till the 1930s), the making of natives as new anti-colonial subjects was appropriated and mobilised through three different, often competing, political discourses of Islamism, communism and nationalism. In regard to Islamic politics, such a transformation significantly shaped the Islamist anti-colonial articulations with a more 'highly egalitarian and pro-social justice' (Hadiz, 2016, 49). Such articulations would influence the contestations and coalitions forged throughout their political struggles. Such a dynamic is particularly shown in the development of Sarekat Islam (SI)

which, according to Noer (1973, 114), represented the rise and fall of the position of the *ummah* in colonial Indonesia.

The Rise and Fall of Islamist Hegemony: Sarekat Islam and Its Adversaries

Emerging out as a mutual help association of Muslim entrepreneurs, directed mainly against their stronger Chinese competitors, Sarekat Islam (SI, founded in 1912) soon became the first national organisation with mass appeal, drawing support from a cross-alliance of the Muslim population. The SI social base was not limited to small traders as it was initially established, but reached broader social coalitions, including the ranks of the rising labour movement, *ulama*, some aristocrats and peasants (Benda, 1958; Noer, 1973; Shiraishi, 1990). In its first general meeting, held in Surabaya in January 1913, there were already fifteen established SI branches, and thirteen of them had sent delegates representing about eighty thousand members. Within just two months, in the first SI Congress in Surakarta, the number of SI branches reached forty-eight, of which forty-two sent delegates to represent two hundred thousand members (Shiraishi, 1990, 49–50).

Writers like Shiraishi (1990) demonstrate the significant role of rallies and newspapers in accelerating the expansion of SI.[4] Noer (1973, 115–126), on the other hand, put more emphasis on the importance of organisational development, especially in the early period. He states that Haji Samanhudi himself, the initial founder of SI, looked for 'people who have better education and experience' (1973, 118). In 1912, he persuaded Tjokroaminoto, who was regarded at mass rallies as 'a miracle-working messiah' (van Bruinessen, 1995, 125), to join the SI, followed by the prominent journalist and politician Abdul Moeis (in 1912) and Agus Salim (1915).

Looking more deeply, the phenomenal rise of the movement reflects the widespread dislocations experienced by Muslims and the natives in general. Their dissent and hopes were then mobilised through

[4] For example, by early 1913, prominent newspapers in some cities had become the SI organs, including Sarotomo, Oetoesan Hinda of Surabaya, Sinar Djawa of Semarang and Kaoem Moeda Bandung and *Pantjaran Warta* of Batavia. It is also reported that the first massive SI rally in January 1913, organised by Tjokroaminoto in Surabaya, was attended by about ten thousand participants. See Shiraishi (1990, 49).

Islamist political discourse. Thus, Islamist discourse provides the language through which, to borrow Shiraishi (1990), 'people could "say" what they had been unable to "say"' (1990, 340). Subsequently, SI transformed itself from an organisation to protect the interests of Javanese *batik* merchants to an inclusive populist movement, 'aligning the interests of traditional petty bourgeoise with larger anti-colonial and nationalist struggles' (Hadiz, 2016, 63).

However, the hegemony of Islamism in anti-colonial struggles only lasted for a brief period, challenged by political forces organised through the discourses of first, communism and, later, nationalism. It is worth noting that the organisational structure of the SI, like that of other organisations of the time, was relatively loose (McVey, 2006, 21), under the coordinating board called the Central Sarekat Islam (CSI). Its local branches enjoyed relatively independent and autonomous status and brought forward different interests and demands depending on the local contexts and constituents. SI built collaboration with the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV, set up by the Dutch revolutionary Sneevliet in 1914 in Surabaya)—the precursor of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1918, as we shall see, conflict and competition between them had escalated.

The rapid growth of SI at the grass-roots level had been accompanied by the increasingly strong influence of its Left-wing, especially after the arrival of Semaun (who joined ISDV in 1915), Sneevlet's protègè, in the coastal city of Semarang in 1916 (McVey, 2006; Shiraishi, 1990, 98–102). Under Semaun's leadership, the SI Semarang continuously condemned the CSI leadership under Tjokroaminoto, Salim and Moeis because they were not radical enough in advancing the demands of social and economic justice. In particular, they criticised Tjokro's participation in the *Volksraad* (Dutch-made People Council) in 1917.[5] Cooperation with the colonial power degraded the credibility of Sarekat Islam in anti-colonial struggles. The conflicts between SI and ISDV worsened in late 1917 and eventually triggered the latter to challenge the hegemony of SI in anti-colonial movements.

[5] The social base of SI Semarang developed very rapidly, from 1.700 members in 1916 to 20,000 in the following year. The SI Semarang immediately become a rival for the SI, especially its headquarter known as Central Sarekat Islam (CSI) that was led by Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim. See McVey (2006, 22–28, also Chapter 5), Shiraishi (1990), von der Mehden (1958).

The popularity of radical politics in colonial Indonesia, as advocated by the ISDV and SI Semarang and, to a lesser extent, SI Yogyakarta, grew after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Soon after the Revolution, in May 1918, the ISDV leadership declared that:

> The Russian Revolution naturally dominates our thoughts at present... We, too, must take the path which the Bolsheviki have chosen, even though the situation here is different. Where capitalism exists, socialism is also possible. (cited via McVey, 2006, 29)

The conflict between the CSI and SI Semarang could no longer be contained and reached its peak in the 1921 SI Congress when the CSI applied a policy of strict party discipline that forced the SI Semarang leaders to resign (Shiraishi, 1990). This policy caused a split in the ranks of the organisations between pro-communist elements, called the 'red SI,' which were opposed to the 'white SI' associated with CSI leaders, especially Agus Salim and Abdoel Moeis. If we look at the global context of that period, the conflict between SI and SI Semarang-ISDV was ironic. Between 1917 and 1920, the Soviets had emphasised the importance of building alliances with Pan-Islamism for anti-imperialist struggles and even created a 'Mohammedan Central Commissariat' in 1918 to facilitate a revolution in Muslim countries (McVey, 2006, 54). Therefore, it is not surprising that Tan Malaka, a young Communist leader who had actively organised grass-roots movements in Indonesia and beyond, reminded the CSI leadership that Islamism was a natural ally of communism in the struggles against colonial imperialism (McVey, 2006, 103). Semaun also attacked the CSI leadership, arguing that if the SI were abandoned by its Left-wing, they would become only a union of Muslim merchants. He convinced the public that the Left-wing role was imperative for transforming SI from a 'party for capitalists' to a 'party for the people.' He also contended that religion *an sich* was insufficient as a basis for a popular movement to challenge colonialism (McVey, 2006, 103–104).

The rift between the purveyors of Islamism and communism was much influenced by their competing strategies of struggle against colonialism rather than an inherent ideological incompatibility. Perhaps the figure of Haji Misbach of Solo, who left Muhammadiyah to become a PKI propagandist in 1922, provided a clear example of the convergence of Islamism and communism when he stated that:

> Our friends who profess themselves communists but still like to express opinions aimed at abolishing the religion of *Islam—these people, I am not afraid to say it, are not true Communists,* or they do not yet understand *the communist position*. In turn, those who profess Islam but reject Communism, I am not afraid to say that they are not true Muslims, or they do not yet properly understand the position of the religion of Islam. (cited in Shiraishi, 1990, 285)

Interestingly, the competition between Islamism and communism eventually forced the SI to strengthen its Islamic identity and, as a result, constituted communism as its antagonism. By 1921, for example, SI explicitly put Islam as the sole foundation of the organisation. SI also embraced the Pan-Islamist project, the so-called *Kongres Al Islam Hindia* (Indies All Islam Congress), following the abolishment of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. The underlying objective of SI's Pan-Islamist articulation was to reunite its Islamist elements after the organisational split (see van Bruinessen, 1995, 125–126). By articulating a vision of transnational Islam and joining the Pan-Islamist project, SI lost its nationalising character. It is also an irony that SI articulated ideas of Pan-Islam at the time that the conditions in the Middle East were shifting from Pan-Islamism to nationalism and subsequently Arabism (cf. Esposito, 1991, 60–95; Formichi, 2010, 130; Zubaida, 2011, 175–199).

Therefore, it is not surprising that SI's efforts to recover its hegemonic position often had counterproductive effects. The paradigmatic example of this was SI's participation in a Pan-Islamist project between 1922 and 1929 as a response to 'the caliphate question' (cf. Landau, 1994; Sayyid, 2014; van Bruinessen, 1995). Such a project was severely criticised by the communists. They argued that it was useless to engage with caliphate issues, which only concerned Turkey and never brought unity, freedom, and welfare for Indonesian Muslims (Noer,1973; Shiraishi, 1990; van der Kroef, 1958, 45). More importantly, this project also led to severe fragmentation within SI itself. The dominance of 'modernist' Islamists (especially Muhammadiyah and Al-Irshad) had practically isolated and subordinated Islamist traditional groups, which forced them to build their own vehicle, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), in 1926, focusing primarily as a social organisation (Feillard, 1999; Noer, 1973; van Bruinessen, 1995). One of the leading causes was that, in the Congress of 1925, Agus Salim showed great enthusiasm in supporting Ibn Saud's Wahabi projects, which was deemed hostile to Islamic practices performed by

the 'traditionalist' Muslims of Nahdlatul Ulama (see Feillard, 1999; van Bruinessen, 1995).

By 1927, SI's relationship with its main ally in defending the caliphate issue, Muhammadiyah, also broke down (see, for instance, Alfian, 1989). This break took place because the SI adopted a new strategy of non-cooperation in dealing with the colonial power. In its bid to challenge the popularity of PKI in anti-colonial struggles, this strategy contradicted Muhammadiyah's relative dependence on the Dutch subsidy for its educational and welfare programs. After losing support from its main pillars, by 1929, SI gave up its Pan-Islamist project in favour of Indonesian nationalism and thus changed its name to *Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) (Noer, 1973; van Bruinessen, 1995, 135).

The change in SI's articulation towards a nationalist orientation in 1929 was also greatly influenced by the surge of nationalism among *kaum muda*. In October 1928, the *kaum muda* held a Youth Congress in Jakarta, issuing a 'Youth Pledge' (*Sumpah Pemuda*), declaring three ideals that essentially attempted to constitute Indonesia as the common fatherland, nation and language (Anderson, 1983, 119; Ricklefs, 2001, 233). Anti-colonial struggles of this period were not only about dismantling colonial power but also about cultivating the social consciousness for imagining a free Indonesia. Crucially, nationalism discourse had increasingly become a new master signifier, articulated through such diverse markers as religion, ethnic group and region, for the vision of a free Indonesia.

The nationalist waves had marked a new episode of anti-colonial struggles in the archipelago. Such a development was also associated with the fragmentation within political forces representing communism and Islamism. After being the primary challenger to SI, the communists were severely suppressed by the Dutch in the aftermath of the failed mass uprising of 1926–1927 (Benda & McVey, 1960; McVey, 2006, 323–346; Shiraishi, 1990). Likewise, SI was weakened, as it experienced a further phase of internal conflicts. For example, PSII expelled its senior leaders, Soekiman and Soerjopranoto, in 1933 after an internal dispute with Tjokroaminoto. Between 1935 and 1939, the conflict between Salim and Abikoesno-Kartosuwiryo took place regarding the issue of non-cooperation policy, known as *hijrah*, that resulted in a new schism in the SI: *Barisan Penyadar PSII* and *Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran PSII* (Noer, 1973, 129–161).

Against this backdrop, Soekarno, the leading figure of the *Bandung Algemeene Studie club* and the future Indonesian first president, wrote a long article entitled '*Nationalism, Islamism, Marxism*' in late 1926 (Soekarno, 1964, 1–53). He called for the nationalists, Islamists and communists to work together in anti-colonial struggles to achieve a Free Indonesia. In that article, Soekarno repeatedly emphasised the urgency of building a link between these three political discourses by constituting colonial power as a common antagonism. For example, he stated that 'so long as Muslims remain hostile to the ideas of broad-minded nationalism and genuine Marxism, they never stand on the *Sirotol Mustaqim* (i.e., the right path blessed by the God)' (Soekarno, 1969, 48). At the time of his writing, with the breakdown of the communists and the fragmentation of the Islamists, any attempt to build new solidarity among diverse movements seemed Sisyphean (Legge, 1972; McVey, 1969, 4; Shiraishi, 1990, 341–342).

By 1927, the nationalist political discourse had increasingly become a new nodal point that unified the diverse anti-colonial movements.[6] Soekarno himself then set up the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) in that year, garnering broad support from various elements, particularly the new generation of Westernised intelligentsia. Indeed, this nationalist discourse was also appropriated by diverse, even conflicting, interests and visions. For example, as Ricklefs (2001, 230) observed, ethnic leaders and regionalist groups articulated nationalist discourse to counter potential Javanese domination. Christian groups saw it as helpful to defend their position against Islamic domination, while the Arab and Chinese favoured the nationalism for their multiracial aspiration. Albeit temporarily, these vast differences were unified in a chain of equivalence, in which an anti-colonial alliance and a vision of Free Indonesia were constituted as new political solidarity. In this coalition, the *rakyat* (the people) became a new

[6] In response to political awakening in 1927, political advisor to Dutch colonial government, M.WF. Treub, warned the danger of this wave, stating that:

There is a ferment in the Indies. Various movement among the native and Chinese population are mingling and seeking contact with each other. The one is impelled by the urge to independence, the other by religious zeal, a third by hatred for authority. The inner motives of the leaders differ fundamentally, but this need not and does not prevent them from working with each other for the achievement of one common goal: the overthrow of Netherlands rule. (quoted in McVey, 1969, 1).

political subject that effectively referred to 'the entire mass of Indonesians, the mystical embodiment of all the nation' against colonial power (McVey, 1969, 4).

Nevertheless, the nationalist-led anti-colonial struggles did not last long, although they re-emerged following the outbreak of World War II. The reason was particularly associated with the changing of Dutch policies. Confronted with the radicalisation of the anti-colonial movements, combined with the global economic crisis of the 1930s in Europe, the Dutch colonial government became more repressive. Their surveillance apparatuses were ready to crush any subversive movements and send their leaders into exile in the notorious Boven Digul concentration camp in western New Guinea (Benda, 1966; van der Kroef, 1953). By the 1930s, political organisations were no longer endorsed as part of associationism policies but as threats to the colonial power (Shiraishi, 1990). In a nutshell, the period of 'benevolent neutrality' adopted by the Dutch since the Ethical era was strictly over, while anti-colonial struggles on a non-cooperative basis had also come to an end.

Pancasila as a Foundation: Islamic Nationalism Versus Secular Nationalism

Political debates on the relationship between Islam and nationalism in the early 1930s had resulted in the schisms of two contentious subjects, the Islamic nationalists and the secular nationalists. As it will be explained later, contestations between these two subjects were apparent in this era, and after Indonesian Independence. The disagreements between these antagonistic camps are best represented by the long debates between Soekarno and Mohammad Natsir between 1930 and the early 1940s (see, for example, Noer, 1973, 296–315). Crucially, their arguments were no longer framed in the horizon of anti-colonial struggles but a vision of a political community and a governing model for a Free Indonesia, or strictly speaking how to 'define' Indonesia. The issue at stake was about the ideological foundation for the postcolonial Indonesia, mainly revolved around contending arguments and claims on the relations between Islam and the state.

For the Islamists, as represented by Natsir, the vision for postcolonial Indonesia should be based on Islam. They saw the creation of an Islamic-based state as inevitable. Natsir, for example, stated that:

> The objective of Muslims to fight for independence is to achieve the independence of Islam, in order that Islamic rules and structures of Islam can be applied, for the salvation and the dignity of Muslims in particular and all God's creatures in general. (*Pembela Islam,* 1931, cited via Noer, 1973, 281)

On the contrary, Soekarno, who represented the proponents of secular nationalism and was sympathetic to Kemalist projects, argued that creating an Islamic state was impossible. He declared that:

> The principle of the unity of state and religion for a country whose inhabitants are not 100% Muslim could not be in line with democracy... For such a country, there are only two alternatives, there are only two options: the unity of state-religion, but anti-democracy or democracy, but the state is separated from religion. (*Panji Islam,* 1940, cited via Soekarno, 1964, 454)

The contestation between the two subjects continued, characterising the dynamics of nation-state-building project from the late colonial to the postcolonial era. In the 1930s, the Dutch repressive policies were followed by the creation of an institutional framework for a limited accommodation, but the main purpose was to discipline and control anti-colonial mobilisations. The Dutch colonial administration, for example, sponsored the establishment of the *Majelis Islam A'laa Indonesia* (MIAI, Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia) in 1937. In this body, Islamic groups, which were previously less radically opposed to the Dutch, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Al-Irshad and *Persatuan Islam* (Persis, Islamic Union), became the main component. Two years later, nationalist groups also formed the *Gabungan Politik Indonesia* (GAPI, Indonesian Political Federation), which requested a full parliament for Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2001, 242–243). The creation of these institutional bodies became a new political arena and mobilisations for contending forces, Islamists and secular nationalists. Yet, their desire to be accommodated in state power was never fulfilled until the Japanese arrived in Indonesia in 1942.

From the outset, both Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists warmly welcomed the Japanese arrival. They expected that this *dunia*

baru (new world) would bring them a better position in the new structure of power.[7] Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese tended to accommodate them (Benda, 1955, 354–356; Kersten, 2017, 132–133; Madinier, 2013, 45–53;). In agreement with Robert Cribb's explanation, such accommodation was made possible in the first place because the institutions of the Japanese occupation reflected a corporatist view of society, whose main target was 'to engage the mass of the population directly with the state' (2010, 103). Indeed, situated in World War II circumstances, the Japanese interest to mobilise popular support for war aims had led them to give political space for the Islamists and nationalists.

To achieve their mobilisation strategies, in October 1943, the Japanese replaced the former MIAI with a more powerful Masyumi (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia,* Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), led by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader, Kyai Hasjim As'ary. They also gave prominent roles to Muhammadiyah and NU, two Islamist organisations that were seen as less radical and had broad masses in urban centres and villages, respectively (Benda, 1958; Kobayashi, 2010, 300–311; Ricklefs, 2001, 252–255). Yet, in some cases, the politicisation of ulama/kyai became counterproductive. Kurosawa (1993, 326–328), for example, showed that pro-Japanese k*yais* were often suspected of being Japanese spies, and ultimately became the target of hatred. This was especially when the people in the rural areas felt that the Japanese occupation had brought more miseries and hardships. As a consequence, anti-Japanese resistance emerged in many local areas, as prominently shown in the case of a rebellion led by Kyai Zaenal Mustafa of Tasikmalaya, West Java (Kurosawa, 1993, 457–471).

However, it can be said that the balance of power that provided a better position for the Islamists lasted almost uninterrupted until the end of 1944 (Boland, 1982, 8; Benda, 1955, 1955b). Circumscribed by continual military reversals in World War II, the Japanese sought to

[7] For example, Soekarno turned his radical position from anti-cooperation with the Dutch to support the Japanese. He stated that 'at this time Indonesia has common interests and needs with the Japanese… In the past, we were struggling to establish a free Indonesia through radical confrontation against the Dutch, now the struggle for building Indonesia is achieved through a cooperation with the Japanese' (*Panji Pustaka*, 5 September 1942, cited via Abdullah, 2010, 115). Furthermore, Kartosuwiryo, the future leader of the *Darul Islam* movement who was previously critical towards PSII's cooperation policies, even declared that cooperation with the Japanese was a religious duty (Formichi, 2012, 138).

alter their overall policies in Indonesia. The new cabinet in Tokyo, on 7 September 1944, promised Indonesian Independence, hoping that they could mobilise people for the war effort. The nationalists established a youth militia, the Barisan Pelopor (Vanguard Column), with about 80,000 members (Ricklefs, 2001, 257). Among the Islamists, the mobilisation policy was supported by Masyumi leaders who called on members 'to prepare Muslims for the liberation of their country and their religion' (Benda, 1958, 176). They also created an Islamic militia, Hizbullah (God's Forces) and Fisabilillah (In the Path of God), which was said to have 50,000 members at the end of the war (Ricklefs, 2001, 257; 2012, 68).

The tensions between the Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists found a new stage in the Japanese-created *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI, Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). In the first session, held on 29 May-1 June 1945, BPUPKI attempted to draft a new constitution. The ultimate debate was regarding the search for a *weltanschauung* to create a free Indonesia. The discussions of a foundation for postcolonial Indonesia, which had started in the 1930s, re-emerged. However, from the outset, the proponents of nationalist groups in this Committee opted for '*kebangsaan*' as the new political community while attempting to convince the Islamists that their aspirations were not essentially contradictory to the Islamic teachings and interests (Soekarno, 2018, 12–13). For example, Mohammad Hatta stated that:

> We will not establish a state with a separation of religion and state, but a separation of religious affairs and state affairs. If religious affairs are also handled by the state, then the religion will become state equipment and… its eternal character will disappear. State affairs belong to all of us. The affairs of Islam are exclusively the affairs of the Islamic *ummah* and the Islamic society. (Hatta, cited from Lev, 1972, 44)

In a similar vein, Soekarno also expressed that:

> If we really are an Islamic people, let us then work as hard as we can, to see that the greatest number of seats in the Parliament, which we shall form will be occupied by Islamic representatives... I am even convinced that only when something like this happens, only then can it be said that Islam really lives in the soul of the people (Soekarno, 2018, 19–20).

Against such backdrop, the Pancasila—or the five principles, essentially comprised of belief in One God, humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy and social justice—was subsequently accepted by consensus to accommodate different visions of a free Indonesia. The disputes between the Islamists and nationalists were 'resolved' by a compromise in a small committee through the so-called Jakarta Charter, declaring that the state was based on belief in God with the additional words, 'with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law' (Boland, 1982, 25–39). Yet, when this idea was brought to the plenary session, some elements objected to such a compromise. For example, Husain Djajadiningrat stated that the Jakarta Charter would lead to fanaticism, as it seemed that all Muslims were being forced to implement sharia (Boland, 1982, 28–29). The fact that these words did not appear in the post-Independence Constitution text, after further negotiation and compromise, has frequently disappointed some Islamist groups to the present day.

Clearly, the antagonism between the Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists is never been 'completely' resolved throughout this period, and, as discussed later, it would continue into the post-Independence era. With the absence of colonial power as a common antagonism, the contestation between these two subjects revolves around the attempts to 'define' a new political formation and communities of a free Indonesia. The rifts among BPUPKI members only exacerbate the existing differences that eventually weaken the Islamists in the early years of Indonesian politics. On the contrary, the ability of the nationalists to universalise the vision of Indonesian unity based on multicultural differences has led them to attain a relatively hegemonic position in the postcolonial era. Additionally, as part of the Japanese colonial policies, the traditions of militia and violent mobilisation are introduced and have lasted until the current democratising era in Indonesia.

Islamism and the Postcolonial Nation-State Formation

Like many other postcolonial nation-state formations across the globe, the making of Indonesia is characterised by a phenomenal rise of popular support for nationalist political projects. Retroactively, the identity of Indonesia itself can be seen as the result of political identification, constructed firstly against the colonial power and, later, as an attempt to

maintain the unity of Indonesia in the postcolonial state formation. The following tendencies have characterised the dynamics of early Indonesia's nation-state formation. Firstly, the postcolonial project for nation-state formation was principally about the dialectical relations between the efforts to maintain the unity of Indonesia and to politically manage the antagonisms that were historically rooted since the colonial era. Hence, as we shall see, the political struggles waged by the communists and Islamists (and later by 'regionalists') that challenged the hegemony of nationalism discourse were framed in conjunction with the fate of the unity of Indonesia. Secondly, the tensions between identities and political subjects never transformed into the framework of citizenship. Instead, the politicisation of identities had perpetually been a viable strategy to occupy the place of power left by the colonial ruler. Thirdly, political struggles were narrowly articulated in terms of contestations to enter the state power structure. As such, their survival heavily depended on continuous control over state power and resources.

Soon after declaring Independence in 1945, the project of nation-state formation was challenged by two major problems: the rise of Dutch-sponsored regional authorities and the outbreak of ideologically-based insurgencies. Practically, between 1945 and 1949, there were two functioning states in Indonesia—the infant republic and the returning Dutch colonial power represented in the so-called *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS, Republic of the United States of Indonesia). By the end of 1946, the Dutch had effectively controlled the eastern part of the archipelago, followed by their occupation in the major export-commodity-producing areas of Java and Sumatera (Kahin, 2003). After a series of physical and international diplomatic struggles, the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to Indonesia in 1949 had effectively terminated RIS federalism model. However, as we shall see, the legacies of social conflicts of this period remained, at least until the mid-1950s.

Furthermore, the new Indonesia also faced insurgencies from within, waged by both the communists and Islamists. In September 1948, following a series of violent conflicts in Central and East Java, the PKI under the leadership of Muso challenged the authority of the Indonesian government under Soekarno, declaring a National Front in Madiun,

East Java.[8] The PKI was decisively crushed by the Republican army—assisted by Islamist militia and irregular units. The army's success gained attention from Washington, which saw it as a potential ally for US-led campaigns against communism in Southeast Asia. In turn, the US support would not only facilitate diplomatic struggles to attain recognition of sovereignty from the Dutch (1945–1949), but also initiate a strong connection between the US and some sections of the Indonesian army (Gouda & Zaalberg, 2002; Kahin, 2003; Mrazek, 1978).

After the Madiun Affair, the political constellation was signified by the tradition of hostilities. The army and nationalist groups saw PKI as a threat to Indonesia's unity while, at the grass roots, the tensions between PKI and Islamists also escalated. Interestingly, sharing a common enemy in the form of the PKI did not necessarily lead the army and the Islamists to become close to each other (Anderson & McVey, 1971, 138–139). This was because another insurgency under the banner of Islam, the so-called Darul Islam movement, led by Hizbullah leader and former Masyumi Executive Board member Kartosuwiryo, also broke out in West Java. He declared the establishment of the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) on 7 August 1949.[9] Kartosuwiryo garnered widespread support from ex-militia particularly Hizbullah groups, who were disappointed with the republican government and the army. Yet, Masyumi and its prominent leaders like Natsir, formally distanced themselves from the DI throughout the insurgency, until it was severely crushed militarily in 1962 (see, for example, Kahin, 2012; Madinier, 2013).

Unlike the experience of other Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, it is essential to note that incorporating Islam into the structure of power of new Indonesia was a not smooth process (Hadiz & Khoo, 2011; Liow, 2009). Islamism in the newly independent Indonesia

[8] Before the Madiun Affair, the PKI labour and peasant organs mobilised massive strikes in Delanggu of Central Java, demanding better working conditions. The movement turned into political actions against the Republic in Yogyakarta (50 kilometres from Delanggu). In Ngawi of East Java, PKI members also unilaterally seized government plantations (formerly Dutch-owned lands). They also targeted Muslim landlords, mostly *kyai* in the villages, which resulted in violent clashes between Muslims and communists. For a discussion of the Madiun Affair, see, for example, Swift (1989), Ricklefs (2001).

[9] For the various studies on Darul Islam movement, see van Dijk (1981), van Niewenhuijze (1958), Jackson (1980), Formichi (2010; 2012); Horikoshi (1975); Soebardi (1983).

was primarily expressed through competition in the parliament amid the tumultuous but slow period of nation-state formation. By November 1945, the establishment of political parties was encouraged, seen as a democratic instrument to institutionalise political conflict and a legitimate vehicle for accessing state power. In fact, the contending forces of this period were historically rooted in the anti-colonial struggle era, yet they were now operating primarily to gain control over state power.

It is also apparent that political developments in the early years of postcolonial Indonesia (1945–1949) constituted a distinct form of power configuration, contestation and coalitions, which would greatly influence Indonesian politics and the practices of Islamism in the subsequent historical periods. From this standpoint, the main historical legacies of this era were threefold. Firstly, the emergence of an increasingly powerful and ideologically coherent army. Secondly, the continuation of antagonistic relations between Islamism and communism. Thirdly, the distrust of the army towards political aspirations from both communism and Islamism, which were seen essentially as endangering the unity of Indonesia.

Pancasila Versus Islam: Islamism and Parliamentary Politics, 1949–1957

After the sovereignty transfer in 1949, Indonesia adopted Parliamentary Democracy as a framework for nation-state building projects, with the leading spirit of maintaining the unity of a young republic. As Feith (2007, 127) shows, the introduction of multiparty system and parliamentary politics is seen as the viable institutional mechanism to accommodate conflicting social groups. He argues that the creation of political parties and parliamentary democracy helped break down political and psychological barriers between those who had cooperated with the Dutch and those who had not during the revolutionary era, or even those who were previously active in the Dutch-created 'puppet' states under the framework of RIS federalism (see also Anderson, 1990, 102). Therefore, the parties became increasingly important as a vehicle to enter state power, and developed patronage functions, through which material resources were distributed. Quite remarkably, for more than five years after implementing parliamentary democracy, the party leaders managed to postpone general elections and showed little commitment to the grass-roots-based representative democracy (Feith, 2007; Ricklefs, 2001, 289–290).

In the early era of parliamentary democracy, the Masyumi party was the only political vehicle for representing the interests of Muslims through the elections. Unlike other parties, it was an amalgamation of some Islamic organisations with diverse, if not conflicting, interests, aspirations and constituencies (see Feith, 2007, 134–135; Madinier, 2013). While there was no general election yet, political composition in the parliament was determined to reflect what was regarded as the strength of support of the various parties. Masyumi assumed the most significant proportion of seats, followed by PNI (nationalist) and Socialist Party (Feith, 2007, 128). It is worth noting that parliamentary democracy did not provide President Soekarno with substantial power, apart from the appointment of *formateurs* to build a new cabinet, which frequently required complex negotiations. While this period witnessed the rise and fall of cabinets—there were six cabinets from 1950 to 1957—Masyumi had continuously led or become a coalition member of these cabinets. The only exception was during the Ali Sastroamidjojo I cabinet (July 1953-July 1955), when Masyumi and PSI were excluded from the coalition.

The perpetual decline of Masyumi's position began in the early years of the Wilopo cabinet (April 1952-June 1953). It was started with the succession of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), because its leaders felt that Masyumi had continuously subordinated their political role (Seri Buku Tempo, 2016, 100). The disappointment with Masyumi emerged at the party's establishment in 1945 when urban modernist politicians such as Sukiman and Natsir took control of the party (Boland, 1982; Madinier, 2013). The separation between *ulama* and politicians became more pronounced when the role of the Party Council was degraded to merely an advisory body, and thus minimised the political role of Nahdlatul Ulama. The conflict culminated in Masyumi's decision to give the post of Minister of Religious Affairs, a position previously filled by an NU representative, to Fakih Usman of Muhammadiyah. After the split, the NU party built a coalition with other Java-based parties, including PNI and PKI, while Masyumi allied itself with the Socialist Party (Feith, 1958, 203). While Masyumi's support was still prevalent in several regions, its position in national politics was limited. The retreat of Masyumi was also concurrently followed by the decline of the Islamic petty trading and manufacturing bourgeoisie (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 44).

It is noteworthy that since the Natsir-led cabinet in 1950, Indonesia's economic policy was mainly intended to secure indigenous (*pribumi*) dominance in the import sectors through the so-called *Benteng* program

(1950–1957), by privileging *pribumi* against international and Chinese capital. Nevertheless, the *Benteng* program also failed to facilitate the emergence of solid *pribumi* bourgeoisie and only produced political fixers and brokers who were strongly linked to political parties (Robison, 2009, 45). This program, as Robison argues, had constituted the patrimonial feature of state-capital relations in Indonesia. In such power relations, access to state power would determine 'which individual enterprises prospered and which declined within the context of general state policy' (Robison, 2009, 47).

While Islamic politics experienced severe fragmentation in the parliamentary democracy system, the communists rose again from the second quarter of 1952. After being crushed in Madiun in 1948, and under the hostile environment of the Cold War, this rapid development was primarily associated with changing articulations and strategies under the leadership of the young D.N. Aidit (1923–1965). The PKI was now leaving aside its international outlook and, in turn, developing new relationships with nationalist forces, primarily through PNI and Soekarno himself (Feith, 2007, 237–246; Ricklefs, 2001, 293–294). Such manoeuvres gave more freedom for PKI to reorganise its social bases without fear of army scrutiny. In the parliament, the rise of the PKI also effectively widened existing schisms between the PNI and Masyumi. After Nahdlatul Ulama split from Masyumi, both PKI and PNI felt more likely to cooperate with the former than the latter.

Before the 1955 elections, political tensions between the PNI and Masyumi escalated at elite and grass-roots levels. For example, as early as 1953, Soekarno of PNI warned Masyumi that many areas of non-Muslim majority would secede from Indonesia if the latter would put forward a demand for an Islam-based state.[10] Soekarno's position was vigorously defended by PKI and Christian parties, arguing that democracy was now under serious threat from Islamic majoritarianism (Feith 2007, 281–283). In its bid to gain broad support from the Islamists for the election, Masyumi promised to create a state based on Islamic law. The secular

[10] In his speech delivered in South Kalimantan on 27 January 1956, Soekarno stated that:

The state we want is a national state consisting all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands, and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia, will not want to part of the Republic. (Boland, 1982, 47–48; Feith, 2007, 281).

nationalist parties subsequently associated Masyumi with *Darul Islam*, framing it as a threat to Pancasila and the unity of Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2001, 299–300). Thus, Pancasila, which previously served as a consensus among contending political forces especially between the Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists, was now appropriated and signified as an anti-Islamist slogan (see Boland, 1982; Feith, 2007, 317). Once an element in Pancasila, Islamism was now constituted as its antagonism.

Not surprisingly, the 1955 general election only made the existing polarisation between Pancasila versus Islam blocs more visible. It turned out that both PNI and Masyumi obtained 57 seats, followed by NU (45), PKI (39), PSII and Christian Party (8 respectively), Catholic Party (6), Socialist Party (5) and other smaller parties with fewer than four seats (Feith 2007, 434–435). Formal debates between Pancasila and Islam blocs regarding state foundation issues took place in the *Dewan Konstituante* (People's Assembly) when it drafted a new Constitution.[11] Despite the internal conflicts they had experienced in the previous three years, the polarisation of Pancasila and Islam blocs during and after the election dragged Islamic parties into cooperation with one another. For example, when President Soekarno started to talk about the idea of Guided Democracy, as discussed below, Islamic parties attempted to launch a counter-attack against the Pancasila blocs, accusing them of authoritarian tendencies (Boland, 1982; Lev, 1966).

In fact, the army and nationalists saw the perpetual conflicts of the parliamentary democracy era as endangering the project of Indonesia's nation-state building. They firmly believed that political articulations organised around the signifier of region and religion would threaten the unity of Indonesia. The parliamentary democracy period was also characterised by the outbreak of a series of insurgencies driven by such prominent issues as national-local economic distribution, Jakarta's centralisation of power and bureaucratic reforms in the military that effectively excluded many 'uneducated' but influential local officers (Crouch, 2007). These regional insurgencies took place almost concurrently in Ambon (RMS, 1950–1963), Sumatera (PRRI, 1958–1960), North Sulawesi

[11] Between 1945 and the 1950s, Indonesia was governed by different constitutions. The 1945 Constitution, enacted soon after the Independence, was replaced by the Constitution of the *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (RIS). After the formal sovereignty transfer (1949), this RIS Constitution was replaced by a temporary constitution when the unitary state was formed in 1950.

(Permesta, 1958–1961), Aceh (DI, 1953–1962) and South Kalimantan (DI, 1950–1963) and all were defeated militarily.

As early as 1956, Soekarno expressed anti-party sentiments and called for the termination of the parliamentary democracy. He saw that this framework had resulted in severe tensions that threatened Indonesia's nation-state's unity. In response, he replaced parliamentary democracy with a corporatist-technocratic framework through various appointed bodies. By April 1957, for example, Soekarno announced a non-party Working Cabinet (*Kabinet Karya*) under the leadership of a non-party politician Djuanda Kartawidjaja. Soekarno's strategy culminated in 1959 when he eventually dissolved the *Dewan Konstituante* and replaced it with a corporatist model of *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara* (MPRS, Provisional People's Consultative Council). He also declared the return to the 1945 Constitution, meaning that there was no room for debating the foundation of the state (Soekarno, 1965, 227–255). As such, Soekarno favoured the strengthening of the technocratic state at the expense of suppressing existing political differences, which sprung from the failure of the nation-state formation project itself (cf. Anderson, 1990, 99–109).

Politicising Identities, Coopting Representation: Islamism and the Guided Democracy, 1957–1965

The coming of Guided Democracy, which strengthened President Soekarno's political position, dramatically reshaped the contestations which characterised political dynamics throughout this period (see Lev, 1966). From the very beginning, the army fully supported Soekarno's decision to implement Guided Democracy, because this system allowed it to wield state power and play a more significant political role (Crouch, 2007). The army consolidated its political position, previously obtained from the imposition of martial law in March 1957 following the outbreak of the 'regionalist' insurgencies. The army also extended business networks in the regions and obtained managerial positions in ex-Dutch companies after the 1957 nationalisation program (Anderson, 1990, 104–105; Crouch, 2007; Samson, 1968). Initially, President Soekarno's relationship with the army was one of mutual dependence, making a relatively smooth transition from parliamentary to Guided Democracy. Soekarno needed army support to maintain the unity of Indonesia that was regarded as in danger throughout the 1950s. In

contrast, the army realised Soekarno's role in providing legitimacy and support to the existing system that benefited the military politically and economically. But, this balance did not last long.

Aware of the potential dangers of dependence on the army to his position, President Soekarno attempted to build an alliance with civilian groups. From 1956 to 1959, Soekarno promoted the creation of a national front to incorporate all functional groups and linked them to the state under his leadership (Porter, 2003, 23–24; Reeve, 1985). In the late 1950s, the army leaders also established their own model of functional groups to challenge Soekarno's political bases. Its main aim was to dissociate the linkage between mass organisations and political parties. For example, they formed various cooperation bodies (BKS, *Badan Kerja Sama*) under army control, culminating in the creation of a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar) in 1964. This organisation was primarily intended as an anti-communist front and, subsequently, the army's vehicle to enter the political arena (see Crouch, 2007; Reeve, 1985).

Through Guided Democracy, Soekarno attempted to manage antagonisms, which were regarded as the source of instability in the parliamentary democracy era, through a corporatist body under the banner of NASAKOM (literally meaning *Nationalism* (represented by the PNI), *Religion* (Nahdlatul Ulama), *Communism* (PKI)). Political conflicts were to be contained through a corporatist framework centred around Soekarno himself. Through NASAKOM, Soekarno gave PKI a more significant role throughout the Guided Democracy as a counterbalance to the army. By 1957, PKI had rapidly developed as Java's most vital political force. For example, in the 1957 election for provincial councils, its vote was 37.2% higher than in the 1955 election, gaining new support from the Leftist PNI (see Rocamora, 1975). In Central and East Java, PKI won 34%, followed by NU 29%, and PNI and Masyumi won 26 and 11%, respectively (Ricklefs, 2001, 316). As discussed later, PKI was subsequently seen as a threat by the army, especially in their competition to build a direct alliance with Soekarno. NU also saw PKI as a political competitor for mobilisation at the grass-roots levels.

Crucially, NASAKOM was a shortcut to manage political particularities and differences for nation-state formation by politicising identities. Indeed, Soekarno fully understood that the nation-state building project would require the creation of common and external antagonisms through which he could manage political differences and contestations in the

country. For this purpose, he emphasised a foreign policy that was hostile towards the interests of Western countries, articulated in his rejection of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism as outlined in *anti-Nekolim* slogans. Soekarno conceived global politics of that era as made up of two contending blocs, NEFO (New Emerging Forces), comprised of postcolonial countries against the OLDEFO (Old Established Forces) (Weinstein, 2007). By using this framework, by early 1960, Soekarno began to mobilise people for the *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia that was regarded as the British neo-colonialism project, and the takeover of West Irian from the Dutch (Courch, 2007). By urging that the Indonesian revolution was still unfinished, such a mobilisation against the imperialist powers was principally driven by the goal of creating a sense of solidarity at home.

The period between 1959 and the 1960s was also characterised by the continuous decline of the Indonesian economy. Efforts to establish a robust indigenous business class through the *Benteng* program had entirely failed by 1957. The government's development plan could not be achieved plainly because of the lack of financial resources (Robison, 2009). By early 1960, as Booth notes (1998, 162), the ratio of government expenditure to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was even lower than during the early years of Independence. One major problem was the collapse in world prices of Indonesia's primary export commodities, especially rubber. Another reason was the burden of financing a series of military operations against regional rebellions in the mid-1950s and Soekarno's reactionary foreign policies. By August 1959, government efforts to restrain inflation were unsuccessful. The inflation rate continued to skyrocket, exceeding 600 per cent in early 1966 (Booth, 1998, 165–172; Ricklefs 2001, 352).

The politicisation of identities and political differences as a strategy to manage antagonisms had been increasingly beyond Soekarno's control. On the one hand, Soekarno's reactionary foreign policies and mobilisation for war had only strengthened the position of the army vis-à-vis Soekarno himself (Crouch, 2007). On the other hand, political tensions, especially between NASAKOM elements (PKI, PNI and NU), escalated and led to violent clashes at the grass-roots level. Such contentions were begun when PKI and its peasant union, the *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI, Indonesian Peasant Front), launched a unilateral action (*Aksi Sepihak*) in 1963–1964. Driven by the motive of fostering land reform implementation, PKI's unilateral actions impacted many PNI and NU landlords

(Lyon, 1970; Mortimer, 2006).[12] From this period, the conflicts between PKI and NU were increasingly framed through religious idioms.[13]

It is also worth noting that PKI's endorsement of launching a class struggle from the countryside (called *Turba, Turun ke Bawah* or 'Go Down" strategies) was influenced by two main political developments (Mortimer, 2006, 278). Firstly, it was a response to the increasingly strong position of the army. After the 1957 nationalisation, PKI could not easily mobilise strikes in companies categorised as nationally strategic objects, while the military had effectively mobilised anti-PKI functional groups in urban areas (Anderson, 1990; Mortimer, 2006). Secondly, without further elections, the NASAKOM framework prompted PKI and NU—whose primary social bases were village-level—to mobilise the people. Both PKI and NU saw mass-based mobilisations as the only strategy to improve their bargaining position, especially with the President.

The zero-sum competition between the NASAKOM elements became uncontrolled and reached its peak on the eve of the 30 September 1965 aborted coup. It then brought together the army and the Islamists as an anti-communist alliance, involved in a series of brutal massacres that took the life of 200,000 to more than 1,000,000 people (see, for example, Anderson & McVey, 1971; Cribb, 1990; Robinson, 2018). Soekarno's nation-state formation project through NASAKOM had also resulted in an internal confrontation between the three central discourses that

[12] The position of PNI and its relations with other NASAKOM elements was ambiguous. The milieu of Guided Democracy had considerably pushed PNI to the Left, which brought about a severe dilemma for the party. Firstly, the party significantly lost its support in the bureaucracy and among local elites—its main social bases. Secondly, PNI's support to PKI's agenda, such as land reform and *Aksi Sepihak*, would only give the latter more incredible political benefits. Such transformation led to the association of PNI and PKI during the army-led anti-communist campaign in 1965/1966. Since PNI had more convergences with PKI than Islam throughout this period, I do not discuss PNI in more detail in this chapter. For studies of PNI, see McIntyre (1972, 183–210), Rocamora (1975).

[13] By 1963, the implementation of the Basic Agraria Law of 1960 stagnated, hampered by such problems as corruption, inadequate administrative support and opposition from landlords and religious organisations. PKI saw land reform backed by the Laws as a communist issue that was instrumental in building a coherent movement in the countryside. On the contrary, the Islamists saw PKI's manoeuvre as fostering chaos at the grassroots levels. Specifically, NU accused PKI and BTI of attacking religious schools and insulting Islam. NU urged followers to crush 'the atheists' and defend their lands in the name of *jihad*. See Mortimer (2006, 376–328), Lyon (1970).

had constituted Indonesia. Such a dynamic eventually led to the disappearance of Leftist discourses in Indonesia's political sphere. Crucially, Guided Democracy discredited representative interest-based articulation. Its legacies, by consequence, effectively facilitated the depoliticisation of citizenship, signified by privileging the technocratic governing model and politicising identities.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has shown the emergence and dynamics of three central anti-colonial discourses that greatly influenced Indonesia's nation-state formation: Islamism, communism and nationalism. By constructing colonial power as a common antagonism, these anti-colonial discourses could link different groups regardless of their background to eventually create new solidarity and consciousness in the making of Indonesia. With regard to Islamism, broader social changes and political contestations during the Movement period (*zaman pergerakan*, 1911–1930) had significantly shaped different faces of Islamist articulations. The chapter also shows that, from the very outset, Islamism was never singular or unchanging. In the early twentieth century, Islamism, represented by Sarekat Islam, had become a hegemonic discourse for the anti-colonial movement, comprising a cross-alliance among diverse social groups. Yet, its hegemonic position was subsequently challenged by communism and, later, nationalism.

As in other Muslim-majority countries, the decline of colonial power resulted in a contested vision for a free nation, whether postcolonial communities would be based on the *ummah* or the nation. In Indonesia, these contestations produced two contending subjects: Islamic nationalists and secular nationalists. Such contestations influenced the making of Indonesia by constituting Pancasila, perceived as the embodiment of the existing political differences, as the ultimate foundation of a new nation-state. However, with the absence of a common antagonism, political contestations in postcolonial Indonesia culminated in struggles to occupy state power. For the nation-state building projects, the main challenge of those contestations was managing contradictory relations between efforts to maintain Indonesia's unity and to deal with political differences. From 1945 to 1965, these processes were achieved through Parliamentary Democracy and Guided Democracy frameworks, respectively.

It is noteworthy that Islamism in Indonesia was not smoothly accommodated in the postcolonial context. From 1949 to 1965, its road to state power was achieved primarily through electoral contestation and corporatist frameworks. In these processes, the old rifts between Islamism, communism and nationalism recurred with the ultimate aim of controlling the state's power and resources. The introduction of Parliamentary Democracy (1949–1957) had significantly resulted in a severe political stalemate, triggered the outbreak of regionalist insurgencies and failed to agree to create a new Indonesian Constitution. Tantalisingly, Masyumi, once a significant political force for the Islamists, continuously suffered fragmentation and marginalisation. Its role in national politics diminished and effectively ended when Soekarno banned the party in August 1960 after its leaders were allegedly involved in the PRRI regionalist insurgencies.

Soekarno's move to Guided Democracy was crucially a historical turning point. In this model, nation-state building projects for managing political difference were not achieved through democratic mechanisms but through a corporatist framework, known as NASAKOM. In fact, the NASAKOM framework was based on the politicisation of identities and making a technocratic state. While providing Soekarno with more authority, the Guided Democracy brought internal conflicts among its elements, especially between the Islamists, communists and the army, that peaked in the 1965 tragedy. The legacies of this period's social conflicts, which were highly situated in the Cold War circumstances, would pave the way for the supremacy of a technocratic state and the depoliticisation of representation and citizenship. These anti-politics elements would be more coherently articulated during the New Order, as discussed in the next chapter.

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PROGRESIF ★ TRANSFORMATIF ★ AMAL SOLEH ★ FIKIR ★ DZIKIR ★ KRITIS ★
PMII
PMII GADJAH MADA

CHAPTER 4

New Order and the Politicisation of Islam

Unlike Turkey's experience with Kemalism, modernisation projects in postcolonial Indonesia were not articulated through 'de-Islamisation,' that is, by removing the influence of Islam from the public sphere (Sayyid, 1997, 63–69; Uzak, 2010). Rather, they were achieved primarily through the creation of a technocratic governing model. This was made possible by the depoliticisation of representation-based politics in both political and civil society. Following the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and killing its activists and sympathisers, the political turmoil in the 1960s fostered the consolidation of a new technocratic regime. Against the backdrop of severe economic crisis and skyrocketing inflation, the doctrine of '*ekonomi sebagai panglima*' (economic development as a priority) gained more traction. Meanwhile, practices of representation-based politics, including those organised around Islam, were discredited and seen as a source of instability and conflict. These conditions had paved the way for the emergence of the developmentalism discourse, constructed by its proponents and supporters as a solution to the political and economic catastrophe of the Soekarno's Guided Democracy.

Notably, the developmentalism discourse in this era was not limitedly articulated through growth-oriented economic policies and integration into global markets. As a political discourse, it prescribed an encompassing logic of governing which characterised the nature of the New

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Order state. Through the practices of developmentalism, a new model of state-society relations, especially between Islamism and the state for this case, was constituted and organised. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: How and through what mechanisms and strategies is Islam constituted in New Order developmentalism discourse? What forms of agencies and subjectivities emerge from such processes? How do these complex processes influence the rise and fall of the hegemony of New Order developmentalism and the practices of Islamism itself?

By conceiving of the New Order developmentalism as a discourse—as a totality of articulatory practices—the relationship between Islamism and the state cannot be captured merely from the perspectives of state corporatism or instrumentalism (e.g. Dhakidae, 2003; Liddle, 1996; Porter, 2002). This chapter suggests that the New Order itself also means the consolidation of diverse Islamist articulations. In fact, Islamism is not entirely outside the New Order discourse but is one of its constituting elements. Indeed, the formation and development of the New Order take place through political contestation and coalition that shape Islamist articulations as well as the state's responses. These dynamics have eventually constituted the specific power configuration of the so-called New Order and the diverse articulations of Islamism. The chapter identifies three discursive settings within which different manifestations of Islamism were constituted and contested throughout the New Order period. These were, respectively, the periods of formation (1966–1973), consolidation (1973–1983) and negotiation (1984–1998).

Following such three discursive settings, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses Islamism and the making of the New Order state. Circumscribed within Cold War global politics and the legacies of Guided Democracy's social conflicts, Islamists played a central role in an anti-communist alliance and in the regime change that subsequently brought General Soeharto into power in the mid-1960s. In this formation period, the encounters between Islam and the state were framed mainly around issues of ideology, by which the discursive formation of the New Order was built upon the exclusion of communism and certain forms of Islamism. The subsequent section explains the consolidation of New Order hegemony. Such a hegemonic process was mainly achieved by constituting and universalising so-called Pancasila Democracy as a general nodal point of diverse demands and articulations organised around the signifiers of political stability, welfare and social harmony. These three

signifiers were constructed as the antithesis of the previously discredited Soekarno's Guided Democracy. Under the New Order hegemony, Islamist articulations took a new political turn and were domesticated in the domain of culture. Here, the political agencies and subjectivities of Islamism were forged and mobilised to defend the appeal of developmentalist projects.

In the last section, the focus is on the contradictions of the New Order hegemony which, in various ways, opened spaces for Islamists to negotiate with Soeharto's authoritarian regime. In this period, the articulations of Islam manifested in the form of identity politics, constructed as a political basis for struggles to reshape the existing structure of power relations. It is shown here that the accommodation of middle-class-based Islamism in the 1990s by Soeharto, as part of the changing balance of forces ensuing from economic development and internal conflicts with some sections of the military, brought about a dramatic change. This strategy shaped fields of contestation among Islamists and other political forces, which, in turn, challenged the New Order hegemony. Such conditions resulted in polarisation among the Islamist groups and further internal fractures within the New Order's key political pillars. More decisively, the Asian economic crisis that hit the country in 1998 fostered the organic crisis of the hegemony of New Order developmentalism, culminating in Soeharto's fall in May 1998.

Islamism and the New Order Formation

Situated in Cold War global politics and Guided Democracy social conflicts, anti-communism discourse had facilitated a social coalition, led by the army, first to crack down on the communists and subsequently to replace the staunchly anti-Western Soekarno's rule. Within this broad coalition, Islamists of various stripes played a prominent role as the army's proxy in purging the communists and promoting regime change. Apart from eliminating communism, the New Order formation subsequently involved the exclusion of certain forms of Islamism. The proponents of the New Order were fully aware of potential challengers from the political forces of communism and Islamism. After disorganising these forces, the New Order decisively developed its governing format by articulating the so-called Pancasila Democracy. In this format, Pancasila Democracy was constructed as a new set of principles for organising the nation for

a technocratic development agenda. Crucially, it is a form of depoliticisation of citizenship that undermines representative-interests-based politics, including that waged by Islamist discourses.

Anti-communism and the Regime Change

From the 30 September 1965 tragedy, anti-communism discourse was a hallmark of Indonesian politics. As part of the social conflicts and tensions during the Guided Democracy, the anti-communist discourse portrayed the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a threat to security, political stability and religion, especially Islam. Framing the 30 September tragedy as ultimately the PKI's effort to threaten Pancasila and the unity of Indonesia, the army began to launch an anti-communist coalition. Through its proxies within society, mainly Islamists, the army urged people to brutally eliminate the PKI, and this led to the systematic massacre (Melvin, 2018; Roosa, 2020). Severe tensions between Islamists and communists escalated, especially during the mid-1960s, when the clashes between their supporters became more violent within the villages. Such a condition prompted the Islamists to justify anti-communist actions as *jihad*, holy war. Apart from economic motives associated with the land reform, as discussed in Chapter 3, many Islamists also realised that the PKI had a political agenda of replacing the Indonesian state with a communist and atheist model (Lyon, 1970; Mortimer, 2006).

In response to the army's call, for example, Muhammadiyah then pronounced that 'the extermination of the Gestapu/PKI… is a religious duty' that was seen as an obligation for all Muslims' (Boland, 1982, 146). The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), through its youth and paramilitary wings, Ansor and Banser respectively, also took part in deadly clashes with the PKI supporters in East Java (Fealy & McGregor, 2010; Feillard, 1999). Masyumi, the most prominent Islamic party before Soekarno banned it in 1960, and PKI's long-time enemy, even went further to call for regime change. Its proponents expected that the new government 'would reverse the increasingly authoritarian actions of its predecessor,' and recover its position in the new political landscape (Kahin, 2012, 154).

Within months, the anti-communist actions had given rise to a coalition representing broader demands for regime change. The worsening of economic conditions in the mid-1960s, especially hyperinflation, only facilitated the expansion of its social base (Booth, 1998; Robison, 2009). More specifically, student organisations and Muslim politicians played

an instrumental role in the regime change process in 1966. Backed by the army, university students established the *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* (KAMI, Indonesian Student Action Front) to replace the *Perhimpunan Perserikatan Mahasiswa Indonesia* (PPMI, Federation of Indonesian Students). Although the latter had once declared an anti-communist stance, it still had many Soekarnoists in its leadership (Boland, 1982). KAMI consisted of several students organisations, such as the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI, Association of Muslim Students—linked to Masyumi); *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (PMII, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement, linked to Nahdlatul Ulama); *Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis* (Gemsos, linked to Socialist Party of PSI); *Persatuan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia* (PMKRI, Union of Catholic University Students); and *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* (GMKI, Protestant Indonesian Student Movement). KAMI was responsible for holding demonstrations against Soekarno in many urban cities, demanding the *Tritura* (three demands of the people): dissolution of the PKI, reorganisation of the government and lowering prices of essential goods (Boland, 1982; Crouch, 2007; Hefner, 2000, 67–70).

In addition, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the Islamic party in parliament and the leading partner of the army, played a significant role in the process of regime change. This is particularly the case after many PKI members in the parliament were expelled, killed or imprisoned in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1965 coup (Feillard, 1999, 88–89). NU politician Achmad Sjaichu, then the speaker of the *Majelis Permusyawarakatan Rakyat Sementara* (MPRS, Provisional People's Consultative Council), approved the purges of the leftish parliamentary members, to be replaced by the army-backed members. He even described NU and the army as 'two brothers' (Feillard, 1996, 42–67). Soekarno's rule effectively ended when MPRS named Soeharto, the Commander of Army Reserve Command (Pangkostrad), as acting president in March 1966, although he only obtained full powers two years later.

The fall of the Soekarno regime and the communists' massacre was greatly welcomed by the United States and Western countries as 'a gleam of light in Asia' (*New York Times* 19 June 1966 via Roosa, 2006, 16). The new army-dominated government proclaimed the birth of the 'New Order' to replace the discredited 'Old Order' that was primarily marked by the signifiers of political instability, economic crisis and authoritarianism. The new government reversed many of Soekarno's Third Worldism-style economic and foreign policies (Crouch, 2007; Robison,

2009; Weinstein, 2007). For example, in contrast to Soekarno's hostility towards foreign capital, the new government began to provide conditions for the influx of international capital and assistance (Robison, 2009, 131–175). Like other United States-backed regime changes during the Cold War era, the new regime also became a prominent ally of the West in the region.

Islam in the New Order Discourse: Strategies of Exclusion and Accommodation

Purging the communists and regime change were just the beginning. Later, the discursive frontiers of the New Order were also constituted by its negation of some forms of Islamism. Through the strategies of accommodation and exclusion, the New Order attempted to separate its friends from enemies. Therefore, the struggles of political groups, including Islamists, to be accommodated in state power became a matter of survival. Such conditions had facilitated the emergence of diverse Islamist articulations that shaped the playing field of their different relations with the New Order regime. From the lens of hegemony, these strategies were a crucial stepping stone to disorganising Islamist groups from potentially being a counter-hegemonic force under the banner of Islam.

Generally speaking, all the Islamists initially considered regime change as an opportunity to have a greater political role. This was particularly the case for Masyumi. Its leaders expected that the change would provide a chance for the party's rehabilitation, given their contribution to resisting Soekarno's rule and being part of the anti-communist coalition (Boland, 1982, 151; Hefner, 2000, 97; Kahin, 2012, 155). Nevertheless, their wishes were pre-empted by the army from the outset. In a joint statement issued on 21 December 1966, the army stated that they 'would take firm steps against anyone, whichever side, whatever group which will deviate from *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution as which already been done by the Communist Party Revolt in Madiun, *Gestapu*, Darul Islam… and Masyumi-Socialist Party of Indonesia' (Boland, 1982, 151; see also Ward, 1970). Seen as ideologically subversive as the PKI, mainly due to the participation of its leaders in the PRRI insurgency, Soeharto and the army eventually rejected the Masyumi leaders' plea.

Subsequently, Masyumi leaders proposed the establishment of a new Islamic party, the *Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (PMI, later changed to

Parmusi). It was after excluding all Masyumi leaders from the party structure as the result of negotiations with the army and Soeharto that the PMI was finally legalised on 20 February 1967, led by Djarnawi Hadikusuma of Muhammadiyah (Boland, 1982, 152–156; Kahin, 2012, 159; Samson, 1971, 553). For the time being, as Ward (1970, 31–32) and Samson (1968, 1008) observed, there were two competing Islamist articulations within the party: the 'idealists' associated with former Masyumi leaders and the 'realists' camp which mostly came from Muhammadiyah. The position of the former continuously declined, and this culminated when Soeharto interfered directly in the party in 1970 by appointing M. S. Mintaredja, a Muhammadiyah figure who had no direct connection with Masyumi, as the party chairman, and inserted his loyalists in its party structure (Kahin, 2012, 161; Ward, 1970, 27–40).

This intervention effectively disentangled the party from Masyumi's influence. Mohammad Natsir, a Masyumi top leader, felt that Masyumi would no longer have the opportunity to participate in the political arena. He described any efforts to rehabilitate the party as rather 'quixotic,' saying that: 'to compromise with such army interference and control would be a disappointment to former Masyumi supporters' (Kahin, 2012, 162). Masyumi then transformed itself into a *dakwah* (predication) vehicle under the newly crafted *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia* (DDII, Indonesian Council for the Islamic Predication). Regarding this new vehicle, Natsir recalled that: 'before we used politics as a way to preach, now we are using preaching as a way to engage politics' (Kahin, 2012, 168).

DDII gained momentum to build its social bases following the implementation of government-sponsored policy of 'building up' (*pembinaan*) communities (1967–the 1970s).[1] Through this program, DDII expanded its target of Islamisation of society strategies from a previous counter-Christianisation effort in Java, especially in ex-PKI strongholds, to a more systematic recruitment of young preachers and university students (Hefner, 2000, 106–113; Kahin, 2012, 167–168). Since the late 1970s,

[1] This program was initiated to control the population in the ex-communist strongholds. Due to Islamists' involvement in the PKI massacre, many of ex-communist members or sympathisers then converted themselves into Christianity or other religions that was seen by DDII as 'Christianisation' wave. It is reported that between 1966 and 1976, almost two million of Javanese converted to Christianity while another 250–400 thousand became Hindu. See Hefner (2011, 86) and Kahin (2012).

financially supported by Saudi Arabia's petrodollars as part of its campaign to counter the influence of the Iranian revolution in Muslim countries, DDII had begun to launch an Islamisation agenda among university students and middle classes in urban cities. This program, as discussed later, brought about far-reaching impacts. The most prominent was the expansion of social bases of Islamists and the cultivation of *ummah* identities among a new Islamist generation, mainly young educated Muslims and university students, in the late 1970s and 1980s (cf. Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Hadiz, 2016; Machmudi, 2008).

In stark contrast to Masyumi, the army tended to easily accommodate Muhammadiyah into state power from the very beginning (Boland, 1982; Samson, 1971: 554). For the army, Muhammadiyah had nothing to do with the social conflicts of Guided Democracy. Muhammadiyah also distanced itself from Masyumi leaders when the latter participated in the PRRI insurgency, and officially broke its ties when Soekarno banned the party in 1960. Many Muhammadiyah members were subsequently accommodated in the early New Order, for instance, to fill the positions of religious teachers following the MPRS's decree of 1966 that stipulated religion as a compulsory subject at all levels of education (Boland, 1982; Hefner, 2000).

Ironically, Nahdlatul Ulama's relationship with the army and Soeharto declined after the regime change due to the following reasons. Firstly, NU was disappointed with Soeharto, as the latter repeatedly postponed elections. Indonesia had not had general elections since 1955. This was because Soeharto did not possess an electoral vehicle yet (Feillard, 1999, 96–101). Secondly, NU also protested to Soeharto that the army was given 50% of seats in the parliament, in contrast to NU's demand for just 5% (Feillard, 1996, 42–67). After the regime change, Soeharto appointed 67 of his loyalists as new parliament members and, therefore, significantly reduced the representation of Islamic parties from 42.4% in the 1955 election result to only 28%. Thirdly, Soeharto and the army saw NU as their greatest political rival given its solid grass-roots base, especially in the heavily populated areas of Java. As a response to the manoeuvres waged by Soeharto and the army, NU politicians began to exploit Islamic slogans and rhetoric, including the sensitive issue of the Jakarta Charter on sharia implementation. Through its media outlet, *Duta Masyarakat*, the NU raised this issue and thus prompted Soeharto to terminate the debate on the Charter. In turn, the army attempted to isolate Nahdlatul Ulama's

political influence by, for example, securitising the latter as the 'neo-Darul Islam' (Feillard, 1999, 101–102, 115–127; Ward, 1970).

Circumscribed by such pressures, NU's articulations towards the New Order were carried out by two different social agents (see Feillard, 1999). The conservative group, led by Idham Chalid, who was once regarded as a Soekarno loyalist, tended to align itself with Soeharto and the army, believing this was an effective way to obtain access to state power and to prevent NU from being destroyed. On the contrary, the radical group, led by a young leader, Subchan, who was once an anti-communist figure and close to the army, opted to enter state power through political competition. The latter criticised Soeharto, arguing that the fruit of NU's support in overthrowing Soekarno's pro-communist regime was only the creation of another authoritarian one (Mietzner, 2009, 80). As discussed below, these competing strategies affected NU internally, and created complex and uneasy relations with the New Order state in subsequent years.

By the late 1960s, it was clear that Soeharto preferred to use the existing Functional Group (Sekber Golkar), established by the army during the Guided Democracy period, as his electoral machine (Bourchier, 2015; Reeve, 1985; Ward, 1974). Not surprisingly, Nahdlatul Ulama's radical group saw Golkar as its political opponent, and harshly protested its unfair tactics of intimidation and fraud before the 1971 election. It has become common knowledge that Soeharto utilised intelligence-led strategies, carried out by the informal unit called *Operasi Khusus* (OPSUS, Special Operation), led by Soeharto's aide, General Ali Moertopo (see Crouch, 1971; Feillard, 1999; Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Hefner, 2000). One of the unit's most infamous manoeuvres involved mobilising ex-Darul Islam commanders, initially to crush the communists and then help Golkar win elections (Hadiz, 2016, 116–136; Jones, 2010; Solahudin, 2013).

Golkar also attempted to undermine NU's monopoly over Islam by embracing and accommodating other Islamists. For example, Golkar (orchestrated by the OPSUS) reactivated and financed the *Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan Islam* (GUPPI, Association for the Improvement of Islamic Teaching), previously established in West Java in 1950, and made it the party's Islamic wing (Cahyono, 1992; Feillard & Madinier, 2011, 37). More importantly, Golkar also successfully gained political support from the families of NU's founding fathers, such as Karim Hasyim and Aziz Bishri, sons of Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari (1871–1947) and Kyai Bishri Sjamsuri (1886–1980), respectively (Feillard, 1999,

139–141). Crucially, these strategies resulted in Golkar's new identification and self-presentation: Golkar became more 'Islamic' and provided a 'home' for the *nahdlyin*—the NU followers. In other words, by the 1970s, Golkar had begun to hold hegemony over Islam.

In Search of a Political Format: Pancasila Democracy and Developmentalism

It is important to note that there was no pre-existing blueprint for the New Order to consolidate a coherent ideological program and power base. It took several years to achieve this. Significantly, the discursive formation of the New Order was based on the negation to the so-called Old Order that was effectively signified as the period of political instability, the failure of development and authoritarianism. For Political Discourse Theory (PDT), redefining the past was strategic for creating a clear break from the dislocated order and was also instrumental in building legitimacy for the new political formation. Thus, in his official speech before the MPRS on 16 August 1967, acting President Soeharto stated that:

> [T]he New Order is nothing less than an ordering of the entire life of the people, nation and state that has returned to the pure implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. We underline the word 'returned' because the New Order was born and has grown as a reaction to and is a total correction of all the forms of deviation and corruption carried out by what has come to be known as the Old Order. (cited via Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003, 37)

After the 1971 election, which was predated by the exclusion of communism and some forms of Islamism, the proponents of the New Order began to advance a political project of so-called Pancasila Democracy. This project, which eventually became the political foundation for developmentalism, was best articulated in the New Order's manifesto, *The Acceleration and Modernisation of 25 Years' Development* (Moertopo, 1972). Crucially, drawn on the notions of familial state and organic statism (Bourchier, 2015), Pancasila Democracy was articulated as a negation of any form of organised politics and political representation. The proponents of the New Order saw ideological polarisation, class struggles, and party-based competition are incompatible with Pancasila's values of unity and harmony (Moertopo, 1972, Ch. 2, 3).

New Order's central articulation was political stability, regarded as the ultimate condition for the workings of modernisation and development projects. Such an articulation had brought far-reaching consequences. It produced diverse forms of agencies, subjectivities and social relations for both individuals and social groups—whether they were compatible with development or otherwise. Moreover, articulating political stability as the cornerstone of development projects provided the rationale for further implementation of the military's *dwifungsi* (dual functions) doctrine that granted exclusive roles in defending the state and socio-political life (Crouch, 2007; Honna, 2003). Politically speaking, this made the military, apart from Golkar, a central pillar of the New Order developmentalism.

Through the notion of political stability, the New Order discourse also sought to diminish the role of parties and people's participation. As early as 1973, the party system was 'simplified' (through a process called *deparpolisasi*) by forcing all parties to merge into three state-designated ones, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, for the 'secular-nationalists'), the United Development Party (PPP, for the Islamists) and Golkar. The regime also introduced the 'floating mass' (*massa mengambang*) doctrine to limit the parties' activities at district level. Crucially, the floating mass policies had prevented the parties from mobilising the people at the grassroots and, more importantly, destroyed the political bases of representation. Through the *deparpolisasi* and *masa mengambang* policies, it was claimed that 'people in the village would not sacrifice their valuable time and energy for the political struggles in political parties or groups but will be occupied wholly with development efforts' (Moertopo, 1972, 96). The New Order sought to constitute them as developmentalist subjects by disembedding people's ties from the parties. Hence, the ruling party, Golkar, then utilised an anti-politics slogan: 'politics no, development yes.'

Indeed, disorganising politics and representation was a primary condition for New Order's technocracy to operate. Such circumstances constituted a distinct logic of developmentalism that people's welfare is defined and achieved top-down by bureaucratic and technocratic arrangements, rather than as a result of people's struggles through democratic institutions. It was stated that people's involvement 'in the conflicts of political and ideological interests had as its result the fact that they ignored the necessities of daily life, the need for development and improvement of their own lives both materially and spiritually' (Moertopo, 1972, 95).

Therefore, social groups were not seen as political subjects involved in policy processes, but merely beneficiaries of development interventions.

This anti-politics governing model was conveniently consistent with globally dominant strands of modernisation theory, which strongly linked economic growth and state-led development to the maintenance of social and political stability (see Huntington, 1968). In the New Order discourse, such Huntington-style modernisation projects were necessary for achieving economic development and social order (Moertopo, 1972). Pancasila Democracy here was articulated as a technocratic governing model whose main elements—depoliticisation of democratic representation and the need for a strong state—provided a condition for the rise of the authoritarian nature of the New Order state.

Disciplining Islamism and New Order Developmentalism: The Consolidation Period

This section explains the relations between Islamism and the consolidation of New Order developmentalism. It suggests that Islamism is not completely excluded, as the antagonistic Other. Instead, within this developmentalism discourse, Islamism is constructed and redirected as a mere system of belief, upon which the articulations of Islam are specifically reoriented to bolster the appeal of modernisation. Therefore, in the period of New Order hegemony, Islamist articulations are mainly manifested and confined within the cultural domain. Through the strategies of culturalisation, Islam is thus acknowledged and defended as conditions for development practices.

When New Order developmentalism discourse became hegemonic in socio-political life, Islamists shifted from objects of intervention into developmentalist subjects. Such a transformation was achieved particularly by giving them certain forms of agency and autonomy in the cultural domain. In such ways they, directly or indirectly, sustained developmentalism as a 'regime of truth.' In such a circumstance, the ways Islamists appropriated the developmentalism discourse were crucial in constituting different agencies and their relations with the New Order state. Therefore, rather than being completely depoliticised, Islamism of this period was *politicised* to support and reproduce development practices and modernisation that eventually sustained the hegemony of New Order developmentalism.

Universalising Pancasila Democracy: A Master Signifier

In stark contrast to the formative years of the New Order, the articulations of Pancasila Democracy in the consolidation period were not associated with its role as the state ideology. Rather, it was primarily articulated as a requirement for developmentalism to operate. In course of the New Order period, the developmentalist articulation of Pancasila was made possible by diverse practices and demands organised around three main nodal points: political stability, welfare and social harmony. Through these three nodal points, Pancasila Democracy was effectively constituted as a master signifier for New Order developmentalism discourse. As such, developmentalism was not a single top-down process. It was an outcome of complex relations, contestations and coalitions, which were continuously reorganised and modified throughout the New Order era.

Pancasila Democracy played a crucial role, to borrow Foucault's term (1991), as an instrument of biopolitics to discipline the population that eventually led to the restructuration of the state and society relations. The aim of the Pancasila Democracy was 'a reorganisation of socio-political forces and the political structure.... in such a way that a stable and viable socio-economic basis can be achieved to support the development of society' (Moertopo, 1972, 55–56). For example, in the efforts to reorganise labour politics, the Soeharto government introduced the doctrine of *Hubungan Industrial Pancasia* (HIP, Pancasila Industrial Relations) that strictly did not recognise the rights of workers to strike on the grounds of building harmonious relations between the workers and the employers (Hadiz, 1997, 65). Through the strategies of biopolitics, the population was targeted as the object of intervention and transformed into new developmentalist subjects. With regard to Islamism, the ultimate target of the New Order was to ensure the diverse Islamist groups accepted and supported the developmentalist style of Pancasila and, simultaneously, to prevent a political discourse that challenged the New Order hegemony.

However, by the first half of the 1970s, New Order developmentalism faced resistance from different fronts. As extensively studied (e.g. Mas'oed, 1989; Robison, 2009; Robison & Hadiz, 2004), Soeharto's early economic policies favoured foreign investors while the military, especially around Moertopo's inner circle, played a prominent role in building politico-business networks with Chinese conglomerate groups. Having been excluded from politics, many Islamist groups felt that New Order's

power consolidation had only resulted in further marginalisation economically and socially. Protests against foreign capital and the state's business management, involving *pribumi* (indigenous, predominantly Muslims), local business groups and university students, culminated in the bloody demonstration of 15 January 1974, known as the Malari (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 64). After Malari, questions of social justice and the *pribumi* discourse became a focus of public debate, which was then accommodated, albeit to a limited extent, through the State Secretariat in the 1980s under Soeharto's close aide, Soedharmono.[2]

Almost concurrently, in late 1973, broader resistance came from an alliance of Islamist groups against a Golkar-sponsored bill that would effectively secularise marriage and family laws. Islamists generally saw the bill as a manoeuvre of the New Order regime. For instance, Hamka (aka. Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdul Karim Amrullah, 1908–1981), a former Masyumi politician and a Muhammadiyah leading figure, accused that the target of this bill was 'to destroy and subjugate Islam' (Cammack, 1997). This controversy was settled outside Parliament, facilitated by the army's lobby to the *ulama*, which forced the government to substantially change the bill (Feillard, 1999, 172–179; Liddle, 1978, 126).

Another stumbling block to universalising Pancasila Democracy emerged from the state-sanctioned PPP, especially its Nahdlatul Ulama elements. To gain more voters from Muslims in the 1977 election, PPP leaders utilised a 'double foundation' of the party ideological platform—i.e., Pancasila and Islam—although the government had obliged the addition of 'Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution' to the foundation of all parties. PPP was continuously pushed to take its Islamic jacket off. For example, during the campaign period, Admiral Soedomo (Commander for the Restoration of Security and Order, *Pangkopkamtib*)

[2] In the early 1980s, the domestic business favoured treatment was encouraged through the Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 14, 14a and 10, under the broader program of the Promotion and Use of Domestically Produced Goods (UP3DN). The Keppres No. 10 gave the State Secretariat jurisdictions of all government projects over 500 million rupiahs, and the domain of such privilege was subsequently extended to not only state ministries but also local governments. The Team 10 and the Ministry of UP3DN led by Ginanjar Kartasasmita were not only responsible for advocating *pribumi*-oriented policies, but also in forging business alliance and patronage with non-Chinese capitalists, including Soeharto families and other business groups such as Bakrie group, Kalla Group and Medco. It is reported that between 1980 and 1986, the projects managed by Team 10 reached approximately 39.5 trillion rupiahs. See, for example, Robison and Hadiz (2004, 59) and Pangaribuan (1995, Ch. 2, 3).

and Amir Machmud (Minister of Home Affairs and head of General Election Committee) announced an anti-government conspiracy of the so-called *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) followed by the arrest of several Islamist activists (Feillard & Madinier, 2011; Solahudin, 2013). While there was no explicit statement about its connection with PPP, such manoeuvres undermined the Islamists. Furthermore, the government prohibited PPP from using *Ka'bah* (the holy shrine of Mecca) as its symbol after the 1977 election (Porter, 2002, 43–44). Although it turned out that Golkar's vote dropped slightly at the national level, the 1977 election was a watershed for the New Order hegemony, given that there was no viable political discourse that could potentially become a counter-hegemonic force at that time.

Against such a backdrop, the New Order state began to embark more decisively on totalisation strategies to control and discipline Islamism and socio-political life in general. As stated in the New Order manifesto, Pancasila Democracy was required to be applied 'in every field of life, every organ and body of the state at all levels of societies, both in towns and in villages' (Moertopo, 1972, 55–56). By 1978, The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) introduced Pancasila moral instruction, known as P4 (Guidelines for the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila). P4 indoctrination became compulsory for civil servants, students and even social organisations. Through the Moral Education Pancasila course, implemented in 1980, P4 indoctrination also became an inseparable part of the curriculum at all levels of education.

Some Islamist groups still resisted this policy, albeit on a limited scale. Islamist figures like Natsir, for instance, were concerned about a policy that he saw as the state's attempt to 'religion*ise* Pancasila and Pancasila*ise* religion' (Kahin, 2012, 176). The PPP, mainly from the NU elements, also led a walkout during the MPR's plenary session (Feillard, 1999). It is against this backdrop that Soeharto expressed his disappointment during a meeting with military leadership in Pekanbaru in 1980, warning that:

> [W]e must step up our vigilance, choose partners and friends who truly defend Pancasila and have no doubts about it.... we are obliged to persuade them in such a way that all social and political forces will base themselves on our natural ideology, Pancasila, with no addition whatsoever. (Rodgers, 1980, 37)

The incorporation of Pancasila Democracy into religious policies was systematically initiated by the Minister of Religious Affairs (1973–1983), Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara. The ultimate aim was to transform religion to be compatible with development agendas. For example, the State Policy Guidelines (GBHN) 1978 conceived the objective of New Order developmentalism as balanced social progress between material and spiritual well-being.[3] Such an orientation effectively justified religions as a 'moral, spiritual, and ethical foundation' for development programs. Thus, as early as 1975, the Soeharto regime institutionalised a developmentalist articulation of Islam following the establishment of the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI, the Council of Indonesian Ulama). The primary objectives of this government-sponsored body were to strengthen national security, maintain religious harmony and facilitate the government's development programs (Ichwan, 2005; Porter, 2002, 78).

The Ministry of Religious Affairs had subsequently played a significant role in controlling the population by articulating the policies under the banner of managing social harmony and difference. In 1978, the Ministry issued a *Tri Kerukunan* (three harmonies) policy that was essentially a redefinition of new Islamist agencies and subjectivities according to developmentalism parameters (Porter, 2002, 62). The first was the harmony between the state and religion, especially Islam. It was believed that through massive indoctrination, all Islamists would ultimately accept Pancasila as their ideology and way of life. The second was the harmony within a religion, with two main objectives. First, to remove doctrinal contradictions within religion and obtain a homogeneous religious interpretation in conformity with Pancasila. Second, to utilise religion as the state's proxy to control spiritual life, by which unexpected articulations of certain religious groups—that potentially hindered development programs—could be judged internally as splinter groups or heresy. The third pillar of *Tri Kerukunan* policy was the harmony between one religion and another. It aimed to mediate interreligious tensions and guide all religious communities in their participation in development.

Furthermore, the New Order also attempted to expand its strategies of managing differences beyond the domain of religion. The ultimate target

[3] According to the MPR Decree No. IV/1978 on the State Development Policy Guidelines, the objective of national development is 'to achieve a just and welfare society both materially and spiritually in accordance with Pancasila within the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia… within a safe, stable, orderly and dynamic national environment.'

was to diminish the potential challenge to the New Order developmentalist hegemony. For this reason, the government then introduced the so-called SARA (Ethnic, Race, Religion, and Inter-groups) framework. Typically, this framework had granted recognition to political differences based on these categories. But, the government depoliticised them by preventing people from utilising these categories as a basis for organising demands and dissent. Articulating such identity categories in politics was framed as a threat to political stability and Indonesian unity. As discussed in Chapter 5, such depoliticised and securitised strategies proved counter-productive for managing multicultural societies, as manifested in the outbreak of violent communal conflicts after Soeharto's fall.

Overall, the ultimate objective of the New Order's hegemonising strategies was to control and restructure the population and territory altogether. It is not surprising that by the late 1970s, 84% of the provincial governments in Indonesia were led by governors of military officers, the Soeharto's loyalists (Emerson, 1976). In early 1979, the Soeharto government also stipulated greater administrative homogeneity and standardisation by enacting the Village Law, followed by the policies of *ABRI Masuk Desa* (AMD, *Military Enters Villages*) a year later. These policies, especially in the context of 'floating mass' doctrine and depoliticised society, had provided the New Order regime with adequate control and surveillance over territory and population. This also marked the increasing role of the military to encroach on the villages' socio-political life (Honna, 2003, 60; Jenkins, 1984). The presence of the military at the lowest administrative levels, through the so-called *Komando Teritorial* (Territorial Command) structure, was instrumental. They could effectively mobilise—often by force and intimidation—the whole population to support development programs, even for issues like food security and birth control (known as *Keluarga Berencana* (KB) or family planning program).

Islamic Developmentalist Subjects

Apart from totalisation strategies, as mentioned above, the making of developmentalist subjects is also pursued by a process called individualisation (cf. Clifford, 2001; Foucault, 1991; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). With regard to Islamism, individualisation is understood here as a process by which the Islamists were transformed from the object of intervention to

be developmentalist subjects. In the hegemonic logic, these double strategies—totalisation and individualisation—are mutually constitutive for the cultivation and reproduction of developmentalist subjects. Through individualisation, the Islamists would have a sort of self-governing mechanism and agencies to reproduce developmentalism practices and ideologies. It is the reproduction of such practices that effectively sustains the hegemony of New Order developmentalism discourse.

However, the discursive formation of Islamic developmentalist subjects, including their diverse agencies and identities, through the individualisation process is also historically situated within larger social changes and their different positions in the New Order state. As early as the mid-1970s, a new generation of Muslims had emerged with distinct aspirations. This generation mainly came from Masyumi-linked youths, particularly associated with *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI, Association of Muslim Students). More specifically, they developed what is known as 'new Islamic intellectualism' (Barton, 1999; Effendy, 1995, 2003; Munawar-Rachman, 2010). This Islamic reform emerged from the dissatisfaction of young educated Muslims with their predecessors who had contributed to the contentious relationship between Islam and the state from the Soekarno and Soeharto eras. From the very outset, the proponents of this reform had generally supported the New Order developmentalism, as they no longer wanted to accept their continuous exclusion 'because of the sins of their elders' (Kahin, 2012, 162).

According to this group, the impasse of Islamism in Indonesian politics was because the older Islamists 'suffered from inflexibility, almost dogmatism, in practical considerations' (Madjid, 1985, 383). The crux of the problem derived primarily from their understanding of the holistic nature of Islam (*shumuliyatul Islam*), that is, the inherent relation between Islam as a religion and as a political ideology (*ad-din wa-daulah*). For them, such a theological position often led to strict formalism and legalism. They argued that although Islam certainly had indeed contained sociopolitical teachings, it did not constitute Islam in itself as an ideology. Some even went further to claim that the ideologisation of Islam can be considered to be reductionist (Effendy, 1995, 106; Wahib, 1981, 146). The leading figure of this group, Nurcholis Madjid, himself a disciple of Fazlur Rahman, a renowned scholar for Islamic reform at the University of Chicago, maintained that Islam is principally a personal religion and that secularisation of religion is required for modernisation agenda in Indonesia (Madjid, 2008). Hence, he subsequently promoted the slogan:

'Islam yes! Islamic party no!' Such reform thus effectively produced 'liberal' Islamic articulations that were neatly compatible with New Order developmentalism (cf. van Bruinessen, 2002, 124).

The reorientation of Islamic developmentalist subjects was also extensively conducted through reforming Islamic higher education in the early 1970s (Boland, 1982: Ricklefs, 2012, 157). This reform was carried out by Professor Mukti Ali, who was also a mentor to theological reform activists such as Ahmad Wahib and Dawam Rahardjo. The appointment of Mukti Ali of Muhammadiyah as Minister of Religious Affairs after the 1971 election was primarily directed at 'punishing' Nahdlatul Ulama for its critical position against the Golkar and Soeharto. While the underlying motives were primarily political, this reform was instrumental in redirecting Islamic education to be more 'liberal' and compatible with developmentalism discourse. For example, Mukti Ali and his associates replaced legalistic orientations of classical methodologies with 'scientific' and comparative ones. They saw that legalistic approaches were responsible for creating 'narrow-minded' Islamists, and irrelevant to the immediate challenges of modernisation and industrialisation (see Kersten, 2017, 38–39).

Islamic developmentalist subjects also resulted from programs under the Reactualisation Agenda, initiated by Munawir Sjadzali, the Minister of Religious Affairs (1983–1993). This program was actually a response to the phenomenal rise of Islamisation among the urban middle class and university students in the late 1970s (Effendy, 1995). Specifically, he persuaded Muslims to implement Islamic values without establishing an Islamic state and that Pancasila is certainly not antithetical to Islam. He even argued that '[f]rom our history we note that the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims are better accommodated if Islamic parties no longer exist in this country' (Sjadzali, 1994, 200–201). In the aftermath of the oil boom of the late 1970s, this program had substantial financial resources, including sending many young Islamic scholars and lecturers of state-run Islamic universities to Western universities, particularly in Canada and America (Kersten, 2017, 38; Porter, 2002).

Another strategy to cultivate Islamic developmentalist subjects was achieved through the state's corporatisation of Islamist groups by channelling them into existing patronage networks (see Porter, 2002; Vatikiotis, 1998). In this scheme, Soeharto himself played a great role by providing financial support from his foundations (*yayasan*), a resource

pool for off-budget funds.[4] The most prominent Islamic corporatisation body, as mentioned earlier, was the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). Throughout the New Order period, MUI's role was instrumental in development programs by providing *fatwas* (religious opinion) for many issues, including 'controversial' ones like the government-sponsored lottery and the use of IUD (Intra-Uterine Device) for birth control (Ichwan, 2005; Mudzhar, 1993). MUI also recruited, trained and deployed Islamic preachers—they were given the title of 'development preachers' (*da'i pembangunan*)—to remote areas outside Java following the implementation of transmigration programs. They were also deployed in some conflict-vulnerable areas, such as plantations and mining sites, not only for delivering Islamic teachings but also as agents for Pancasila indoctrination (Porter, 2002).

The corporatisation strategies expanded to other Islamic entities such as mosques and *dakwah* institutes. In the mid-1970s, the activities of mosques were supervised and controlled under a Golkar-linked organisation called *Dewan Masjid Indonesia* (DMI, Indonesian Mosque Council). DMI was also involved in building and renovating mosques at housing complexes, university campuses, transmigration sites and entertainment parks. In 1978, the Soeharto government and Golkar also sponsored the establishment of the *Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah* (MDI, Islamic Dakwah Council) initially as a counter-strategy in response to fierce competition between PPP and Golkar in the 1977 election. Its activities included sending preachers to villages to counter PPP and Nahdlatul Ulama activities, and training 'Pancasilaist' mosque leaders and preachers (see Porter, 2002, 82–85).

Indeed, New Order developmentalist hegemony over Islamism was uneven, whereby not all Islamists followed and articulated this discourse. They subsequently developed somewhat different Islamic articulations and forms of agencies. It is worth noting that such different articulations were not exclusively determined by distinct ideologies but rooted in

[4] From the early 1970s, Soeharto and his family established numerous *yayasan*, mostly for financing Golkar and expanding his patronage networks. Through a Presidential decree of 1978, for example, state banks had to transfer 8% of their operating profit to *Yayasan Dharmais* and *Yayasan Supersemar*. Bogasari, the flour milling monopoly owned by Soeharto's Chinese-ethnic business partner, had to contribute 26% of its profit to various *yayasan*. The Yayasan Amal Bhakti Pancasila (YABP) had facilitated the building of hundreds of mosques and Islamic centres throughout the country. For detailed discussion, see Robison and Hadiz (2004, 55), Robison (2009), and Schwarz (2000).

their sociological basis, which constituted specific power relations between Islamists and the New Order state. As discussed in more detail later, excluded groups cultivated different imaginations and trajectories of the *ummah*. Such processes and dynamics significantly influenced the contestations and social coalitions in the negotiation period (1984–1998) and after Soeharto's fall.

Generally speaking, these Islamist groups were critical towards 'liberal' Islam and, in turn, advocated the rearticulation of *shumuliyatul Islam*.[5] The social bases of these groups were primarily the 'conservative' Masyumi heirs among university students and the new urban middle class. These groups were also a product of the Islamisation of society agenda that began in the mid-1960s, particularly associated with religious instruction policies and DDII-led activities. Since 1966, the government had stipulated the study of religion as compulsory at all educational levels, which meant that not all Islamists today are necessarily *santri* (those who learned and graduated from Islamic seminaries). Even as early as the late 1970s, the main components of these Islamist groups were from 'secular' university campuses rather than 'Islamic' ones. Being middle-class members in urban areas, these young educated Islamists found themselves disappointed that their upward mobility was blocked, given they were outside the New Order's patronage networks (cf. Hefner, 2000; Kuntowijoyo, 1991).[6] By rearticulating the notion of *shumuliyatul Islam*, these groups cultivated a new foundation of solidarity among their fellows. This subsequently became a new basis for political groupings in the negotiation period.

Such Islamist articulations and mobilisations found broad appeal in the context of the depoliticisation of universities following the Malari riots and student demonstrations in the late 1970s. Through NKK/BKK (Normalisation of Campus Life/Campus Coordination Board) policies, the government prohibited student activism. These policies unintentionally had paved the way for *dakwah* activities and the increasing role of university-based mosques for Islamic activism without scrutiny (Aspinall, 2005; Porter, 2002, 56–57). In this period, DDII expanded its program to universities, establishing the so-called *Bina Masjid Kampus* (BMK,

[5] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, PKS chairman (2000–2004) and MPR deputy speaker (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[6] Interview with Fahri Hamzah, former Tarbiyah activist and House of Representative (DPR) deputy speaker (2014–2019) (Jakarta 2 and 10 November 2016).

Campus Mosque Religious Supervision) and sponsoring the building of mosques in about fifteen universities across the country. Immaduddin Abdurrahim, a BMK leading figure, organised young Islamic activists in his famous short course, *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (LMD, Training of Preacher Combatants), at the Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology (Feillard & Madinier, 2011, 113; Kahin, 2012, 178). Many Islamist activists, especially those from non-Islamic universities, had joined this group and thus facilitated the making of a nationwide network for a new generation of educated Islamists.

The development of these Islamist groups also gained momentum following the Iranian revolution and 'Islamic revival' in the late 1970s. Facilitated by media technologies and networks in the Middle East (especially DDII-sponsored students in Saudi and Egypt), these groups got accustomed to the ideas and methods of such Islamic movements as Muslim Brothers, Hizbut Tahrir or Jamaati al-Islam (Fealy, 2010; Rahmat, 2008). The translation of influential works from prominent thinkers of these Islamic movements, such as Sayyid Qutb, Hassan Al-Banna, Abul 'Ala al-Maududi and Yusuf Qardhawi, was massively conducted during this period (Furkon, 2004, 129–130; Tamara, 1986). Having completed their studies in the Middle East, many activists of this new Islamism established various institutes and study clubs for disseminating the Middle East-based movements and Islamic thoughts.[7]

Thus, once discredited by the proponents of the 'renewal' movement, the rearticulations of *sumuliyatul Islam* regained its currency among educated Islamists. They rapidly built their networks in urban centres, initially by recruiting the members through a clandestine network of *usroh* (literally means denoting a family) and developing mutual aid and solidarity. With regard to the New Order regime, it is worth noting that these groups did not directly challenge the existing structure of power relations. Instead, their activities, largely on theology (*tauhid*) and personal capacity and community building, remained within the New Order developmentalism discourse (cf. Asshiddiqie, 1999; Hefner, 2000, 123–126).

[7] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016). He established a research institute, *Yayasan Al-Haramain*, after returning from the University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia. Interview with Abu Ridho, a senior DDII activist and co-founder of the PKS (Jakarta, 2 November 2016).

Islamism and the New Order's Hegemonic Crisis: The Negotiation Period

This section discusses Islamist articulations situated in the context when democratisation had increasingly become a new political discourse in the world. Circumscribed in the context of post-Cold War global politics and the heightening authoritarianism at home, democracy discourse had provided a space for the Islamists—and other political forces—to articulate their demands to bring about political changes and to improve their social positions. This section shows that Islamist articulations took the form of identity politics, by which dissent and demands were organised and mobilised by using the category of Islam. While Islam was contained within the cultural domain in the previous period, it had become more politicised in this era. As such, the hegemony of the New Order developmentalism that was relatively stable during the consolidation period was now put into question, challenged by diverse political articulations, in particular Islamism.

This period was also characterised by dramatic changes in Indonesia's socio-economic conditions. Benefiting from the oil boom era of 1974/1975–1981, Soeharto had virtually expanded his control in the economy and built complex patrimonial relations and politico-business networks (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 72). However, in the early 1980s, Indonesia experienced economic stagnation and was forced to implement the World Bank-sponsored liberalisation measures, called the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). With this liberalisation banner, the government slashed subsidies for essential goods that affected the lives of ordinary people. Yet, such measures had little impact in breaking—in fact, they in some ways strengthened—the existing politico-business networks, especially that of the Soeharto family and their cronies among the ethnic Chinese conglomerates (Robison, 2009; Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 72). From the mid-1980s, such dislocation had triggered some Islamist groups to challenge New Order developmentalism that was seen as depriving the *ummah*; some even used violent means (Hadiz, 2016; McVey, 1983, 218; Solahudin, 2013). From this period, anti-New Order authoritarianism protests became more heavily accompanied by anti-Chinese sentiments.

Since the 1980s, Islamist articulations have manifested in the different forms of identity politics. It is shown here that such differences had been less driven by the ideological imperative than bounded by their respective positions within the existing structure of power. Furthermore, democracy

discourse, as a new nodal point, had also forced New Order elements to reshape their approaches in dealing with Islamism and oppositional groups. More specifically, the greater accommodation of the aspirations of the middle-class Muslims in the early 1990s did not only signify the 'Islamic turn' of the New Order (Liddle, 1996) but more significantly altered the playing field of contestations and social coalitions. Such complex dynamics had led to fracture within the New Order's key political pillars. Crucially, this had contributed to fostering the de-sedimentation or the organic crisis of the New Order hegemony, especially in the context of the 1997 economic crisis.

Pancasila as the Sole Ideology: Three Forms of Islamism

The New Order hegemony had been primarily built through the praxis-ideology of Pancasila Democracy. Thus, the sustainability and fragility of its hegemonic formation depended on the constitution of Pancasila Democracy as a master signifier, a terrain for diverse articulations of political stability, welfare and social harmony. As discussed earlier, New Order strategies had been relatively successful in mobilising Islamists of different stripes to support and maintain developmentalism hegemony. However, the New Order hegemony over Islam lasted until the 1980s when the Soeharto government promulgated a bill, proposed in 1982 and formally adopted in 1985, that effectively compelled all social organisations to accept Pancasila as *asas tunggal* (the sole ideology).

It is suggested here that the *asas tunggal* policy had only totalised Pancasila as an ideology of ruling power and thus lost its hegemonic and universalising character. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a former Masyumi leader, warned President Soeharto in his open letter that the *asas tunggal* had betrayed the nature of Pancasila as compromising all principles of life evolved from Indonesian societies (Prawiranegara, 1984, 74–83). As such, the debates around this issue had decisively become a moment of reactivation, that is, a period when the hegemony of Pancasila Democracy became opened and contested. As we shall see, rather than completely containing Islamism (see, for instance, Dhakidae, 2003), the *asas tunggal* had indeed *re-politicised* the Islamists, who were once effectively domesticated in the domain of culture.

It is noteworthy that the *asas tunggal* debates took place when many Islamists increasingly saw the New Order economic development had brought about the marginalisation of the *ummah*. The Islamists'

discontent culminated in the bloody Tanjung Priok riots of 1984 when protesters led by Amir Biki[8] criticised the *asas tunggal* compounded by anti-Chinese sentiments. Afterward, the anti-Pancasila Islamists, allegedly the offshoots of the Darul Islam (DI), called for an 'Islamic revolution' and launched a series of violent attacks, including the bombing of Borobudur temple in Central Java and two branches of Bank Central Asia in Jakarta, the largest private bank owned by the ethnic Chinese tycoon and Soeharto's prominent business ally, Liem Sioe Liong. It was followed by a clampdown by the state, making these groups severely disorganised as some of its leaders were imprisoned or fled overseas (Hadiz, 2016, 124; Solahudin, 2013; Temby, 2010; van Bruinessen, 2002).

Interestingly, while social justice was the primary demand in these Islamist protests, it was not coherently conveyed as an Islamic issue. The reasons were twofold. Firstly, it is because of the fear of military repression. Muslim scholars such as Abdurrahman Wahid of Nahdlatul Ulama were concerned about the danger of associating such anti-New Order protests exclusively with Islam. He argued that the depiction of Islam and Pancasila as two opposing enemies would only augment the military's suspicion of Muslims altogether (Ramage, 1995, 19–20). Secondly, the developmentalist subjects of the Islamists and their absorption into the New Order regime had hampered them in organising radical demands and a social alliance under the banner of Islam.

As symbolically manifested in the *asas tunggal* debate, the dislocations of New Order hegemony reveal three different forms of Islamist articulations: the confrontationists, the 'social movement' and the accommodationists. The first form is generally represented by those who ideologically maintain the views of a binary opposition between Islam and Pancasila, and they typically have no access to state power. This group ranges from the veterans of Darul Islam and ex-Masyumi activists to conservative Islamic students (such as HMI-MPO, a splinter group of the Madjid-led HMI and Masyumi-associated *Pergerakan Islam Indonesia*, PII) (see Ismail, 1996). Their confrontations against the New Order

[8] Amir Biki was killed during the infamous massacre of 1984 that took between 18 and 400 lives. Biki was, in fact, a KAMI activist who supported army-led anti-communist campaigns in 1965/1966. He then became an entrepreneur as a business partner of the state oil company, Pertamina. Yet, he subsequently frustrated when he saw the fact that Chinese business groups were given favourable treatment and occupied virtually all state-related business projects. See Hadiz (2011, 22) and Raillon (1993).

during the 1980s had made them severely repressed politically. Therefore, their influence in shaping the political constellation was almost negligible as they were driven to the fringes of politics, if not underground.

The second form of Islamism is paradigmatically shown by the Islamist groups like the *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, the precursor of the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS). These groups were basically anti-*asas tunggal* but employed non-confrontation methods (Machmudi, 2008). These Islamist groups even blamed the confrontationists as the latter's involvement in violence and provocative preaches had only prompted the repressions and put Islamic movements under the military's scrutiny. Yet, these two groups shared an ideological vision of *shumuliyatul Islam*. Their encounters with the Middle East-based Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brothers and Hizbut Tahrir made them adopt the gradual strategy of Islamisation, known as *marhalah ad-dakwah*. In fact, this strategy resembled the Gramscian model of *war of position*, which favoured resistance to domination with culture, not physical might. For the Islamists of this camp, this strategy was essential for protecting their members from the military's suppression and building their social base in society.[9]

The third form of Islamism emerged from the modernist Islamists and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), though each has starkly different characteristics and orientations. For the former, which were largely entrenched in state power, accommodating *asas tunggal* was inevitable. Such acceptance is seen as the fruit of the 'renewal' movement that had significantly been successful in diminishing the presumed contradictions of Islam and Pancasila (Madjid, 2008; see also Maarif, 2009). Its proponents frequently argued that once Islam is no longer identified with a single party, all political parties and even the military begin to promote their commitment to Islam (Hefner, 1997, 89; 2000, 122). As discussed later, this group would typically utilise Islamic identities as a political strategy to advance their demands from within state power in the subsequent years.

Unlike the modernists, NU's accommodation to *asas tunggal* in the 1984 Congress of Situbondo was rather surprising. The bill was politically promulgated to respond to NU's 'radical' elements since the 1971 elections. Crucially, the acceptance of *asas tunggal* was also a result of the emergence and ascendancy of the young generation within NU. Instead

[9] Interview with Cahyadi Takariawan, senior PKS politician (Yogyakarta, 8 September 2016); Ismail Yusanto, Hizbut Tahrir national spokesperson (Jakarta, 7 November 2016).

of favouring electoral politics in the New Order era, they were intellectually committed to such neo-modernist ideals as pluralism, secularisation and human rights (Barton, 1995; Feillard, 1999; Ramage, 1995, 26–46).

Crucially, accommodating the *asas tunggal* had strategically improved NU's position by increasing its leverage before Soeharto. In the 1984 Situbondo Congress, NU also decided to leave electoral politics and formally broke away from the state-sanctioned party, the PPP (Bush, 2009; Feillard, 1999; Nakamura, 1996, 94–109). As a result, as Munawir Sjadzali described, 'all doors (of state departments) were open to NU and Abdurrahman Wahid' (Ramage, 1995, 55). It is noteworthy that since the 1970s, NU had lost influence in the bureaucracy after the 1970 ban on civil servants' associations with a political party other than Golkar. The situation changed in the aftermath of the Situbondo Congress. For example, under Sjadzali's policy, NU schools and *pesantrens* received a more significant proportion of subsidies. NU's *dakwah* activities and its wing organisations, such as *Fatayat* and *Anshar*, also gained more support and facilities (Bush, 2009, 65–110; Feillard, 1997, 1999, 241–244). In addition, NU's relationship with the military improved considerably, which was crucial for NU's chairman, Abdurahman Wahid, as discussed later, 'to gauge how far he could go in his criticism of the regime before risking confrontation' (Barton, 2002, 154).

Leaving electoral politics had made possible the development of NU as a civil society organisation that sought political changes *outside* of the state parameters. Wahid recalled that '[i]f NU allowed itself to stay in the formal, government-sanctioned political structure then it would be increasingly compromised and unable to contribute to the national discourse on development and politics with a distinctive, independent voice' (Ramage, 1995, 33). Partly influenced by Wahid's leadership, NU's decentralised structures and growing support from international donors, NU had contributed to strengthening civil society in Indonesia by building various civil society organisations and research institutes (Aspinall, 2005, 86–115; Bush, 2009). Through these vehicles, NU also initiated vibrant discussions (*halaqah*) to critically address such social issues as poverty, human rights, gender, environment and social justice beyond religious views (Barton, 2002, 160). It also appears that NU's accommodation of *asas tunggal* served as a shield and sword simultaneously: it protected Wahid and NU from the state's repression while opening up an arena to contest the state's monopoly of Pancasila.

Islamism in the 'Political Openness': Towards the New Order's Hegemonic Crisis

By the late 1980s, the hegemony of New Order developmentalism had been increasingly challenged by diverse social groups dissatisfied with Soeharto's policies. At this time, the discourse of democracy had become a nodal point that channelled the aspiration among a broad section of societies to reshape the relations of power within the New Order regime. These dynamics were influenced by the political changes in the Eastern bloc dubbed as the 'third wave of democratisation' (Huntington, 1991; Uhlin, 1997). In Indonesia, the growing demand for democratisation was also situated in the context of intra-elite rivalries, especially between Soeharto and General Moerdani, the commander of the armed forces since 1983 before he was sacked in 1988 (Liddle, 1996; Mietzner, 2009). Soeharto upset Moerdani when he established a new base of power independent of the military. By the mid-1980s, Soeharto had increasingly reduced the grip of the military's influence both in the Golkar party and other strategic positions. For example, in 1983, Soeharto attempted to transform Golkar into a cadre-based party under the leadership of Soedharmono (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, Ch. 2, 3). Being an increasingly powerful institution in the early 1980s, the State Secretariat, also led by Soedharmono, had severely cut off the privileges of the military in various lucrative businesses (Pangaribuan, 1995, 57).

Indeed, democracy discourse had been signified and appropriated by social groups with different contents, interests and purposes. It does not mean that they would necessarily democratise Indonesian politics. But, they attempted to reshape and reconfigure the New Order regime by articulating this discourse. Even some military sections also began to call for a return to 'normal politics' and democratisation in their bid to challenge Soeharto (see Honna, 2003). In response, Soeharto embraced democratisation by initiating a policy called *keterbukaan* (political openness) in 1989. In his state address of 16 August 1990, Soeharto stated that:

> [w]hen our society was still divided by ideological differences, we had reason to be concerned about the differences of opinion. That time is now passing... To fear diversity of opinion is to doubt Pancasila's power and to hinder the evolution of Pancasila itself. (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003, 195)

Given the tensions with the military, Soeharto appropriated democracy discourse by courting urban middle-class Islamists into the state power. It was a turning point by which Islam became a strategic alliance, as a balancing power, against some sections of the military. Such a new strategy known as the 'Islamic turn' culminated when Soeharto sponsored the establishment of the *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in December 1990, led by the Minister of Technology and Soeharto's protégé, B. J. Habibie (Hefner, 1993; Liddle, 1996; Ramage, 1995, 53–57; Vatikiotis, 1998, 132–137).

Tantalisingly, Soeharto's approach to the modernist and urban-based Islamists had prompted other Islamist groups to develop different strategies for political negotiations. Instead of weakening Islamic opposition and bringing all Islamists into his coalition, Soeharto's support for ICMI politicises other Islamist groups. In response to the increasing corporatisation, these groups articulated democracy to critically challenge the New Order regime. Therefore, the strategies for accommodating middle-class Islamists had paradoxically brought about severe polarisation within Islamic groups. These strategies also led to internal frictions among key pillars of the New Order state, as discussed below.

In fact, ICMI itself is not a monolithic organisation. It comprises diverse social groups that articulated democracy discourse very differently. Its members, especially Muslim bureaucrats and professionals, saw ICMI as a strategic vehicle outside Golkar to access state power and resources. Others, like the Islamist figure Imaduddin Abdurrahim, claimed that ICMI enables the Islamists to participate in politics as leading actors, not spectators (Hefner, 2000; Porter, 2002, 89; Ramage, 1995, 48; Vatikiotis, 1998). While realising that Soeharto could instrumentalise ICMI (*vis-à-vis* the military or for election purposes, for example), they saw this rather as an opportunity. Since they advocated the reform strategy from *within*, 'they had to build a close relationship with, not against, the state' (Porter, 2002, 137; see also Mietzner, 2009, 82; Vatikiotis, 1998, 132–137).

Generally speaking, ICMI's agenda can be summarised in three issues, namely, Islamisation, democratisation and demilitarisation. However, ICMI activists advocated a different version of the Islamisation agenda from the outset. For 'liberals' such as Dawam Rahardjo and Nurcholis Madjid, Islamisation is understood as the use of Islam as the source of political morality (Hefner, 2000; Porter, 2002, 138). Others, such as Adi

Sasono, Soetjipto Wirosardjojo and Muslim bureaucrats, defined Islamisation as an attempt to promote the brand of 'moderate and modern' Islam compatible with the development agenda (Ramage, 1995). The more conservative activists—generally associated with the DDII—advocated Islamisation in formalistic and legalistic forms.

It is also apparent that ICMI signified democracy discourse primarily as a political strategy (Ramage, 1995, 62, 71). Its proponents constituted Islam as a new category, as clearly shown in their demand for 'proportionalisation' in economics and politics, resembling Malaysia's New Economic Policy (NEP). It appears that its underlying idea was to 'seek revenge' on those they perceived as responsible for the marginalisation of Muslims, frequently referring to 'Christianisation' and ethnic Chinese dominance in the economy (Hefner, 2000; Ramage, 1995, 64–66; Schwarz, 2000). Furthermore, the ICMI activists used the demilitarisation agenda to improve their position before Soeharto by sidelining the military (Mietzner, 2009; Ramage, 1995). They often expressed discomfort with the military's dominance, especially the Moerdani-linked Catholic generals, deemed responsible for New Order's anti-Islam policies.

ICMI-Soeharto alliance re-politicised other Islamists. The latter developed different strategies for survival and expanding their social bases. For example, the proponents of 'social movement' Islamism considered the state's accommodation to Islamist groups a considerable opportunity to 'pragmatically' expand their social bases by building multiple socio-economic institutions for recruitment.[10] One of its senior activists stated that 'we didn't care whether the state's accommodation to Islam was because Soeharto himself became pious or a mere political strategy to deal with the military. We saw this as momentum for *dakwah* and Islamic

[10] By the late 1980s, this group had changed its method from the secretive *usroh* models to more exposed ones such as *liqa* (discussion), *daurah* (training), *rihlah* and *mabit* (retreat camps). The Tarbiyah activists also built a number of institutions, which were instrumental for recruitment, to their young activists. These included the pre-university tutoring preparation centres of Nurul Fikri (since 1984), Al-Hikmah Islamic higher education (1987), Khairu Ummah, a *dakwah* institute (1989) and the Studies and Information for Contemporary Islamic World (SIDIK, a research centre, 1992). From 1993, they also began to assume strategic positions in campus-based organisations in big universities which were for decades had been occupied by HMI or other leftist student organisations. See Machmudi (2008), Damanik (2002), Rahmat (2008) and Rosyad (2006).

movements.'[11] Unlike other modernist Islamists who utilised ICMI as a vehicle for accessing state power, they presented themselves as 'neither ICMI opponent nor Soeharto supporter.'[12] The main reason for this position is certainly not ideological but more sociological: they had no sufficient leverages for negotiations.

The critical response against the Soeharto-ICMI relationship was expressed by Abdurrahman Wahid, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. He was disappointed with ICMI's political manoeuvres, arguing that it had promoted sectarian and exclusive politics (Barton, 2002; Porter, 2002; Wahid, 1995). Indeed, the rise of ICMI, which was largely represented by modernist organisations like Muhammadiyah and HMI, had challenged his and NU's strategic bargaining position before Soeharto, which they had enjoyed since 1984. Through the *Forum Demokrasi*, set up in 1991 by intellectuals, NGO activists and non-Muslim representatives, Wahid frequently criticised ICMI's manipulation of religion and the government's instrumentalisation of Islam. Wahid's critical position had severely deteriorated his and NU's relationship with Soeharto precisely during the New Order's 'Islamic turn.'

Rather than reflecting a battle between 'idealists' and 'pragmatists,' Wahid's critical stance against ICMI was better seen as signalling a different negotiation strategy with Soeharto. While criticising ICMI's sectarian Islamism, he repeatedly declared that 'I am for an Indonesian society, not just an Islamic one' (Hefner, 1997, 100). Wahid also organised a mass rally (*rapat akbar*), attended by about 200,000 people at the Senayan sports stadium, to commemorate NU's 62nd anniversary on 1 March 1992. Here, he publicly declared NU's loyalty to Pancasila and thus indirectly challenged Soeharto-ICMI's sectarian orientation. In a letter written to Soeharto, just a day after the rally, Wahid boldly warned that:

> By preventing Nahdlatul Ulama from obtaining conclusive legitimacy for its views, the responsibility for orientating Indonesia's religious movement now moves to the government. If the government fails, then within ten

[11] Interview with a senior tarbiyah activist and PKS politician (Jakarta, 2 November 2016).

[12] Interview with Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail, a former PK chairman (Depok, West Java, 30 October 2016).

> years the strength of those who don't accept the national ideology will grow. (Schwarz, 2000, 192–193)

In addition, Soeharto's moves to court urban middle-class Islamists had upset some military officers, and the tensions between ICMI and the military had thus heightened. Their rivalry culminated during the nomination of the vice-president in 1993, in which Soeharto finally approved General Try Soetrisno instead of ICMI's political patron, B. J. Habibie (Ramage, 1995, 63–64). ICMI's close association with Habibie also became another source of anger for the military. Habibie upset the military following the transfer of arms industries and supply management to his office, the Ministry of Technology. More importantly, the military saw Habibie as their greatest rival if political succession were to take place (Mietzner, 2009; Porter, 2002; Ramage, 1995). In turn, the military's resentment of ICMI, especially among Moerdani's men and secular-nationalist officers, had driven them to build close relations with Wahid. They shared the same concern regarding the issues of sectarianism and the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism.

By 1994, Soeharto had begun to purge his and ICMI/Habibie's opponents. He dismissed Moerdani from the cabinet in 1993, restructured the military leadership and appointed more Muslim bureaucrats to ministerial posts. Soeharto then promoted the so-called 'green' generals (associated with military groups linked to ICMI) into strategic positions, such as Feisal Tanjung as Commander-in-Chief, Hartono (known as Anti-Wahid and linked to Soeharto's family) as the military's powerful Bureau of Social and Political Affairs and President's son-in-law, Prabowo, as head of the Armed Special Forces (Porter, 2002, 142; Ramage, 1995, 47–78).

The military's influence in Golkar also diminished again when Harmoko, the Minister of Information and Soeharto loyalist, was elected as the first civilian party chairman in 1993. Specifically, the removal of anti-ICMI commanders had increasingly prompted tensions between the publicly perceived as 'green' (refer to Islamists' ally) versus 'red-and-white' (nationalist) military wings. The rise of 'green' generals became a turning point for ICMI's conservative Muslims to build a network with a section in the military (cf. Hefner, 2000, 128–166). Intra-elite rivalries between Soeharto's ICMI/Golkar civilian supporters on the one side and the military on the other were exposed to the public when the popular magazine *Tempo*, *Editor*, *DeTik* reported on a scandal involving Habibie

in the purchase of old warships from East Germany navy. These publications ended up being banned in June 1994. This moment also signalled the termination of the period of political openness.

Moreover, the state bureaucracy was also increasingly politicised when the tensions between ICMI and its antagonists spilled over into strategic posts. The appointment of more ICMI-linked nationalist ministers in 1993 reduced liberal-oriented technocrats' positions (Porter, 2002; Schwarz, 2000). Inevitably, the State Secretariat (Sekneg), the closest institution to the President, became the arena for power competition. Some felt that ICMI activists had encroached on Sekneg's role of controlling access to the president, in which Minister Moerdiono stood in favour of the technocrats. The tensions reached a peak when ICMI-associated Minister of Transport, Haryanto Danutirto, through a publicly leaked letter, was reported to have been involved in a corruption scandal (Ramage, 1995). While ICMI opponents, especially the military faction in the parliament, called for Haryanto to resign, its supporters saw this issue as part of Moerdiono's conspiracy to discredit Habibie (Ramage, 1995).

Clearly, the contestation and changing social coalition resulting from different articulations of democracy had brought about polarisation. Such a condition had subsequently led to severe internal fractures within the New Order's key pillars. Soeharto's support for middle-class Islamism in the form of ICMI had politicised other Islamists and altered the playing field of competition that was increasingly beyond his control. More specifically, the democracy discourse of this period had also facilitated the fragmentation of Islamism, overwhelmed by the internal battles for being absorbed into the state power. Yet, in one way or another, these developments had considerably contributed to the hegemonic crisis of the New Order.

Political Unravelling and Soeharto's Fall

By 1994, oppositional groups had proliferated, and their demands for political changes increasingly became more vocal. Street demonstrations and strikes became a new phenomenon in Indonesian politics, though relatively small but widespread across urban cities (Aspinall, 2005; Lane, 2008). Meanwhile, the hegemony of New Order developmentalism was also increasingly challenged by 'regionalist' insurgencies. Organised through ethno-nationalist and communist signifiers in Aceh of North

Sumatra and East Timor respectively, the New Order regime saw this turmoil threatening Indonesia's unity. The military operations launched by the Soeharto regime to clump down these movements had only resulted in the New Order's hegemonic crisis and severe critics from international communities. More decisively, the New Order's crisis of legitimacy was inevitable when the Asian crisis hit the country in mid-1997, especially after the dramatic drop of the rupiah's value in early 1998. As such, the promises of the New Order's developmentalism fell apart.

Against this backdrop, Soeharto's strategy to build a new political basis and legitimacy by accommodating urban middle-class Islamists had brought about a paradoxical result. Instead of domesticating opposition, such a strategy triggered the radicalisation of other political groups in challenging the New Order. By early 1996, Soeharto and his allies were concerned if Wahid of Nahdlatul Ulama and Megawati Soekarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), with their respective grass-roots support bases, would begin to build a formal alliance (Barton, 2002; Eklof, 2004). Efforts to undermine them had marked a new chapter in the use of violence. The turning point was when Soeharto repressed Megawati's supporters, known as *Kudatuli* (*Kerusuhan 27 Juli*, riots of 27 July). Such repressive and iron-fist measures became a backlash when they only brought diverse opposition groups into a relatively unified anti-New Order movement.

The mobilisation of ICMI-linked Islamic groups to attack pro-Megawati elements and anti-New Order groups in general also showed the emergence of an alliance between the 'green' military and the conservative Islamists, especially the DDII and KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World) (see Honna, 2003; Porter, 2002; Schwarz, 2000). The military typically branded all opposition groups as agents of instability, resembling the methods reminiscent of the communists. At this time, the military also reintroduced the doctrine of 'vigilance' (*kewaspadaan*) that enabled it to discredit and crush the opposition at any time (Honna, 2003). Yet, the more suppression by the regime that opposition groups suffered, the more the New Order lost its hegemonic character.

Inevitably, Wahid's support for the pro-Megawati movement worsened the existing tensions between him and Soeharto. In October 1996, anti-Christian and anti-Chinese riots broke out in NU's stronghold of Situbondo in East Java—followed by the same patterns in Tasikmalaya

of West Java. The riots were widely regarded as intentionally engineered to undermine Wahid. In the aftermath of the Situbondo riots, Wahid ultimately realised that confrontation with Soeharto was counterproductive, and he had no choice but to negotiate with him (Barton, 2002, 221). Wahid began to rehabilitate his relationship with Soeharto, even publicly declaring his support for Golkar and Soeharto's next presidential bid—in stark contrast to his position in the 1992 elections.[13] He further upset pro-democracy activists when he worked with Tutut Soeharto and General Hartono of Golkar, who disliked Habibie and the 'green' generals. He even escorted Tutut and Golkar to visit *pesantrens*—the NU's main social base. By so doing, however, Wahid had directly challenged ICMI's and PPP's claim of representing Muslims and thus recovered his bargaining positions before Soeharto.

On the contrary, the PPP became more critical against the New Order and Golkar before the 1997 elections (Aspinall, 2005; Porter, 2002, 178). This was mainly triggered by Golkar's and Wahid's manoeuvre that led many PPP cadres to declare their loyalty to the ruling party. In fact, the party leaders were too optimistic about their ability to defeat Golkar, expecting to gain Megawati's supporters' votes. The PPP leaders then proclaimed that voting for the party was part of *jihad*, while it also brought the rhetoric of defending *wong cilik* (the little people) to attract Megawati's masses. Without a formal alliance at the level of the party leadership, many Megawati grass-root supporters joined the PPP rally, known as *Mega-Bintang*, which frequently clashed with Golkar crowds and anti-riot troops during the campaigns (Aspinall, 2005, 200–202; Porter, 2002, 181–183).

By early 1997, Amin Rais, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, previously an outspoken ICMI activist, also began to oppose the New Order. While the opposition leaders with the most significant supporters—Wahid, Amin and Megawati—shared visions for political changes, the efforts to build a formal alliance among them to challenge the Soeharto regime declined. Wahid, for instance, argued that being patient was better to avoid confrontation (Barton, 2002, 229), while Amin shifted his strategy to

[13] In his biography, he even recalled that '[i]t is better that Golkar has a good win in the 1997 elections because if the numbers drop too much then Soeharto might panic and lash out again. … we're going to be stuck with Soeharto for some years yet, so now it is not the time to push for change—we'd best retreat and consolidate' (Barton, 2002, 223).

'return' to ICMI networks after Habibie was named as the next vice-president (Porter, 2002, 201–104; Vatikiotis, 1998). The failure to build an alliance, even a tactical one, had clearly shown that they still considered that, as Robison and Hadiz rightly argued, 'their ambitions could only be achieved from *within* the regime—even if Soeharto had to go' (2004, 171).

Although the opposition groups were fragmented, their social base had broadened rapidly in the last months of Soeharto's rule (Aspinall, 2005; Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 164–183; Schwarz, 2000). In urban centres, ordinary people and middle classes immediately took part onto the streets. At the same time, uncontrolled unrest broke out following the drastic increase in essential commodities, hyperinflation, widespread unemployment and an uncertain economic immediate future. At this time, the anti-New Order slogan then served as the rallying point within which multiple demands were articulated and organised.

It is noteworthy that the central role of students in anti-New Order mobilisations also evidently showed the absence of viable political vehicles to channel such widespread dissents. In fact, student movements were also severely fragmented. Unlike the radical and leftist student organisations, which mobilised dissent beyond their campus and called for total reform, the Islamist student organisations generally framed their activism as a 'moral' movement. Hence, they remained confined within campuses (Aspinall, 2005, 226–228). The Islamists became active on the streets when the network of Campus Dakwah Institute (LDK), associated mainly with the Tarbiyah, built the Muslim University Student Action (KAMMI) in Malang in March 1998. However, their 'moral' and 'purist' tendencies prevented them, and other Islamist student organisations, from establishing collaboration with left-wing counterparts (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 180–182).[14]

Amidst the politics of the streets and the breakdown of social order, the tensions inside the regime heightened. With Habibie as the sole candidate for the vice-president, the positions of ministries became an arena for contestations where anti-ICMI groups sought to diminish Habibie's influence. Consequently, many ICMI leaders and other Islamist groups, such as Muhammadiyah, KISDI and Persis, were distraught when only ICMI-linked bureaucrats, perceived as unrepresentative of Muslims,

[14] Interview with Fahri Hamzah, a former KAMMI chairman and DPR deputy speaker (2014-2019) (Jakarta, 10 November 2016).

gained the positions in the cabinet announced in March 1998. Interestingly, these groups still expected that their survival could be better assured in a post-Soeharto regime, in which Habibie would have greater power. Soeharto's fall was imminent when Harmoko of Golkar and other loyalists in the parliament called for him to resign and threatened impeachment proceedings that would commence on 22 May (Schwarz, 2000). Being the last survival effort, Soeharto reacted by inviting Muslim leaders for consultations and offering them to sit in his 'reform committee,' but none of them accepted. By the night of 20 May, Soeharto was abandoned by all his closest associates when he received a letter from Ginanjar Kartasasmita, the Minister of National Development Plan, announcing his and other fourteen cabinet members' resignation (Robison & Hadiz, 2004, 170–171; Schwarz, 2000, 355).

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter has portrayed diverse articulations of Islamism in the emergence, consolidation and crisis of the hegemony of New Order developmentalism. More specifically, this chapter examines these dynamics under three central discursive settings, namely the periods of formation (1966–1973), consolidation (1974–1983) and negotiation (1984–1998). Accordingly, the manifestation of Islamist articulations and the relations between Islamism and the New Order state are significantly constituted within three dominant discourses: anti-communism, developmentalism and democracy.

Having excluded communism and some forms of Islamism, constructed as its antagonism, the New Order became a new hegemonic social order in the 1970s. More specifically, the New Order hegemony had been achieved by universalising Pancasila Democracy as a master signifier—a general nodal point organised around the signifier of political stability, welfare and social harmony. Previously utilised as a marker to distinguish itself from the discredited Old Order, Pancasila Democracy was constituted as the pre-requisite for the New Order development agenda. Here, developmentalism discourse was not limitedly articulated by growth-oriented economic policies. Rather, it produced distinct social relations, agencies and subjectivities, leading to the restructuring of state and society relations.

Throughout the New Order era, the different ways the Islamists appropriated developmentalism discourse had resulted in the emergence of

three forms of Islamism, namely, the confrontationist, accommodationist and 'social movements.' It has been argued that such diverse Islamist articulations were less associated with their ideological underpinnings but greatly influenced by their socio-historical conditions, particularly their different positions in state power. Undoubtedly, these forms of Islamism had shaped the contestations and social coalitions, which influenced the fragility of the New Order hegemony. More specifically, the New Order's 'Islamic turn' by courting urban middle-class Islamists in the early 1990s, in the form of ICMI, had brought about polarisation that led to severe internal conflicts within the New Order's key elements. Soeharto could no longer control these polarisations and conflicts. By privileging ICMI, Soeharto's strategy had paradoxically prompted other Islamists to articulate 'radical' demands in their bid to increase their leverage of negotiation with the regime.

While democracy discourse in the 1990s facilitated the proliferation of movements that successfully forced President Soeharto to step down, it had failed to enable the opposition groups to build a relatively common agenda. In fact, the leaders of the opposition groups generally saw that their ambitions for controlling state power could only be guaranteed from *within* the New Order's power structure. Therefore, in the last years of Soeharto's administration, the national politics increasingly became an arena of open confrontation among power-seekers, as they saw themselves as possible contenders for ruling the state in the post-Soeharto era. To use Gramscian terms, the 'war of position' strategies waged by diverse political oppositions soon became a 'war of manoeuvre' in the last years of the New Order.

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CHAPTER 5

Islamism and Its Hegemonic Failure in Democratising Indonesia

Although anti-authoritarian movements have an important role in toppling Soeharto from power amidst the 1998 economic crisis, the lack of a common agenda limit their ability to navigate political changes with precision. One consequence is that hopes for radical changes resulting from the dismantling of the *ancien régime* under the banner of *reformasi total* quickly fades away. As Gramsci (1971, 210–212; 275–276) reminds us in the politics of hegemony, the *ancien régime* must not only fall before a new political formation can emerge, but an alternative order must be ready to take its place. For hegemonic politics to be made possible, a political struggle requires the expansion of chains of equivalence among a multitude of social groups (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 182). Without such a condition, political frontiers between those in favour of transformation and those who defend the status quo are obliterated, and hegemonic struggles to establish a new political order are thus strictly impossible.

Against this backdrop, the primary concern of this chapter is to comprehend the diverse articulations of Islam in the struggles for the post-Soeharto social order. These struggles are situated in the context where the democratisation discourse becomes a master signifier—a new terrain with various political articulations of how to transform Indonesia from authoritarianism to democracy. This chapter argues that competing articulations of democratisation, especially between those that signify

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it as an elite-driven process on the one hand or as the 'will of the people' on the other, have brought about complexities that ultimately characterise the contestations and coalitions involved in transforming post-New Order politics. In so doing, the chapter identifies three central nodal points of post-Soeharto democratisation discourse that considerably shaped the practices of Islamism: political liberalisation, decentralisation and multiculturalism.

It is noteworthy that democratisation discourses and struggles of contending political projects in defining post-Soeharto order are situated in the context of the ascendancy of neoliberalism and of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The convergencies of the national context and these global trends have influenced the dynamics of hegemonic struggles for the post-Soeharto politics and brought distinct forms of agency and subjectivity. Beyond the post-crisis economic restructuring agenda imposed by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, neoliberalism here is understood broadly as a form of 'governmental reason' (e.g. Brown, 2015; Foucault 2004; Larner & Walters, 2004). This 'governmental reason' is specifically premised on the expansion of the logic of the market to every aspect of social life such that it distinctively reshapes social relations, institutions, norms, subjectivities and ultimately state and society relations. Within this neoliberal governing logic, democracy discourses are articulated primarily through the crafting of institutions and mechanisms to facilitate competing political groups for controlling state power. 'Economisation of democracy,' to borrow Brown's term (2015), has degenerated democracy into electoral politics, conceived as a marketplace that replaces political terms with market-oriented criteria, such as representation with electability and governance with management. In this mode of articulation, therefore, vibrant political conflicts are essentially neglected in neoliberal democracy discourses (Brown, 2015).

In a post-authoritarian context, neoliberalisation of democracy has brought about two immediate consequences. Firstly, democratisation agendas become elite-driven transition that even facilitates the forces of status quo to reconsolidate their power through democratic institutions and mechanisms. Secondly, depoliticising effects of the neoliberal democracy discourse prevents people's based struggles from articulating progressive projects organised around the demands for equality and social justice. In Indonesia, the neoliberalisation of democracy has been

facilitated by the conditions where reform movements were severely disorganised after Soeharto's fall. Instead of creating a space for hegemonic struggles between the blocs of reform and the status quo, democratisation discourses in the post-Soeharto era have paved the way for the reemergence of the forces representing those of the status quo. Furthermore, as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) imperatives, the global promotion of democracy has been increasingly integrated into the securitisation of Islamism (Asad, 2007; Mamdani 2004; Volpi, 2010). By mainstreaming of the danger of Islamic articulations in politics, its proponents force Muslims in Indonesia and the world to deal with the questions on Islam-democracy compatibility which result in the emergence of two dichotomic subjects, the moderate and the radical Islam. It is within the nexus of neoliberal democracy and GWOT discourses, therefore, Islamism has become a prominent matrix in explaining post-Soeharto Indonesia.

In engaging with democratisation theories, the chapter argues further, that the functioning of democracy in transforming New Order authoritarianism is less determined by the presence of democratic rules and institutions as advocated by transitology approaches (e.g., Diamond, 1999; O'Donnell et al., 1986). Instead, the democratic trajectories are shaped by the complexities resulting from contending articulations of democratisation which ultimately reorganise and modify the contestations and social coalitions engaged in directing post-Soeharto politics. The chapter reveals that democratisation discourses articulated through the three nodal points mentioned above have brought about different and even contradictory forms of Islamism. While political liberalisation and decentralisation have provided Islamists with a more significant role in the state and society, they do not facilitate the building of effective representation of a sociologically diverse *ummah*. Meanwhile, dominant articulations of multiculturalism, constructed within the merging context of GWOT and post-authoritarian democratisation, have, in some ways, contained Islamism as a cultural category. Through the multiculturalism discourse, the antagonistic lines of 'radical-intolerant' and 'moderate-pluralist' camps are constituted and reproduced. As we shall see, these conditions have led to the further fragmentation of Islamism, which have shaped the relations between Islamism and the state and among Islamist groups in the post-New Order era.

Political Liberalisation and Fragmented Islamism

This section discusses diverse articulations of Islamism in the context of political liberalisation. Soon after the fall of Soeharto regime, political liberalisation became the most important nodal point for democratisation discourse. It manifested itself mainly through the reintroduction of multiparty elections and the lifting of anti-democratic legal frameworks that constrained vibrant political participation. Due to the dominance of the democratic transition paradigm, however, political liberalisation was mainly articulated through the crafting of democratic institutions that focused primarily on elite-driven processes aligned to the neoliberal development agenda of international agencies (e.g. McLeod & MacIntyre, 2007). The convergencies between the global development orientation and the reorganisation of power at home through democratisation discourse were influential in shaping the trajectories of Indonesian democracy.

Yet, political liberalisation in the early years of democratisation era had also meant the opening of new political terrain where multiple social agents, especially the Islamists, created distinct forms of agency for the struggle to define the post-authoritarian Indonesia. Thus, the establishment of Islamic parties, either those which explicitly articulate Islam as their ideology, or those which had direct links to the social bases of existing Islamic organisations, provided a legitimate entry point for those seeking to represent the interests of the *ummah* through electoral politics at the national and local levels. Meanwhile, the Islamist movements with diverse articulations in civil society arena were freer to compete to control and order the public sphere. Undoubtedly, political liberalisation had created an arena for the Islamists to actively participate and to advance their agenda in post-New Order politics. But, fierce electoral competition to control state power and their historical legacies of social conflicts prevented the Islamists from being capable of establishing a cross-cutting agenda for uniting and advancing a distinct project under the umbrella of the *ummah*.

The Islamists and Political Representation

By looking at contentious relations between Islam and the state throughout the New Order period, some scholars like Sidel describe the events leading to Soeharto's fall as representing a 'final push' driven by

'the forces associated with the promotion of Islam in Indonesian society and state' (2006, 117–120, 126). As Hadiz (2008, 462) rightly suggests however, if this assessment was correct, Habibie's interim government, from May 1998 to October 1999, should have represented the 'victory' of Islamic politics.[1] Yet, the alliance between Habibie and Islamists felt apart immediately. Indeed, the assumption that the hegemonic crisis of the New Order directly benefited Islamism, in the sense that Islamists might potentially provide a coherent narrative for a new political order, is too simplistic and misleading. From the lens of hegemony analysis, the central issue is to what extent the New Order hegemonic crisis subsequently allows Islamists to expand their chains of equivalence by linking themselves with diverse democratic struggles, as we shall see below.

In fact, debates and practices on how Islam should play a role following political liberalisation have revealed different and conflicting forms of Islamism. It is worth noting that the diverse forms of Islamism, including their diverse identities, strategies and interests, do not come out of nowhere but are related to the prevalent structures of power, especially those nurtured in the last years of the New Order. In the early months after Soeharto's fall, the dynamics of Islamic politics revolved around the way Habibie's interim government forged its new power base. Indeed, Habibie's democratisation agenda was inseparable from his efforts to establish new legitimacy by distancing himself from New Order and to cling to power. Dubbed as an 'accelerated evolution,' Habibie rapidly set up various regulations and institutions, regarded as the necessary conditions for a democratic transition (Anwar, 2010, 106; Habibie, 2006). Inheriting historically distinct power structures of the New Order, he built a power base by accommodating and mobilising modernist Islamists while also relying on the New Order's key pillars, Golkar and the military. Despite holding great concern that the military might sabotage the political transition, the Habibie-military manoeuvre was, in fact, instrumental in mobilising Islamist support (Honna, 2003, 168; Mietzner,

[1] Islamist groups which were previously accommodated by the New Order regime believed that their political fortunes could only rise by continuing their patronage networks with Habibie. They celebrated the Habibie government as representing the *ummah*. For example, MUI declared that supporting Habibie would continue state-assisted Islamisation (Ichwan, 2005, 53). KISDI's leader, Ahmad Sumargono, openly stated that 'if this status quo clearly benefits the *ummah,* why not?' (*Tempo*, 17 November 1998).

2009, 200).[2] This is salient when Habibie's government was criticised as representing an anti-*reformasi* coalition and faced widespread opposition, particularly from cross-campus student movements. This anti-Habibie movement culminated in the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, People's Consultative Council) special session, held in November 1998, that would formalise the interim government. To counter anti-Habibie demonstrations, the military and pro-Habibie Islamist groups facilitated the creation of the so-called *Pam Swakarsa* (civil security forces) by mobilising some 100,000 militia-men from various organisations but mostly Islamist vigilante groups.[3] While anti-Habibie movements saw the MPR session as a political battle for *reformasi total*, the military-backed Islamists accused Habibie's opponents of representing anti-Islamic movements.

The Islamists within Habibie's coalition were, in fact, increasingly concerned about their future vis-à-vis the military and Golkar. They began to realise that continuing their strategies of building an ICMI-like patronage network was no longer enough to secure their position. Rather, they had to rely on mobilising their bases of support through participation in electoral politics. Prompted by the fragility of the Habibie coalition and the golden momentum of political liberalisation, numerous

[2] Since the 1990s, the democratisation discourse had brought about competing camps in the military divided between the so-called 'conservative' and 'reformist' camps. After Soeharto's fall, the latter became ascendant and supported democratic reforms. More specifically, the democratisation agenda of the military was prompted by two main motives. Firstly, to recover social credibility after the military was discredited as 'a dead tool of the government' and its *dwifungsi* doctrine was severely criticised. Secondly, to enable the reformist camp under General Wiranto's leadership to purge the conservatives and thus enhance his bargaining position with Habibie. For example, Wiranto secured majority votes in favour of Akbar Tanjung, a Habibie ally and HMI veteran, for the party chairman during the Golkar Special National Congress in July 1998. Akbar's rival was General Edi Sudradjat, a former military commander, a declared Habibie-ICMI opponent who was popular among military ranks and Golkar's 'nationalist' elements. See Honna (2003, 159) and Crouch (2010).

[3] *Pam Swakarsa* included Islamist groups such as the MUI-linked *Furkon* (Islamic Forum for the Establishment of Justice and Constitution), FPI (Islamic Defender Front), Front Hizbullah, Banten army, Batalyon Al-Ghifari and so forth. See, for example, van Dijk (2001, 152–167), Wilson (2015) and Sidel (2006). During the mobilisations, the military also revived its conservative doctrine of *kewaspadaan* (vigilance) by framing anti-Habibie groups as communists that should be fought against. Thus, as Honna (2003, 168) demonstrated, Habibie-Wiranto's mutual dependence frustrated the 'reformist' camps who saw that such a relationship had prevented military reforms from moving forward.

Islam-associated parties emerged, in which 18 of them (out of 48 parties) were ultimately eligible to participate in the 1999 election (Suryadinata, 2002, 78–84). Nevertheless, as discussed below, the plurality of Islamic political vehicles did not lead to a better representation of the sociologically diverse *ummah*. The diverse articulations of Islamism during the early years of *Reformasi* era had been inseparable from their different subject positions in relation to the New Order developmentalism and the Habibie's democratic transition discourse.

For example, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), that was critical to the alliance between Habibie regime and the Islamists, welcomed political liberalisation as a moment to 'take revenge' for their previous marginalisation.[4] Since the early 1990s, NU's relationship with the Soeharto regime was severely deteriorated and it was not accommodated in the New Order state, especially when the regime began to court modernist Islamists into its power base. Under the chairmanship of Abdurrahman Wahid, NU leaders were concerned with the alliance between Habibie regime and the modernist Islamists on the ground that this alliance, like their previous critics against the Soeharto-ICMI coalition, would promote sectarian politics. The *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB, *National Awakening Party*) which was connected directly to the NU's official structure, was set up in July 1998. Partly dissatisfied with PKB's pluralist platform—i.e. not an Islamic one—and its commitment to ally itself with Megawati's PDIP (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*), some NU figures established alternative Islamic parties claiming to represent the *nahdlyin*, the NU followers. Among them were Abdurrahman Wahid's political rivals such as Abu Hasan, who formed the *Solidaritas Uni Indonesia* (SUNI, Solidarity of the Indonesian National Union), Syukron Makmun, who forged the *Partai Nahdlatul Umat* (PNU, Muslim Community's Awakening Party) and *Partai Kebangkitan Umat* (PKU, Party of Awakening of the Muslim Community) led by Yusuf Hasyim—Wahid's own uncle (Bush, 2009, 125–127; Mietzner, 1999, 174–186).

While projecting the image of national unity and advancing a pluralist platform, the PKB found limited support in urban-based *reformasi* movements. Exploiting NU's traditional social base, the PKB relied significantly on the *pesantren* network, mostly in Javanese villages, and was largely unable to expand their constituency in urban centres. This lack of

[4] This phrase was expressed by Abdurrahman Wahid in speech before PKB supporters in a general meeting in March 1999. See Salim (ed.) (1999, 199–206).

support also stemmed from Wahid's manoeuvres working with Soeharto in early 1997, in his earlier bid to contain ICMI's monopoly on Islam, which provoked serious dissatisfaction among pro-democracy activists. Here, PKB's main competitor in claiming the NU's constituency was arguably the previously state-sanctioned PPP.[5] Established in 1973 as a fusion of various Islamic forces including NU, PPP possessed better political infrastructure and experience to participate in the post-New Order election. More importantly, some NU figures, such as senior politician Hamzah Haz, took control of the PPP leadership in 1999 that symbolically terminated continuous marginalisation experienced by NU elements within the party since its establishment (cf. Feillard, 1999). Subsequently, the PPP's decision to affirm Islam as its ideological basis and the reintroduction of Ka'bah (the holy shrine of Mecca) as its party symbol had attracted NU figures dissatisfied with Wahid's leadership and NU's non-*pesantren* constituents.

Meanwhile, the modernist Islamists, were well accommodated in Habibie's coalition, but were also not immune to internal frictions. Some scholars pointed out that this fragmentation was linked to the manoeuvring of Amien Rais, a leading figure in ICMI, turned anti-Soeharto leader before Soeharto's fall (e.g. Mietzner, 1999, 186–192, 194). The modernist Islamists expected Rais to lead a 'unified' Islamic party founded by the *Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam* (BKUI, Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community), representing Islamic organisations such as ICMI, DDII, KISDI and other smaller groups. There was also a plan to 'take over' the PPP and instal Rais in its party leadership. All of these scenarios collapsed when Rais ultimately felt that the 'Islamic jacket was too small.'[6] Rais subsequently built a pluralist platform party, the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, National Mandate Party). Unlike Wahid's PKB, PAN initially attracted leading pro-democracy figures. Yet, its inability to

[5] In fact, not all NU-based *pesantrens* supported the PKB. Some of them decided to remain in PPP, such as *At-Taroqy* (Madura, East Java) and *Al-Anwar* (Rembang, Central Java), led respectively by charismatic leaders *Kyai* Alawy Muhammad (d. 2014) and *Kyai* Maimun Zubair (1928–2019).

[6] Abu Ridho says that Rais' final decision to build a pluralist party, and his 'lack of confidence' in an Islamic party, had disappointed modernist Muslims, especially within the DDII. DDII offered him the leadership of the Masyumi-model party. Interview (Jakarta, 2 November 2016). Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a DDII and ICMI figure, also expressed the same disappointment, saying that '…[It] was very bad behaviour, and we will certainly remember that for the future' (cited via Mietzner, 2009, 257).

manage the tensions between the pluralist and Muhammadiyah-Islamist elements within the party subsequently led many of them to resign.[7]

The lack of leadership within the modernist Islamist camps facilitated the rise of numerous Islamic parties. Among them was the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, Crescent and Star Party), led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra. While claiming to represent Masyumi's revival, its main social base was largely associated with conservative organisations such as DDII and KISDI, which were staunchly anti-Western and actively promoted sectarian politics (Mietzner, 2009, 256–257; Platzdasch, 2009). Other modernist Islamic parties were largely unsuccessful, including Deliar Noer's *Partai Umat Islam* (PUI, Party of the Muslim Community) and Ridwan Saidi's *Masyumi Baru* (New Masyumi Party) (Suryadinata, 2002, 74–101).

Significantly, the establishment of the *Partai Keadilan* (PK, Justice Party) in 1998 represented different dynamics within modernist Islamist camps. The embryo of this party was *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, which took on a 'social movement' strategy and had remained outside state power since the New Order. This party drew its constituency from the so-called 'global *santri*' waves, which refers to young educated Muslims and urban middle-class members who gained inspiration from Islamic activism in the broader Muslim world (Furkon, 2004; Machmudi, 2008). Another key party constituent was the *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia* (KAMMI, Action Committee for Indonesian Muslim Students) in university campuses. Against the backdrop of the depoliticisation of student movements in the (early to mid) 1980s, the university-based *dakwah* (Islamic propagation) network had not only replaced the dominance of progressive student organisations but also became a new base for the establishment of many Islamic organisations such as *Partai Keadilan* and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). In the mid-1990s, Islamic activists from this network began to successfully occupy strategic positions in many university-based student organisations. As part of this student Islamic network and being the *Partai Keadilan*'s political wing, KAMMI was formally built in 1998 and was the main supporters of the Habibie regime (Aspinall, 2005; Damanik, 2002).

[7] Like the PKB-NU relationship, PAN also faced challenges to manage the tension between the pluralist banner and Muhammadiyah-Islamist elements. For example, Muhammadiyah activists dominated PAN's regional branches, which led to severe frustration among non-Muhammadiyah members. See Mietzner (1999, 189).

Other factors that constrained the building of a coherent form of representation were associated with strategic-ideological issues. This factor mainly manifested in debates over Islam versus Pancasila as the party's ideological foundation for representing and mobilising the *ummah* in the post-New Order politics. While articulations of Islam and Pancasila had been relatively 'reconciled' through New Order developmentalism, its hegemonic crisis following Soeharto's fall had made possible the rearticulation of Islam as a political signifier for nation-state reformation. Rearticulating Islam in the political arena gained momentum when Law No. 3 and 5/1985 that obliged all parties and social organisations to recognise Pancasila as their sole foundation (*asas tunggal*) was revoked in early 1999.

Indeed, the abolition of the *asas tunggal* became a turning point for establishing political parties and social organisations where Islam being identified as the foundation of their ideological platforms. Here, advocates of Islam as the comprehensive basis for religion and the state (*shumuliyatul Islam*) perceived that reforming the state following Islamic laws (sharia) was an obligation for individual Muslims.[8] Islamist organisations like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) further claimed that Islam was the only solution to Indonesia's multidimensional crisis (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009). In contrast, the proponents of pluralist Islam argued that the decision for not using Islam as the party's ideological foundation did not contradict Islam in itself. For them, political parties were only a method or vehicle to achieve the ultimate political objectives of this religion, namely creating a just and prosperous nation (see, for example, Wahid, 2010).

Rearticulating Islam in the political arena, therefore, was not always publicly welcome. This triggered some newly established Islamic parties to form the short-lived *Forum Silaturahmi Partai-Partai Islam* (FSPPI, Goodwill Forum of Islamic Parties) in September 1998.[9] The forum was

[8] They stated that supporting Islamic parties was mandatory for every Muslim. They legitimised this claim by using a famous *ushul fiqh* (legal inferences) method of *ma la yatimmul wajib ila bihi fahuwa wajib* (a means that without it, the obligatory ends cannot be achieved, the status of (using) that means thus becomes an obligation). Interview with Abu Ridho (Jakarta, 2 November 2016), Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[9] The FSPPI was initiated by PK, PUI, Masyumi Party, PSII 1905, *Partai Politik Tharekat Islam* (PPTI) and *Partai Islam Persatuan Indonesia* (PIPI). Later, PKU, PNU, PBB and PPP also joined the forum. See Wahono (2003, 117–129).

designed to convince fellow Muslims that Islam should play a more significant role in democratising Indonesia. Abu Ridho, a DDII activist and PK co-founder, states that:

> New Order's depoliticisation policies have far-reaching consequences among Muslims. People at the grass-roots often perceive politics as 'evil' and merely as affairs of the elites. Meanwhile, many Muslim scholars are phobic towards Islamic parties, as if Islam is a threat to the nation. Indeed, we see democratisation as a golden momentum for Muslims to be able to participate in the political arena and determine the future of our nation.[10]

Finally, the aspect of time pressures for the holding of national elections in 1999 further explained the inability of Islamists to build coherent vehicles of representation. Specifically, when elections were moved forward from 2003 to mid-1999, Islamic parties had limited time to achieve nationwide political consolidation. Their immediate agendas were to fulfil the requirements to participate in the elections and gain better votes. Instead of building a more inclusive program for nation-state reformation, they favoured revisiting their respective socio-historical roots and traditional constituents. Consequently, their bases of political representation were largely inward-looking and failed to establish the cross-cutting demands of the broader society.

At the same time, this inward-looking character was found not only in parties that have historically rooted social bases such as Nahdlatul Ulama (PKB), Muhammadiyah (PAN) or Masyumi/DDII (PBB), but also in *Partai Keadilan* (PK). The PK party founders admitted that many of their members still felt unprepared to enter the political arena.[11] Initially, there was a commitment among *Jamaah Tarbiyah* members, PK's main constituents, that they would establish an Islamic party in 2010. Yet, they saw political liberalisation, that allowed the Islamists to build Islamic parties, as a golden opportunity and they decided to establish *Partai Keadilan* soon after the fall of Soeharto regime (Hisyam et al., 2012; Munandar, 2011). Abu Ridho explained that:

[10] Interview with Abu Ridho, PK/S co-founder and PKS senior politician (Jakarta, 2 November 2016).

[11] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, PK/S co-founder and party chairman in 2000–2004 (Jakarta, 15 December 2016), Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail, PK/S co-founder and the first PK chairman in 1999–2000 (Depok, 26 October 2016).

> Building an Islamic party is a necessary condition for *dakwah*. Every *dakwah* and *muammalah* (social activity) culminates in the political arena. Thus, the ultimate issue debated among us at that period was whether we would set up the party now or later. Soeharto's power was declining and we did not know whether or not the future political situation would be favourable for us (to build an Islamic party).[12]

Subsequently, with only some thousands of registered members, the PK was formally set up and was prepared for electoral contestations. The party leaders ultimately adopted the policies of *al-hizb huwa al-jamaah wal-jamaah hiya al-hizb* or the unity between *Jamaah* and the party. Rather than building outward-looking strategies that might accommodate the multitude of demands of diverse *ummah* and broader pro-democracy movements, they were more focused on establishing cell-like networks of *Jamaah Tarbiyah*. In the initial phase, they even believed that the 'militancy of their constituents was much more important than the quantity.'[13]

The foregoing discussion shows the different and conflicting articulations of Islam following the introduction of political liberalisation in the early years of post-New Order era. While political liberalisation has provided Islamists with greater opportunity to participate in elections and to influence the public sphere, they failed to establish a relatively coherent channel to represent the diverse demands and interests of the *ummah*. It is evident that the tensions between past legacies of the corporatist New Order model and present pressures of electoral politics hampered the creation of a hegemonic project under the banner of the *ummah*. In fact, they became increasingly inward-looking as the pressure of electoral politics made them rely on their 'primordial' social bases which resulted in severe polarisation of Islamism. During this period, Islamists also failed to connect themselves to broader pro-democracy movements that significantly blurred the battle line between the forces of *Reformasi* and of status quo.

[12] Interview with Abu Ridho (Jakarta, 2 November 2016).

[13] Interview with Dr Arif Munandar, *Jamaah Tarbiyah* activist (Depok, 22 October 2016), Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

Conflicts and Consensus: Caught Between Reform and Status Quo

Although political liberalisation had considerably altered the institutional architecture of Indonesian politics, the absence of a coherent political force to direct nation-state reformation limited the substantive change under the banner of democratisation. More specifically, the inability of the Islamists to create a basis for cross-cutting representation, as we shall see, had forced them to continuously seek consensus and compromise that effectively blurred political frontiers that separated them from other political forces. Following Soeharto's fall, the modernist Islamists (except for PAN) persistently supported Habibie in their bid to challenge Megawati from the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDIP, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), a secularist-nationalist party, who was emerging as a strong presidential candidate. Meanwhile, PKB/NU under Abdurrahman Wahid leadership supported Megawati to defeat Golkar in the 1999 election (Barton, 2002, 269). To counter the potential coalition of PDIP-PKB, representing the nationalists and traditional Islamists, the modernist Islamists in Habibie coalition boost an 'Islamic' image for Habibie and Golkar under its new leaders Akbar Tanjung, a former HMI-veteran activist.[14]

Yet, the hopes of the Islamists to control state power through electoral politics were soon in tatters after the national electoral victory of the nationalist-secularist PDIP and Golkar.[15] Megawati (PDIP) and Habibie (Golkar) then became the most likely potential presidential candidates. After PAN's poor election results, Amien Rais withdrew from the presidential race, and he turned to support Wahid (PKB). He mobilised the Islamic parties to establish a new political grouping, known as the *poros tengah* (lit. the central axis), as a counterbalance to the Megawati and

[14] Prior to the 1999 election, MUI issued a religious recommendation (*tausiyah*) to discourage Muslims from supporting non-Muslim leaders and parties dominated by non-Muslims, specifically referring to the PDIP. See, for example, Ichwan (2005, 45–72; 2013). Interview with Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail (Depok, 26 October 2016).

[15] The PDI-P won the election with 33.7% of the vote, followed by Golkar and PKB with 22.4 and 12.6%, respectively. PPP came in fourth with 10.7 per cent, followed by PAN with 7.1%, while PBB and PK obtained only 1.9 and 1.4%. In total, the secular-nationalist parties gained 62.5% of the votes, while Muslim-based parties (including PAN and PKB) only received 37.5%. For the Islamists, these results were even worse than in the 1955 elections, the first democratic election held in post-Independence Indonesia. The percentage of Islamic votes had dropped by 6% compared to the 1955 election results. If the PKB and PAN votes were excluded, the loss was 25.7% (Suryadinata, 2002, 106).

Habibie blocs. Rais had less sympathy for Megawati because '[a]s an open party, PDIP had been significantly dictated and dominated by and dictated to by forces representing Christian and Catholics' (Najib, 2000, 104).

Nevertheless, other Islamic parties, outside of PAN and PKB, remained with Habibie until he withdrew from the presidential race after his accountability speech at the 1999 MPR general session was rejected.[16] It turned out that Golkar did not fully support Habibie's candidacy, especially the so-called 'White-Golkar' faction led by Akbar Tanjung. When Habibie announced General Wiranto as his Vice-Presidential choice, in his bid to secure the support from the military, Akbar Tanjung felt that his political fortunes would be enhanced if Habibie failed (Honna, 2003). Akbar soon became Golkar's new candidate before the party ultimately decided to support Abdurrahman Wahid due to pressure from Habibie's supporters, who denounced Akbar for betraying Habibie (Honna, 2003; Mietzner, 2009). Consequently, Islamic parties which previously supported Habibie and were staunchly anti-Megawati had no other option but to join the *poros tengah.*

Rather than reflecting an Islamic coalition to create a post-Soeharto political order (cf. Wahono, 2003), the *poros tengah* represented a form of political deadlock. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, then PK chairman, describes this situation as follows:

> Given PK's presidential candidate (Dr Didin Hafidhudin) was an unknown and the poor results of the elections, the ultimate issue was how PK could realistically play a better role in politics. To be honest, our target was supporting a figure capable of navigating Indonesia's democratic transition. When we endorsed Habibie, don't judge that PK was pro-status quo, no. We saw him merely as a political figure who was pro-*reformasi* and pro-*ummah*. Even after the rejection of his accountability speech, PK and other small Islamic parties still supported Habibie for the presidential race… After he finally withdrew [from the presidential race], we had to think of an alternative scenario. Initially, we tried to convince Amin

[16] Habibie felt that there was a scenario designed to block his presidential candidacy by refusing his accountability speech at MPR on 19 October 1999. Central public issues during Habibie's interim administration, including East Timor referendum, anti-corruption commitment and his failure to bring Soeharto's cronies to justice, had constrained his way for running as a presidential candidate (Habibie, 2006, 304).

> Rais, but he was not confident. Like or dislike, Abdurrahman Wahid then became the last option for us.[17]

Dubbed as the honeymoon period for the Islamic parties (Barton, 2002), Wahid's brief presidency in 1999–2001 relied on a fragile coalition. His cabinet accommodated all political elements, including the representatives of parties with different platforms and six generals—four were even still active in the military (Suryadinata, 2002, 163). It is not surprising that opposition to Wahid increased as internal disagreements came to the fore within his government coalition. The internal conflicts began to appear when he dismissed Hamzah Haz (PPP), Jusuf Kalla (Golkar) and Laksamana Sukardi (PDIP) from his cabinet while promoting his allies within the NU community for politically and economically strategic positions (Bush, 2009; Robison & Hadiz 2004, 214).[18] As part of the military reform agenda, he also gradually attempted to disengage the army from politics by, for example, appointing a civilian, Professor Juwono Sudarsono, as the Defence Minister (Mietzner, 2009; Suryadinata, 2002, 167–169). In a snub to the powerful army, he subsequently named Admiral Widodo the Armed Forces Commander, a position traditionally occupied by the army generals (Honna, 2003; Mietzner, 2009).

The tension between Wahid and the parties of his coalition had not only affected his fragile position. But, the tension also resulted in severe polarisation and hostility among their respective constituencies. This was particularly the case when Islamists saw some of Wahid's policies as being counterproductive to the interests of Muslims. The prominent examples of this were Wahid's proposals to open trade relations with Israel and lift an MPR ban on communism, a ban dating back to 1966 when Soeharto came to power.[19] But the most pressing issue was Wahid's statements regarding the worsening religious conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku in 1999, which his opponents saw as pro-Christian and

[17] Interview with Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail (Depok, 26 October 2016).

[18] For example, President Wahid appointed his brother, Hasyim Wahid, to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Association (IBRA) that controlled over 600 billion US dollar. See Bush (2009, 137).

[19] The PK politicians argued that these policies were a form of Wahid's escapism from his failure to tackle economic recovery. See the party's official statement issued on 16 April 2000. Nugraha (2001, 67–70).

having less sympathy for the fate of Muslim communities.[20] In response, the Islamists convened a demonstration at Monas Square of Jakarta in January 2000. Leading figures, such as Amin Rais, called for *jihad* in the conflict zones (Sidel, 2006, 183)—although the main target was to undermine Wahid's legitimacy. The call for *jihad* was subsequently followed up by the deployment of Islamic paramilitaries, organised by the notorious *Laskar Jihad* (Jihad troops), led by Afghanistan war veteran Ja'far Umar Thalib (Hasan, 2002, 147–148; Sidel, 2006, 182–183).

The disappointment of other Islamists with the performance of Islamic parties in the early years of democratisation had facilitated the rapid emergence of other vehicles, claiming to represent the *ummah,* including those which resorted to violence. On the 2000 Christmas Eve, a series of explosions took place in several cities in Indonesia, waged by 'radical' Islamists associated with Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah who justified their violence as a retaliation against the Christians in religious communal conflicts in Maluku (Sidel 2006). At the same time, Islamist vigilante groups such as the notorious Front Pembela Islam (FPI, *Islamic Defender Front*) became more active, engaging in raids on 'places of vice' under the slogan of '*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*' (lit. 'enjoin the good, forbid the evil') (Sidel, 2006; Wilson, 2015). The *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, *Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly*), led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was also established in Yogyakarta, demanding the implementation of sharia and the projection of an Islamic state (Hilmy, 2010, 109–117).[21] On 28 May 2000, the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) also began to openly mobilise Islamists when they convened the first international conference at Senayan, Jakarta, calling for a global caliphate (Fealy, 2007; Munabari, 2010; Osman, 2010).

[20] For example, the *jihadists* were upset when President Wahid decisively rejected their demands, saying that 'I don't care if you want *jihad*…the bottom line is that if you threaten the stability of the state, we will take action' (Zada, 2002, 132). Yet, the President was unable to prevent them from exacerbating the conflict when some elements within the military, dissatisfied with his pressure for reforms, also instrumentalised the situation to undermine his legitimacy by facilitating the deployment of some 3000 Laskar Jihad fighters in Maluku. See Aditjondro (2001, 100–128), Sidel (2006) and Hasan (2002).

[21] The MMI Congress in Yogyakarta was attended by several Islamic figures such as Deliar Noer (PUI), Hidayat Nur Wahid (PK) and Fuad Amsyari (ICMI). The central elements of MMI, as suggested by van Bruinessen (2002) and ICG (2002), were Darul Islam's activists. Even the date of its establishment symbolically marked the fifty-first anniversary of Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam (DI). See Hasan (2002, 150), Hilmy (2010, 109–117) and van Bruinessen (2002).

Furthermore, the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI, Council of Indonesian Ulama), established during the New Order in 1975, also played a role in delegitimising Wahid presidency. Having been accommodated in both the New Order and Habibie regime, Wahid's administration marked the MUI's decline. This was mainly after the open conflict between Wahid and MUI regarding the *fatwa* (religious opinions) on the Japanese-brand food enhancer, *Ajinomoto*.[22] Wahid's confrontation with the Islamists had made MUI a new base for Islamists to challenge Wahid and an avenue for an Islamisation agenda. As early as 2000, MUI had dramatically altered its position from the *khadim al-hukumah* (servant of government) to the *khadim al-ummah* (servant of the *ummah*). Crucially, this change opened the door for 'conservative' Islamist figures such as Din Syamsuddin, Choilil Ridwan and Muhammad Al-Khaththath to play a more influential role in this body (Ichwan, 2013).[23] As we shall see, all of these developments, generally labelled as the 'conservative turn' (van Bruinessen, 2013), would significantly shape the MUI's Islamist orientation, especially in ordering the public sphere by issuing various conservative religious opinion (Kersten, 2015).

In these conditions, Wahid's coalition and his political legitimacy were continuously deteriorating. His relationship with key political parties was beyond repair after he kicked out their representatives from the cabinet, as was his relationship with the military. These conditions facilitated the emergence of an anti-Wahid alliance between the 'conservative'

[22] In 2001, MUI issued a *haram* fatwa for this product. This fatwa could lead to the shutdown of the company with some 4000 workers in East Java because the company had to pay the compensation fee and lost its consumers in Indonesia and Malaysia. Recognising the counterproductive effects of closing the company during recovery from economic crisis, President Wahid openly challenged the MUI by declaring this product to be *halal*, allowed to be consumed by Muslims. The fact that he announced this decision after he met the Japanese Minister of Justice who committed to investing 1.5 trillion rupiahs in the country was extensively utilised as a further pretext by the Islamists to undermine Wahid's position of power. See *Gatra* (10 January 2001).

[23] Though NU and Muhammadiyah still played a role in the MUI, the involvement of the more 'vocal' figures from conservative Islamist organisations significantly shaped its Islamist orientation. For example, in the new document of the Outlook of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (published in 2000), apart from issuing fatwas, the organisation added three roles: (1) *khadim al-ummah* (servant of the ummah); (2) *ishlah wa tajdid* (reform and revival of Islam); (3) *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar* (enjoin good, forbid evil). The last two points are often seen as a result of the influence of, and further utilised by, conservative Islamists. See Ichwan (2013).

elements of the military, the modernist Islamists and the aggrieved political parties. At the grass-roots levels, the tension between the traditionalist versus modernist Islamists intensified and even led to violence.[24] Having promoted and supported Wahid for the presidency after the 1999 election, Rais considered his past decision as a 'sin.' He further claimed that 'if Gus Dur (Wahid's nickname) continues to be kept as president despite his failure to achieve political and economic stability, there is a risk that Indonesia will break up' (Barton, 2002, 342). The parliament provided the principal institutional base to launch formal impeachment proceedings against Wahid, using the premise of Wahid's alleged involvement in two cases of corruption, which subsequently led to his fall from the presidency.[25]

The subsequent inauguration of Megawati as the new president in July 2001 was anti-climactic for Islamic politics. Islamist groups tended to be pragmatist and even claimed to be on board the bandwagon that brought Megawati to the Presidential Palace. Even Islamic parties which actively promoted Islamisation of the state in the parliamentary sessions were well accommodated in Megawati's coalition when their leader, Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), was appointed as Minister of Justice while Hamzah Haz (PPP) became Vice-President after Wahid's impeachment. Leading NU clerics who had previously defended Wahid immediately declared that they would cooperate with the new government. The violence at the grass-roots level also cooled down when NU leaders had no interest in opposing the Megawati administration after the removal of Wahid from power. Some of them even felt relieved that the 'burden' to support and defend Wahid had been removed from their shoulders (Mietzner, 2009, 268).

[24] Some NU clerics, directly or indirectly, contributed to legitimising this violence. For example, they granted Wahid the title of *waliyul amri dlaluri bissyyaukah* (legitimate interim ruler according to Islamic law) and framed the opposition as *bughot* (rebels) thus legitimatising the fight against them. Such a condition also became a pretext for establishing pro-Wahid militias such as *Pasukan Berani Mati* (Troops Ready to Die) in NU's stronghold in East Java. See Feillard (2002, 127), Mietzner (2009), and Barton (2002).

[25] In August 2000, the parliament started to investigate two cases, 'Brunei gate' to refer a $ 2 million gift from the Sultan of Brunei to the President and 'Buloggate,' involving a $350,000 grant from the deputy head of the National Logistics Agency (BULOG, *Bada-nUrusanLogistik*) given via Wahid's assistant. Although Wahid's involvement was never proven, the parliamentary investigation continued and culminated in the impeachment of the President. See Bush (2009, 137).

Megawati administration made considerable concessions to the coalition of forces supporting her presidency, mostly anti-Wahid elements. For example, Megawati gave enormous privileges to the military, including greater institutional autonomy and increased their influence in security affairs.[26] The Megawati era also marked the retreat of the advancement of an Islamic agenda through parliamentary politics, when Islamic parties gave up on their efforts to advocate the Jakarta Charter—which would effectively provide a legal basis for sharia implementation—in the newly amended constitution. Having incorporated Islamic parties into the cabinet, the Megawati-military alliance also strengthened the draconian 'nationalist' stance which effectively undermined the radical Islamists (e.g. Mietzner, 2006; Sidel, 2006). By mid-2000, for example, security forces began to crack down on *Laskar Jihad* troops and arrested Islamic figures allegedly supporting the radical Islamists. Megawati also reversed Wahid's policies in dealing with separatist movements, by taking a conservative, often militarist approach. She subsequently granted the military further concessions, such as in the case of the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM, Aceh Independent Movement), where she declared martial law and launched one of the most extensive military campaigns in Indonesian history.

Significantly, the fragmentation of Islamism and its political pragmatism had swung the political pendulum back in favour of the status quo. This was particularly apparent in the reversal of military reforms and the changing orientation of Islamic parties. Post-*reformasi* fears of instability and disintegration of Indonesia's nation-state were reflected in a considerable decline in public anger and resentment towards the military.[27] Using the political discourse of 'defending NKRI' (*Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia*), the military found new legitimacy to re-enter socio-political

[26] In the 2002 cabinet reshuffle, she returned the post of TNI commander to the army by appointing General Sutarto, a determined defender of the military's interests. She also supported promoting a conservative and anti-military reform General Ryacudu as the position of army chief of staff. Having supported Wahid impeachment, Matori Abdul Jalil of PKB became Minister of Defence. However, after his stroke attack in August 2003, Megawati did not replace him and thus virtually gave the military control of its internal security affairs. See Mietzner (2006, 34).

[27] Politicians in the parliament even warned of the danger of military reforms. They saw military reform as efforts to reduce the capacity of the military in their tasks for defending the country from disintegration and external threats (Mietzner, 2006, 38).

affairs after the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (dual functions) had been officially terminated in April 2000 (Crouch, 2010, 140–142). Prompted by the shortage of civilian leaderships, many political parties even embraced and nominated retired military generals for governors and district heads. These trends substantially allowed the military to reorganise their power and interests in the democratisation era (Hadiz, 2010; Honna, 2006).

The compromise made by Islamists with secular-nationalist elements had ultimately shaped their political practices. The Islamic parties increasingly moved to the 'consensus of the centre' while facing internal frictions.[28] For example, as a vocal advocate of the Jakarta Charter, PPP had put aside this agenda after the party signed a political contract with the PDIP to join Megawati's coalition. After failing to achieve the electoral threshold, PK rebuilt the party as the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*). No longer visibly advocating an Islamist agenda, PKS introduced a new platform of 'clean, caring and professional,' indicating its support for a neoliberal agenda of good governance.[29] Surprisingly, PBB, which did not utilise Islamist slogans in the 1999 election, built a pro-*sharia* image, expecting to gain votes from *sharia*-minded masses within PPP and PKS. However, its poor performance in the 2004 elections—compared to a dramatic increase in PKS votes—triggered internal debates regarding the party outlook (Plazdasch, 2009, 248). Meanwhile, PKB experienced internal divisions after Wahid's fall, with the rise of a Matori Abdul Djalil camp who supported Megawati and opposed a Wahid loyalist, Alwi Shihab. Unlike in the 1999 election, there was also a relative dissociation of PAN and PKB from their Islamic

[28] The 'consensus of the centre' here is adopted from Mouffe's analysis of the transformation of the Left parties in the European context. Instead of offering an alternative to the neoliberal order, they tend to build compromise under the ideological platform of 'reconciled or consensus societies' between the Left and Right. See Mouffe (2000, 2005), Laclau and Mouffe (2001). In the context of Indonesia, the changing orientation of Islamic parties is less attributable to the party's internalisation of liberal values or related to the softening processes expected by the proponents of inclusion-moderation thesis. Rather, this is a result of the Islamists' failure to build a hegemonic force in democratisation era. Such a condition ultimately forced them to build consensus and become part of the status quo—instead of offering an alternative social order.

[29] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, PKS politician and MPR deputy speaker (Jakarta 15 December 2016). PKS also subsequently changed 'Islamic' terms in its official documents. See Platzdasch (2009).

social bases where Amien Rais and Wahid no longer held decisive power in Muhammadiyah and NU, respectively.[30]

The fragmentation of the Islamic parties also paved the way for Golkar, the party of the New Order, to present itself as the most credible political contender in the 2004 election. Slamet Effendy Jusuf, a member of Golkar's election campaign committee, confidently claimed that:

> Golkar's victory will become a national necessity (*kebutuhan nasional*). Our nation needs a solid political force to bring back political stability and security as the pre-requirements for development providing more jobs and public order… Those things can only be found in Golkar. To achieve a Golkar victory in the elections means to save the country from disintegration and to recover it from the severe multidimensional crisis. (Jusuf 2003, 22)

Crucially, the failure of Islamic parties to build a coherent representation of the *ummah* had driven the Islamists into further divisions. Such conditions triggered the rapid emergence of a multitude of Islamist vehicles claiming to represent the *ummah*, including by exercising violent means and strategies. This trend conflicts with neo-Weberian analysts (e.g. Abuza, 2007), who explain the proliferation of 'radical' Islamist groups to be a direct result of the weakness of state institutions associated with the democratic transition. The absence of a coherent force able to provide alternatives to the New Order only facilitated the reorganisation of Soeharto-linked politico-business elites. Dominated by the practices of compromise and pragmatism, the political frontiers that separate new political forces from those reminiscent of the New Order effectively disappeared. Consequently, the period between 1999 and 2004, which proponents of transitology approaches claim as the period of completion of democratic transition (e.g. Liddle & Mujani, 2013, 25; Mietzner,

[30] Unlike Amin Rais, new Muhammadiyah chairman Syafii Maarif (1998–2005) was less interested in political parties. During the interview, he even stated that he decided to prevent Muhammadiyah from being dragged too far in political competitions. His decision made some PAN leaders, including Amin Rais, upset. The Muhammadiyah-PAN relationship culminated when the party was led by Sutrisno Bachir, a businessman and less popular among Muhammadiyah members, in 2005. Meanwhile, Abdurrahman Wahid failed to struggle for his bid in the 2004 presidential race amidst the fragmented support from PKB and NU.

2009, 291), was in fact the period where the momentum for hegemonic struggles to establish a new political formation was lost.

Decentralised Development: Islamism and Localisation of Power

This section discusses the diverse articulations of Islam following the introduction of decentralisation policies. Like political liberalisation, decentralisation was a central nodal point of the post-New Order democratisation discourse. Decentralisation was championed as a turning point in efforts to dismantle New Order's authoritarianism by devolving considerable powers, resources and authorities to the local levels.[31] To reverse the New Order Java-centrist development model, decentralisation was seen as the mechanism to fulfil demands such as economic justice through local and national revenue sharing, equal access to development resources across the archipelago, better public service provisions and local cultural recognition and autonomy. Under the pressure from international donors such as the World Bank, IMF and USAID, decentralisation discourse was significantly reduced as managerial affairs, as reflected in their neoliberal development agenda of the so-called 'good governance' (Fine, 2002; Hadiz, 2010; Harris et al., 2004). Democratic notions such as participation, civil society and local autonomy, which also became the demands of pro-democracy movements, were immediately incorporated into neoliberal-led decentralisation project.

Initially, there was a conviction that decentralisation would automatically strengthen civil society, participation and local democratic governance (Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). However, this conviction began to crumble when the articulation of decentralisation was increasingly dominated by neoliberal projects which ultimately bolstered technocratic and managerialist forces for local governance reforms, which were anti-politics in nature (cf. Hadiz, 2010, 30). This section shows that decentralisation,

[31] Based on Law No.22/1999 and Law No.25/1999, decentralisation policies were implemented in 2001. The first devolved wide-ranging authorities from central to local governments, while excluding the five areas of defence and security, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary affairs, the judiciary and religious affairs. Meanwhile, the latter provided local governments with more significant shared revenue from sectors such as forestry and mining. See Aspinall and Fealy (2003).

as a discursive framework, does not always lead to a teleological democratic development. Instead, it is highly contingent on the complexities resulting from the confluence of diverse articulations of decentralisation through which the interests, identities, practices and institutional arrangements are reconstituted and reorganised.

Debates on decentralisation and Islamism emerge following the mobilisation of Islamic identity politics in local power struggles. But, it is inadequate to comprehend the mobilisation of identity politics—ethnic or religious—as a political trend that essentially threatens democracy. The main reason is that the practices of identity politics, which are discussed below, spring directly from the confluence of decentralisation and democratisation. In regard to Islamism, the fact that Islamic parties are unable to establish a relatively coherent representation of *ummah* at the national level have resulted in diverse practices of Islamism in local settings. This section shows that Islamic parties are inclined to ally themselves with secular-nationalist elements, albeit there are possibilities for bringing more Islamic political projects into some localities (cf. Buehler, 2016). This inclination is prompted by the pressures to win the elections and, more importantly, reflects the disappearance of identifiable political alternatives as all parties tend to construct an ideological compromise under a 'nationalist-religious' platform. Therefore, democratic politics is no longer marked by a battle between different political alternatives but merely a consensus project—a 'reconciled society' (cf. Duile & Bens, 2017). Against this backdrop, Islamism, as a political discourse, is increasingly becoming a floating signifier. The Islamism discourse is appropriated and articulated by multiple social subjects—not necessarily Islamic parties—with different interests and agendas. All these developments are apparent in the dynamics of Islamism in local elections (*pilkada*) and in the making of local sharia-by-laws (*perda shariah*).

Islamism and Decentralisation

The failure of Islamic parties in constructing a coherent vehicle to represent the diverse demands of the *ummah* at the national level has dramatically influenced their practices in the local levels. This is particularly the case for the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS) which officially declares itself as a *dakwah* (predication) and cadre party. In contrast to public concern regarding its Islamist agenda, PKS leaders generally do not see decentralisation as a moment to advance the project of

Islamising local politics. This is especially because PKS also tends to seek compromise in local political contestations due to the following reasons. Firstly, their constituents are geographically concentrated in certain areas, mainly within urban settings. Secondly, the conviction that building an alliance with non-Islamic elements is a key to survival and winning local contestations—particularly in areas where PKS is relatively weak.[32] These conditions drive the party into a pragmatic logic and practice in facing local elections (*Pilkada*).

Against this backdrop, it becomes apparent that PKS leaders perceive decentralisation as a central arena for attaining more favourable positions to compete for access to state institutions and local resources. It is not surprising when a senior party leader states that:

> If we decide to compete in a local election, we need to win by whatever strategies. If we can then influence local governance with Islamic values, thank God, it would be an additional advantage.[33]

Yet, the prevalence of such a pragmatic logic does not necessarily characterise the behaviour of all groups within the party (Munandar, 2011; cf. Muhtadi, 2012). But, it is deeply rooted in the party's social base and broader socio-political changes in the post-Soeharto democratisation era. In the early years of democratisation, the discourse of decentralisation brought about internal tensions within the party. PKS activists, especially those associated with *Jamaah Tarbiyah*, increasingly questioned conventional methods of gradual Islamisation (*marhalatu dakwah*) from society to the state levels in the context of decentralisation. They saw this method as incompatible with the pressure of local elections because there would always be a discrepancy between the efforts to build a solid Islamised social base in given areas and the demand to win local elections.

These discrepancies have considerably affected PKS' political practices, and often manifested in how the party forges alliances for local elections. Given that the local elections are bound within specific administrative settings, the party creates rather pragmatic coalitions to win

[32] Interview with Cahyadi Takariawan, senior PKS politician (Yogyakarta, 8 September 2016), Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[33] Interview with Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail (Depok, 26 October 2016).

the *Pilkada*.[34] The PKS leaders pursue this strategy because the party's social base is unevenly concentrated in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, the coalition-building that ensues frequently dissatisfied the party's core Islamist constituents, as they see that PKS is no different from other parties.[35] Another manifestation of this discrepancy is shown in the debates on whether the party should nominate its own cadres or external figures with greater potential electability to run for *Pilkada*.

Like other parties, PKS is inclined to appoint a non-cadre candidate for *Pilkada,* although the party has an internal mechanism for selecting its cadres.[36] The fact that new parties, like PKS, fail to offer alternative leaders have paved the way for contending old elites who are better positioned because of their access to power and resources or electability rating according to opinion polling (e.g. Hadiz, 2010, Ch 4). Crucially, this tendency also opens up the possibility for political transactions and money politics. For example, Yusuf Supendi, the former PK(S) founder who subsequently resigned from the party, accused PKS leaders of receiving 40 billion rupiahs from Adang Daradjatun, a former police general, for his nomination in the Jakarta gubernatorial race in 2007 (*Kompas.com*, 17 March 2011).[37] Indeed, with fragmented national representation and a lack of leadership, small or medium-sized parties like PKS are becoming vehicles that function as an event organiser for the *Pilkada*, and whose participants are figures who have enormous financial support and/or popularity.

The ascendancy of this pragmatic logic significantly affects the party's internal dynamics, including changing relations between the party and

[34] The party even collaborates with Christian-based parties for the local election. Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[35] Interview with Dr Yon Machmudi, lecturer at the University of Indonesia (Depok, 19 October 2016).

[36] For example, PKS previously declared its cadre, Mardani Ali Sera, as a candidate for vice-governor to pair with Sandiaga Uno (Gerindra Party) for the 2017 Jakarta election. Sera's nomination collapsed when PKS and Gerindra finally nominated Anies Baswedan (an external figure to PKS and Gerindra) and Sandiaga Uno to challenge the more favoured Ahok-Jarot pairing (supported by PDIP, Golkar, PPP and PKB). Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[37] Political transactions during the nomination of candidates for *Pilkada* are normalised, commonly labelled as the *mahar* (lit. dowry) paid by candidates to the parties. For example, Dedy Mulyadi (Golkar chairman at West Java) publicly stated that his party asked him to pay 10 billion rupiahs (Liputan6.com, 28 September 2017).

its main constituents. For example, within the *Jamaah Tarbi*yah, the doctrine of party unification, i.e. *al-hizb huwal jamaah, wal jamaah hiyal hizb*, is increasingly at odds when *Jamaah*-based activists feel that the party has sidelined *dakwah* activities. Demands for separation between the party and *Jamaah* are increasingly voiced among PKS' traditional constituents.[38] These demands grew considerably following the corruption scandals involving no less than the PKS chairman Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq in 2013 that greatly destroyed the image of the party. The efforts to recover the party's credibility had even led to severe internal frictions between the pragmatic and conservative camps in 2015. When the conservative camp ultimately took over the party leadership, many PKS politicians, labelled as pragmatic camp, resigned from the party. As consequence, younger generations, especially those were active in KAMMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*, Action Committee for Indonesian Muslim Students), the PKS' political wing among university students, tended to distance themselves from the party. They found that it is better to develop professional careers such as in business or bureaucracy rather than join the party after graduating from their studies. Some opted to affiliate with other parties, following in the footsteps of HMI activists who have developed their political fortunes in virtually all political parties.[39]

A further problem has been that PKS' leading activists remain young middle-class elements and university graduates with limited influence in broader society, not to mention their limited financial capacities. Thus, the party's self-sufficient financing slogan of *sunduquna juyubuna* (lit. our fund is from our pocket) is at odds with the increasing costs for financing its programs and activities, especially related to *Pilkada*.[40] These young activists also have limited opportunities to develop careers or business as they are overwhelmingly absorbed into the party's activities, such as

[38] Interview with Dr Yon Machmudi (Depok, 19 October 2016); Fahri Hamzah (Jakarta, 10 November 2016); Sapto Waluyo, journalist and *Jamaah Tarbiyah* activist (Depok, 22 October 2016).

[39] Interview with a KAMMI activist (Yogyakarta, 27 February 2017); Kartika Nur Rokhman, KAMMI national chairman (Jakarta, 16 December 2016).

[40] Interview with Fahri Hamzah, PKS politician and parliament deputy speaker (Jakarta, 10 November 2016); Dr Arif Munandar (Depok, 22 October 2016).

being a member of Pilkada 'success teams' or personal assistants to PKS politicians.[41]

Moreover, the opportunity for PKS to expand social base beyond its traditional constituency is strictly limited. For example, the party's efforts in charity and educational networks are still constrained by the shortage of financial resources. In some areas like Yogyakarta, this has prompted harsh competition, especially with Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah activists feel that PKS activists have infiltrated and used Muhammadiyah-based institutions—such as educational institutions and mosques—for the PKS' benefit.[42] Equally important are PKS' attempts to forge an alliance with some labour activists though such initiatives have largely failed (Hadiz 2016, 148). Although the party attempts to broaden its base to embrace workers, farmers and other sectoral groups, they have no clear programs and lack the resources to implement them.[43] One informant even despairingly states that the expansion strategy is ineffective for winning elections. To justify his assessment, he demonstrates political experience of a former Minister of Agriculture (2009–2014) from PKS, Suswono, who had disbursed many ministerial-financed programs in Central Java. Still, he eventually failed in his bid for a seat from the province in the 2014 parliamentary elections.[44]

Significantly, the attempts to develop the party's social base by linking itself to diverse social groups have resulted in intense debates among political scientists and within the party's internal circles. Some observers often highlight the tensions between the *ummah* (defined as supposedly homogeneous) and electoral constituents (heterogeneous) as a sort of a political dilemma as if the relations between the two are mutually exclusive

[41] Interview with Dr Arif Munandar (Depok, 22 October 2016).

[42] In 2006, under Din Syamsuddin leadership, Muhammadiyah issued a decree (149/Kep/1.0/B/2006) to counter the infiltrations of PKS activists within Muhammadiyah's institutes and educational networks. Interview with Dr Najib Burhani, Indonesian Institute of Science (Jakarta, 8 December 2016), Professor Syafii Maarif, former Muhammadiyah chairman and Muslim intellectual (Yogyakarta, 25 September 2016).

[43] A senior PKS politician states that 'if the party should develop empowerment programs [for these sectoral groups], we have limited resources. And if we committed only to advocating for them in the aspects of regulations, they will consider our contributions are not tangible and real.' Interview with Ledia Hanifa, PKS legislative member (Jakarta, 3 November 2016); Memed Sosiawan, PKS senior politician (Jakarta, 3 November 2016).

[44] Interview with Cahyadi Takariawan (Yogyakarta, 8 September 2016).

(Muhtadi, 2012; Munandar, 2011; Permata, 2008). In fact, the tensions between *ummah* and constituents are always in place and have become a constant political challenge to build a common political project. From the lens of hegemony analysis, the issue at stake is not for choosing one over the other in a mutually exclusive way. But, the ultimate task is to establish chains of equivalence, a linkage through which the agenda of the *ummah* could be articulated by engaging a multitude of demands of different group of electoral constituents.

Within the PKS' inner circle, the debates between the *ummah* and electoral constituents were exemplified in the controversies surrounding the party's self-declaration as an 'open party' in 2008. Expecting that the party would gain greater votes in the 2009 national elections, it adopted a new slogan, '*PKS untuk semua*' (PKS for all). This shift was publicly understood as the antithesis to the *dakwah* party.[45] While political scientists like Fealy (2010) and Buehler (2012) underscore the party's rigid internal structure, referring to the decisive role of the *Majelis Syuro* (Party's Consultative Assembly) under the leadership of Hilmy Aminuddin, the controversy around the 'open party' platform brought the party's internal conflicts into the public realm. It revealed the tensions between 'pragmatist' and 'idealist' groups—dubbed mockingly as the 'prosperous' versus 'justice' camps, referring to the party's name. Some analysts saw the proponents of an 'open party' was widely associated with the former camp, including Annis Matta (then party's Secretary-General) and Fahri Hamzah (e.g. Munandar, 2011). The proponents argued that the party's traditional constituents built through *dakwah* activities were insufficient for electoral competition and the PKS would shrink in the political arena if it did not change its strategy. Meanwhile, their opponents rebutted that the strategy of open party need more resources and

[45] The 'PKS for All' platform was formally introduced in the 2010 Congress. Observers like Fealy (2010) argue that this move is contradictory since the party has to continuously balance a double agenda: securing electoral success through growing mainstream support and satisfying the religiously devout identity of PKS elements. Meanwhile, Hadiz (2016, 137) states that this is a bid to court the support of elements of wealthy Chinese business people. For the proponents, like Fahri Hamzah, the open party is seen as instrumental in transforming the party for the so-called 'second leap' (referring to the fact that after 2004, PKS' votes remain stagnant). He also criticised the party when the PKS leadership at the time revoked this platform by declaring the party as a *dakwah* party. Interviews with Fahri Hamzah (Jakarta, 10 November 2016), Abu Ridho, PK co-founder and PKS senior politician (Jakarta, 2 November 2016), Cahyadi Takariawan (Yogyakarta, 8 September 2016).

PKS could do nothing compared to resource-rich parties such as Golkar and PDIP. They also claimed that changing party-orientation could lead to risky political corruption.[46]

Although PKS leaders consider winning *Pilkada* a strategic moment for developing party's constituency, they admit that there is no linear correlation between the districts or provinces led by PKS and the expansion of its social base.[47] In fact, this case is not exclusively experienced by PKS, but a general characteristic of post-New Order decentralisation. This phenomenon is a result of two intertwined factors. The first relates to the parties' pragmatic coalition that continuously treats the elections as power and resource sharing instead of a battle for policy platforms. The second is severe disjunction between parties and social groups they claim to represent in the political arena. Thus, neither Islamic parties nor secular-nationalist parties become a hegemonic force to transform post-New Order politics.

The failure to build a hegemonic project through decentralisation framework, characterised by the dominance of political compromise and the crisis of representation, has resulted in the strengthening of technocratic politics. This condition paves the way for the dominance of neoliberal articulations of decentralisation that significantly reverse decentralisation as a framework for democratising local politics to mere management of public affairs. Therefore, political categories of representation and democratic policy making are replaced by 'non-political' notions such as 'success stories,' well-trained officials and electability (cf. Hadiz, 2010). Mainly facilitated and mainstreamed by media and survey companies, politics is subsequently constructed as efforts to establish publicly acknowledged images rather than an arena for organising diverse demands among social groups and offering an alternative in governing public affairs. In other words, technocratic logic of governing, as advocated by neoliberal proponents, has not only become prescriptions for

[46] Interview with Abu Ridho Jakarta (2 November 2016), Fahri Hamzah (Jakarta, 10 November 2016).

[47] This is particularly the case in West Java Province and Depok Municipality, where PKS figures—Ahmad Heryawan (2008–2018) and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (2006–2016)—served two consecutive administrations. In the 2014 elections, PKS only controlled 6 out of 50 local parliament seats in Depok a significant drop from the 2009 election in which the party occupied 11 seats. Interview with Abu Ridho (Jakarta, 2 November 2016), Fahri Hamzah (Jakarta, 10 November 2016), Cahyadi Takariawan (Yogyakarta, 8 September 2016).

managing public affairs. But, it is also mainstreamed as criteria to access the success or failure of managing governance at the national and local levels.

Islamising Local Politics: A Symptom of the Islamists' Hegemonic Failure

One major issue regarding the increasing role of the Islamists in the decentralisation era is arguably the pressure for the Islamisation agenda, primarily through promoting *perda shariah* or sharia-by-laws in local areas (Buehler, 2016; Bush, 2008; Künkler & Stepan, 2013). Islamising local politics, or *shariatisasi*, is frequently seen as an inevitable result of the intersection between Islamism and decentralised democracy. While there is no guarantee that *shariatisasi* of local politics is a direct continuation of the Islamisation of society, observers tend to quickly conclude that this phenomenon represents 'a historical breakthrough in the trajectory of political Islam in Indonesia' (Hasan, 2007, 10). Without undermining the importance of discussing the development of sharia issues and their associated problems and contradictions, it is suggested that *shariatiasi* is a symptom of the Islamists' hegemonic failure rather than indicating their strength or coherence, as we shall see.

It is evident that decentralisation and the localisation of power have facilitated the mobilisation of communitarian politics—often a merge between religion and ethnic markers—by a multitude of social groups for concrete struggles to improve their social position in local areas (Hadiz 2010; Schulte-Nordholt & Klinken, 2007). For example, Islamist organisations like *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) in Jakarta, the Committee for the Preparation of Formalisation of Sharia (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi and numerous *Majelis Ta'lim* (Islamic congregations) in Jakarta and Java, or even transnational-oriented HTI[48] have increasingly influenced local power contests at provincial and district levels (Buehler, 2016; Bush, 2008; Nashir, 2007). Furthermore, these organisations actively advocate the enactment of sharia-by-laws (*perda shariah*), whose contents mainly

[48] HTI activists have an ambiguous position regarding decentralisation. While helping them expand their outlets bases at local levels, they are concerned that decentralisation is incompatible with the centralistic governing model they advocate and even presents possibilities for non-Muslims to control the regional power. Interview with Ismail Yusanto, HTI national spokesperson (Jakarta, 7 November 2016).

pertain to regulating women's dress and behaviour (Robinson, 2009, 171), creating moral-based societies, and also inclined to be discriminatory towards minority groups (Bush, 2008, 175). Nevertheless, rather than representing a coherent struggle for sharia implementation, Islamist organisations tend to advance their demands for sharia with different and conflicting strategies. And, they are also pragmatic in building their political alliance to achieve their agenda.[49]

The failure of Islamic parties to build a viable vehicle representing the diverse demands of the *ummah* in decentralised local politics has brought about two immediate consequences. Firstly, instead of collaborating with Islamic parties, many extra-parliamentary Islamist organisations tend to support parties or candidates with a greater chance to win the *Pilkada*. They see this strategy as the only means to have better access to state power and influence within society. The absence of an Islamist hegemonic agenda has greatly facilitated mutual instrumentalisation between the established local elites and the Islamists for building patronage networks to control and preserve privileged access to the state institutions and local resources. Secondly, as a political discourse, Islam has increasingly become a floating signifier, appropriated and articulated by any parties, especially for courting Islamist constituents dissatisfied with Islamic parties. As further discussed in Chapter 6, this also explains why the discourse of Islamism has been increasingly prominent in electoral politics, as exemplified in the 2017 Jakarta election and the 2019 Presidential election. All these developments are at odds with the proponents of the inclusion-moderation thesis, which argue that the participation of major Islamist organisational vehicles in the elections would lead to the moderation or normalisation of Islamic politics (Brocker & Künkler, 2013; Buehler, 2013; Tomsa, 2012).

For some Islamists, the growing demands for *perda shariah* are also considered an immediate response to the crisis within the existing legal system and socio-economic conditions. Hidayat Nur Wahid, for example, states that 'the demands for sharia should be positively appreciated, as an alternative solution for social problems. These demands rapidly grow

[49] One informant states that: 'through an organisation like FPI, we struggle for the implementation of sharia, especially in local areas. To achieve this goal, we must collaborate with any figures and any parties—no matter who they are—especially when Islamic parties cannot advocate this demand and work with us.' Interview with Mahdi Assegaf, the leader of Islamic *Majelis Syababul Kheir* (Bogor, 4 December 2016).

because members of society perceive that law enforcement in this country is feeble' (2004, 162).Similarly, HTI activists also advance the slogan of 'save Indonesia with sharia and caliphate' (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009), seen as a solution for the continuous marginalisation of the *ummah* and the socio-economic problems faced by this country. In fact, *perda shariah* has been appropriated by diverse groups, including local governments, which often advance it rather opportunistically. They often support and promote *perda shariah* as a strategy to address their weak legitimacy among constituents, mainly due to their corruption practices or failure to bring about substantial improvement (Bush, 2008). They also advocated *perda shariah* to preempt challenges against the government that might be waged by extra-parliamentary Islamist organisations like FPI or HTI (Hadiz, 2016). In addition, the introduction of *perda shariah* also provides local elites and governments with new sources for capital accumulation (Buehler, 2008, 2016).[50]

Therefore, it is not surprising that the prominent advocates of *perda shariah* are not necessarily Islamic parties but those associated with the district heads, mayors or governors who collaborated with Islamist groups during the *Pilkada* (Buehler, 2013, 2016; Bush, 2008). Buehler (2013, 67–68) notes that, between 1999 and 2009, the parties which promoted *perda shariah* in all provinces were not Islamic parties but secular-nationalist parties like Golkar and PDIP. In fact, 'secular-nationalist' parties have increasingly utilised Islam as their new political slogan and even created an 'Islamic wing' within their parties' structure. For example, PDIP had established its Islamic wing, *Baitul Muslimin Indonesia* (BAMUSI, The House of Indonesian Muslims, set up in 2007),[51] and the Democrat Party's self-depiction of being a 'nationalist religious' party under the leadership of Anas Urbaningrum, a former HMI chairman. Crucially, all these developments have prevented Islamic parties like PKS

[50] Many *perda shariah*, such as zakat (alms-giving) that target local bureaucrats and private sector enterprises, can create a new source for off-budget revenue that can be utilised for expanding patronage networks. For example, in the district of Bulukumba in South Sulawesi, local civil servants are asked to pay 2.5% of their annual salary for *zakat*, collected and managed directly by the local government. See Buehler (2008, 262–263).

[51] Interview with Dr Cornelis Lay, a UGM political scientist (Yogyakarta, 16 January 2016).

from claiming themselves as the sole and most 'legitimate' articulator of Islam, especially in matters related to *perda shariah*.[52]

It is worth noting that instead of unifying the diverse demands of the *ummah*, *perda shariah* debates have only weakened Islamism, contributing to the further division among Muslim communities. Those who oppose the introduction and implementation of *shariah* are often members of the Muslim community who perceive that sharia-by-laws are frequently discriminatory against women and minority groups (Wahid Institute, 2007). Some even argue that *perda shariah* is more driven by political than religious motives, and it is actually, to borrow the then Vice-President Jusuf Kalla words, 'insulting to Islam and God' (via Bush, 2008, 175). Meanwhile, the purveyors of *perda shariah* like HTI and FPI often accuse groups that oppose them, those that support and advocate so-called liberal Islam, as Western-created agencies hostile to those seeking to implement Islam comprehensively.[53] Accordingly, FPI leaders often frame Muslim scholars and activists who are unsupportive of the implementation of sharia as '*sipilis*' (lit. syphilis) groups, referring to the advocates of 'secularism, pluralism, liberalism' (see, for example, Kersten, 2015). Rather than showing a distinct political agency to reshape power relations in favour of the *ummah*, the *perda shariah* debates only produce further fragmentation of Islamism. Hence, the dynamics of sharia politics reveals the symptoms of Islamists' failure to be a hegemonic force in the context of decentralised democracy—instead of its strength in Islamising local politics.

Islamism and Multiculturalism in an Age of Terror

Prompted by the traumatic experience of violent communal conflicts following Soeharto's fall (e.g. Bertrand, 2004; Colombijn & Lindblad, 2002; van Klinken, 2007; Wessel & Wimhofer, 2001), multiculturalism projects—seen as efforts for managing plural societies—become another nodal point for the democratisation discourse in Indonesia. While political liberalisation and decentralisation have brought about diverse articulations

[52] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016), Dr Nur Mahmudi Ismail (26 October 2016).

[53] See *Al-Wai*, 14 May 2015; Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016), Mahdi Assegaf (Bogor, 4 December 2016).

of Islam seeking a more significant role in the state and society, the pervasiveness of identity politics in power struggles has raised a concern about the intrusion of identity politics in the political arena and its mobilisation for elections. This concern sets the ground for advocating the separation of religion from politics. Following the GWOT campaigns, the dominant articulation of multiculturalism discourse has directed Islamism to be confined into the domain of culture. Therefore, the projects of managing plural and tolerant societies in post-New Order democratisation are often pursued, paradoxically, by the depoliticisation of Islamism.[54]

Depoliticisation of Islamism, as articulated by the dominant discourse of multiculturalism, is achieved through two interconnected strategies. Firstly, through the securitisation of Islam, especially following the merging of GWOT and democratic transition discourses. In democratising Indonesia, the GWOT campaign has facilitated the making of a sharp distinction between Islamist articulations considered compatible with the democratisation agenda from other articulations, which are seen as not only endangering democracy but also threatening national stability and sovereignty. Secondly, through the culturalisation of Islamism, as propagated and directed by the proponents of multiculturalism and tolerance discourses. Through these two discourses, certain articulations of Islam—especially those associated with the purveyors of *shumuliyatul Islam*—are essentially presented as a challenge to a harmonious and multicultural nation. Depoliticisation of Islamism, either through securitisation or culturalisation of Islam, has greatly influenced how Islamist agency and subjectivity are disciplined and reoriented to be compatible with neoliberal global order and Indonesia's presumed democratisation.

GWOT and Securitisation of Islamism

Following the GWOT campaign, Islamic radicalism increasingly emerged as an explanatory concept for the current understanding of the relationship between Islam, politics and violence (Asad, 2007; Mamdani 2002; Sen, 2006). In Indonesia, the Islamic radicalism concept captures not only the Islamists with violent articulations, especially the *jihadist* and

[54] By depoliticisation, we specifically refer to the attempts to remove 'a political phenomenon from the comprehension of its *historical* emergence and from a recognition of the *powers* that produce and contour it' (Brown, 2006, 15. *Italics* in original).

vigilante groups, which have sprung up more visibly since the 2000s. It also refers to those advocating the comprehensive nature of Islam in religion and politics or *shumuliyatul Islam* (see, for example, Fealy, 2004). Defined mainly in terms of ideological and behavioural aspects, the category of radical Islam can easily lead to simple profiling of the Islamists while at the same time obscuring the dimensions of power that influence the emergence of radical Islamists and contour their development. While the GWOT discourse reveals two contending forms of Islamism, the radical versus moderate Islamism, it also shapes the contestation and coalition among different political forces in their struggle for reorganising power in the post-New Order era.

Especially after the 2002 Bali bombing, committed by the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) network, the US-led GWOT became a nationalised discourse that revealed the different forms of Islamism. This diverse articulations of GWOT in Indonesia are constituted through their different responses to the dynamics of global politics, violent action and Indonesian Islam. Some scholars like Hefner (2002) argue that GWOT discourse does not represent a *clash of civilisation* but a *clash within civilisation* where the moderate and the radical Islamists are competing to define Islam in post-New Order Indonesia. Initially, Islamists' responses to the GWOT discourse were rather ambiguous. While condemning violent acts in the name of Islam, they were also concerned about the consequences of this campaign for Islamism. For example, Vice-President Hamzah Haz (PPP) warned the US against 'scapegoating' Muslims, claiming that the WTC attack might help 'cleanse' their sins (via Hefner, 2002, 754). Even after the 2002 Bali bombing that took more than 200 lives, many Muslim leaders were still sceptical regarding the existence of Al-Qaeda's regional branch of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI)—who were seen by security specialists as the perpetrators of terror in Indonesia and Southeast Asia (Jones, 2004, 25).[55]

It is not surprising that the tendency to associate the GWOT and the US-led campaign to undermine Islam is more pronounced among the advocates of *shumulyatul Islam*. PKS chairman (2000–2004), Hidayat Nur Wahid argues that the GWOT discourse is deliberately designed to target Islam and the unity of Indonesia's nation-state by creating disharmony within Muslim communities (2004, 144–152). Furthermore,

[55] For the discussions on the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, see Abuza (2003), Barton (2004), ICG (2002), and Ramakrishna and Tan (2003).

US-led military actions in Muslim countries such as Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), in the name of GWOT campaign and global promotion of liberal democracy, has resulted in the anti-America sentiments among many Indonesian Islamists. Supported by various international donors, the massive promotion of 'liberal Islam' and governmental intervention in Islamic education under the projects of 'deradicalisation' are often regarded as systematic efforts to destroy the *ummah*.[56] For example, HTI spokesperson Ismail Yunanto argues that the deployment of the Islamic radicalism category is specifically 'to target people or groups regarded as threatening the status quo, particularly Islamist activists who struggle for the implementation of Islamic teachings.'[57] Another HTI senior activist, Yusuf Mustakim, sees that the tensions between 'moderate' and 'radical' Islam implied by the GWOT discourse are fabricated to discredit Muslims altogether. He states that 'the difference between those who appropriate Islam for individual piety and those who are aware that Islam must be implemented comprehensively is seen exclusively from the lens of security.'[58]

Interestingly, these Islamist groups also take benefit from the GWOT campaigns. By escalating anti-Western sentiments following the US invasion against Afghanistan and Iraq, the Islamist groups expanded and mobilised their constituents. Not surprisingly, constituting 'the West' as the antagonist for the Islamists is not a new phenomenon. This is inseparable from their identity construction as vehemently articulated in the praxis-ideology of *ghazwul fikr*.[59] In fact, their anti-Western slogans and peaceful Islamist mobilisations were functional to broaden their social base and, in turn, to build 'peaceful' images as a counter to the 'radical' label that had been attached to them. For example, Suharna Surapranata, the head of PKS' Central Advisory Board (MPP, *Majelis Pertimbangan Partai*), recalled that anti-US mobilisations following its invasion of

[56] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[57] Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016).

[58] Interview with Yusuf Mustakim, HTI Yogyakarta-based spokesperson (Yogyakarta, 23 September 2016).

[59] *Ghazwul fikri* is often defined as the defence of a cultural or ideological system among the Islamists against all forces and ideologies which, in their perceptions, will undermine Islam. The enemies of Islam in this praxis-ideology may include the forces representing the Jews, Christian, Communists, liberals or cultural expressions like hedonism and consumerism. See van Bruinessen (2014, 61–85).

Afghanistan and Iraq were crucial for the party prior to the 2004 elections. It was 'like a blessing in disguise because, at that time, the party did not attract Muslims more generally through the promotion of sharia or other Islamist slogans.'[60] HTI activists also claim their ideology became more acceptable among general Muslims, as they accused the West of being the true face of terror. One HTI activist states that:

> Our *dakwah* is not waging jihad against the perpetrators… but protecting the *ummah* by, for instance, disseminating awareness about Western conspiracy and hypocrisy… In the name of GWOT, they are continuously killing Muslims, our women and children in Afghanistan, Iraq, and others. So, who are the radicals then? Who are the real terrorists?[61]

GWOT discourses in Indonesia have been specifically intertwined with post-authoritarian democratisation agendas, in which the debates on Islamism is increasingly framed in its relations to security and democracy. In the early 2000s, securitisation of Islamism in Indonesia took place when there was a growing concern that democratic transition in this country would result in Balkanisation or even lead to a failed state (Abuza, 2003; Aspinall & Berger, 2001). The concern of disintegration is mainly related to the outbreak of religious violent conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi in the early years of democratisation and the successionist movements in Aceh and Papua. Furthermore, the presence of transnational terrorist networks, especially after the 2002 Bali bombing, strengthened security-oriented approaches to Islamism. Security analysts (e.g., Abuza, 2007), for example, typically argue that the rise of radical Islam has been the result of the transformation from an authoritarian regime to democratic rule. The weak capacity of the state in the aftermath of the New Order is often seen as being responsible for the emergence of Islamist groups (Abuza, 2007, 5).

In the mid-2000s, global discourse on terrorism changed its central focus from responding to threats of transnational terrorist organisation

[60] In the 2004 election, PKS' national votes increased significantly from 1.36 to 4.34%. Apart from its success in creating the image of a clean party, the party leaders also pointed out that such anti-US demonstrations and humanitarian activities such as helping the people during the Jakarta flood in 2003 were also instrumental for broadening the party's constituency. Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid (Jakarta, 15 December 2016), Dr Suharna Surapranata, PKS' Central Advisory Board (Jakarta, 31 October 2016).

[61] Interview with Yusuf Mustakim (Yogyakarta, 23 September 2016).

to the failed and weak states considered vulnerable to being exploited by transnational crime, including the terrorists (Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner & Pascual, 2005; Rotberg, 2004; Volpi, 2010, 156). More specifically, by framing Southeast Asia as 'the second front' of the GWOT, Washington began to actively engage the countries in this region in the anti-terrorism campaign (see, for example, Acharya, 2007). Crucially, the GWOT discourse has legitimised the projects of state transformation worldwide conducted in the name of global promotion of liberal democracy, even those pursued through unilateral military actions(Duffield, 2001; Hameiri, 2010). As Hadiz (2006, 124–125) points out, GWOT campaigns are instrumental in creating a distinct form of governance to securing Indonesia's nation-state, containing radical Islamic forces and maintaining security for the operations of international capital in Indonesia and the region.

Therefore, the securitisation of Islamism has been directly linked to the restructuring of the global order and state-building under the banner of the worldwide promotion of democracy (cf. Fukuyama, 2004). In the 1990s, global democracy promotion was mainly advocated through crafting democratic institutions, strengthening civil society and promoting good governance. However, under the nexus of GWOT and democratic transition discourses in the mid-2000s, the main emphasis was on the advancement of 'civic' practices and values such as religious tolerance. All these changes occurred concurrently with the reorientation of the post-Cold War global development agenda, where the main focus was on creating technocratic and market-friendly governance. By reviving Huntington's revisionism of modernisation theory, this new development agenda privileged political order and stability by depoliticising democratisation processes. Hence, the ascendancy of security approaches after 9/11 that frequently conceived of Islamism as a threat to national security and stability converged comfortably with the neoliberal global ordering (cf. Brown, 2006).

At the societal level, the securitisation of Islamism exacerbated the conflicts between the radical and moderate Muslims. This was primarily conducted through the promotion of 'liberal' or 'civil' Islam, seen as a sort of civil society force functionally necessary for the working of democracy (cf. Mujani, 2007). This orientation was articulated by various Islamist groups, in particular the Islamic Liberal Network (JIL, *Jaringan*

Islam Liberal).[62] Other Islamists, like HTI and FPI, frequently consider JIL as a US-created agent to undermine Islamism in Indonesia and as a domestic source of *ghazwul fikr*.[63] Commenting on such charges, Ulil Abshar Abdala, a JIL leading figure, stated that:

> Indeed, the rise of JIL can be cynically seen as part of the GWOT scheme. It is undeniable because one of its agendas is fighting the jihadists and radical Islamists. Yet, this is only one among others of JIL's activities and intellectual aspirations… Essentially, JIL believes that the framework of liberal democracy is the best one, and we attempt to provide a conceptual and theological basis to support it. I think this is JIL's most significant contribution, refreshing Islamic teachings for the workings of democracy.[64]

To summarise, the preceding discussion shows that the GWOT discourse constituted 'Islamic radicalism' as an object of knowledge production on the one hand and the political object of surveillance and securitisation on the other hand. More specifically, the convergences of GWOT and democratic transition discourses in Indonesia have effectively depoliticised Islamism, in which the articulations of Islam are directed to be contained in the cultural domain. Yet, in a fierce contest for power in the post-New Order era, the global discourse on terrorism has further aggravated the fragmentation of Islamism. The confrontation between the radical and the moderate Islamists re-emerges, where the former is constructed as the global and national security threats. It is noteworthy that the dominance of security approach to Islamism has not only put some forms of Islamism under scrutiny but also facilitated the reconsolidation of nationalist-conservative forces.

[62] JIL is a loose and fluid forum comprising young middle-class Muslim intelligentsia based in Utan Kayu, Jakarta. The platform promotes a more liberal interpretation of Islam through discussions, seminars and web-based media outlets. See also Ali (2005) and Kersten (2015).

[63] Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016), Yusuf Mustakim (Yogyakarta, 23 September 2016).

[64] Interview with Ulil Absar Adalla, JIL activist and Muslim intellectual (Jakarta, 6 December 2016).

Multiculturalism and Politicisation of Difference

Culturalisation of Islam, constructing Islam as a mere cultural category without political agencies, as implied by some forms of multiculturalism discourses has further depoliticised Islamism. Like political liberalisation and decentralisation, the multiculturalism discourse has become a primary nodal point for post-New Order democratisation. Against the background of communal violent conflicts (1998–2002), multiculturalism is often articulated as efforts to sustain peaceful and harmonious societies, considered as a central prerequisite for democratisation. With regard to Islamism, the development of multiculturalism discourse is situated within two major contexts. Firstly, the need to rebuild peace and political stability in plural societies, largely due to the traumatic events of violent communal conflicts in the New Order's last years. Secondly, the mainstreaming of religion as a non-political and private matter, most specifically in the context of the GWOT campaigns and the global promotion of neoliberal democracy. We can identify three distinct articulations of the multiculturalism discourse that developed within these intertwined contexts: multiculturalism as part of the GWOT imperatives, as one of the modalities of democratisation, and as a framework for the state's management of plural societies (see Hakim, 2020).

Following the GWOT campaign, questions of Islamism and global violence became a new basis for categorising forms of Islamist agencies, further promoting the culturalisation of Islamism (see Asad, 2007; Mamdani, 2002). Hefner (2002), for example, states that the real struggles 'lie *within* Muslim societies, where ultraconservatives compete against moderates and democrats for the vision and soul of the Muslim public' (2002, 763, *italics* in original). These cultural categories of Islamism strengthen the already existing binary subject of radical and moderate Islamism, where the former is seen as representing anti-democracy tendencies. Consequently, the diverse forms of Islamism in the early 2000s were no longer acknowledged as having political agencies to struggle for a better position for the *ummah* through democratic contestation but rather *politicised* for the mainstreaming of moderate Islamism.

Under the rubric of democratic transition studies, multiculturalism discourses during this period were articulated as modalities for the democratisation agenda, particularly by highlighting the notions of pluralism and tolerance. Within this discursive framework, Islamist groups

which sought to articulate religion in the political arena came under scrutiny. Maarif (2010), for example, warned about the danger of Islamist groups which call for the implementation of sharia on the basis that this aspiration is incompatible with the nature of Indonesian society and, worse, it can lead to exclusionary politics. The underlying thesis is that democratic consolidation can only be sustained by constructing the identity of 'Muslim democrats' or 'civil Islam' (see, for example, Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Mujani, 2007). By advocating issues such as protecting minority rights and tolerance, the formation of pluralist Islam identities is often carried out by defining other Islamists as radical and intolerant. The latter is not only constituted as incompatible but also as a threat to Indonesia's democratic consolidation and social harmony.

The final articulation of the multiculturalism discourse—which is inexorably linked to the second one—was associated with the state's management of diverse societies. Emerging from a critique of the New Order's model of organising societies based on a top-down and universalisation framework, many pro-democracy activists advocated the need for recognising differences and strengthening the state's capacities, especially through the rule of law, to guarantee the protection of minority rights (see Hefner, 2018). Indeed, such articulations have provided spaces for previously suppressed groups, such as Ahmadi (regarded as a minority sect within Islam) and *penghayat kepercayaan* (the followers of 'indigenous' religion) to claim their rights to political recognition.

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, however, such an articulatory model has brought about a paradoxical result: the contestation over religious rights. Reports on religious freedom in Indonesia, such as the Wahid Foundation (2018) and the Centre for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (2013), have shown increasing intolerance and violence against religious minority groups. According to these reports, the acts of intolerance is a direct result of the expanding role of conservative or radical Islamists in ordering the public sphere. But, the escalation of violence is also a consequence of this third articulatory model of multiculturalism. Instead of investing in coexistent living, this model opens the spaces for contestation over religious rights and relies on the intervention of the state through law enforcement.

This tendency is well represented in the case of repeated violence against Ahmadi community in several Indonesian cities. The perpetrators, especially *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) and its allies, often claim that their violent acts are justified as efforts to maintain social order (*ketertiban sosial*). They instrumentalise a Joint Decree (*Surat Keputusan Bersama*,

issued in 2008 by Home Ministry, Religious Affairs Ministry and Attorney General's Office), as a pretext to attack Ahmadi community. The Decree itself is ambiguous as it does not formally disband the Ahmadi but its adherents cannot continue their activities and practices, denounced as deviant to the doctrines of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia (Kresten, 2015; Suryana, 2019). Ironically, FPI and its allies claim that they are assisting the government in law enforcement. Meanwhile, in the name of freedom of expression and religion, multiculturalism proponents are accusing FPI as intolerant groups and urging the government to disband this organisation.

The Islamist backlash against multiculturalism discourses peaked when the MUI, increasingly dominated by conservative Islamist figures, issued a *fatwa* in 2005 that condemned the notions of pluralism, liberalism and secularism. The ultimate targets were the proponents of moderate-liberal Islam (Ichwan, 2013; Kresten, 2015). While many Muslim scholars criticised this *fatwa*, Islamist groups like FPI, HTI and PKS utilised it for Islamist mobilisations. A new vehicle called the *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI, Forum of Islamic Society), pioneered by HTI and FPI, was forged to follow up on this anti-multiculturalism *fatwa*.[65] Polarisation among Islamist groups based on multiculturalism discourses manifested in public debates such as the promulgation of the anti-pornography bill. Both groups often mobilised their respective supporters onto the streets.[66] The rift between the so-called radical-intolerant and pluralist-tolerant Islamism culminated in June 2008. FPI and FUI activists, who at that time were holding a demonstration demanding the ban on Ahmadi community, violently attacked the masses from the *Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan* (AKKBB, National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith) that organised a rally to commemorate

[65] FUI was established in 2005, comprised several ultra-conservative groups. It aims at following up the MUI *fatwa* to counter the proponents of secularism, pluralism and liberalism. Its principal proponents were HTI and FPI—the most vocal mass-based Islamist organisations in Jakarta. FUI was led by Muhammad Alkhaththath, then also the HTI chairman. After the 2008 Monas incident, HTI subsequently expelled him from their structure. Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath, FUI chairman (Jakarta, 14 December 2016), Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016).

[66] Interview with Muhammad Al-Khaththath (Jakarta, 14 December 2016), Ledia Hanifah (Jakarta, 3 November 2016), Iffah Nur, HTI Women (Muslimah HTI) spokeswoman (Jakarta, 11 November 2016).

the birth of Pancasila in the National Monument (Monas) areas, Jakarta (*The Jakarta Post*, 2 June 2008).

Framed within the fears about the danger of ethnic and religious conflicts that threatened Indonesia's unity, discourses of tolerance and multiculturalism comfortably accommodated themselves into discourses on nationalism. The construction of intolerant Islamist identities refers not only to their different behaviour, but was now seen as inherently threatening to the pluralistic and tolerant nature of Indonesian societies (cf. Burhanuddin & van Dijk, 2013). Terms like '*Arabisasi Indonesia*' (lit. Arabisation of Indonesia) versus *Islam Nusantara* (lit. Islam of the archipelago), for example, have become two antagonistic subjects of Islamism constructed through multiculturalism discourses. In such contestation, the proponents of the latter align itself with the secular-nationalist forces to counter the so-called transnationalist and intolerant Islamism such as HTI, FPI and later Salafi groups.[67] For example, secular-nationalist parties like PDIP vocally articulate and defend *Islam Nusantara*.[68] The nationalist discourse of Islamism subsequently manifests in the utilisation of terms such as 'defending NKRI' or '*NKRI harga mati*' (NKRI as the final form of the state). This slogan specifically frames transnational Islamism and those advocating sharia as betraying the state ideology of Pancasila. In fact, defending NKRI rhetoric, which were previously associated with the re-entry of the military into the

[67] NU formally adopted the platform of *Islam Nusantara* in its 2015 Congress in its bid against the influence of transnational-based Islamism, in particular HTI. This idea was developed from notions of *pribumisasi Islam* (lit. indigenisation of Islam) that Abdurrahman Wahid introduced in the 1980s. While this notion accentuated the merging of Islam and local traditions that characterised Indonesian Islam, the articulation of *Islam Nusantara* emphasises opposition towards transnational-based Islamism like HTI and Salafism (Sahal & Aziz, 2015). In turn, Islamists like HTI sees *Islam Nusantara* as more dangerous than *Islam Liberal*. Although both *Islam Liberal* and *Islam Nusantara* are similarly opposing HTI's sharia and caliphate projects, the latter has broader chance for public acceptance. For HTI's views on *Islam Nusantara*, see *Al-Wai*, 1 July 2015. Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016), Muhammad Al-Khaththath (Jakarta, 14 December 2016).

[68] For example, PDIP chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri calls for the importance of building Indonesian Islam. Such identity is constructed 'not by importing from the Islamic culture of the Middle East, which is not necessarily compatible with the values of our Indonesia-ness.' The transcript of her speech before the inauguration of its party's Islamic wing, BAMUSI, is retrieved from https://pdiperjuangan.id/article/category/detail/210/Berita/Pengarahan-Ketua-Umum-PDI-Perjuangan-PadapPelantikan-Baitul-Muslimin-Indonesia- (accessed, 25 January 2018).

socio-political arena, are now appropriated to build a coalition between moderate-pluralist Islamists and secular-nationalist groups against the so-called intolerant-radical Islamists.

In relation to discussions of Islamists' hegemonic struggles, complex dynamics between the practices multiculturalism and Islamism have brought about paradoxical results. It is apparent that, as part of the post-New Order democratisation agendas, the multiculturalism discourses have been counterproductive for Islamist hegemonic struggle as they create further polarisation among Islamists, and they also fail to establishe a more substantive democracy. The following reasons explain this paradoxical results. Firstly, the three articulations of the multiculturalism discourse have not facilitated the making of political unity among different Islamist groups. Instead, they draw new antagonistic lines between the so-called radical-intolerant and moderate-pluralist Islamists. Secondly, as part of the democratisation agenda, the multiculturalism discourse has not facilitated citizenship-based representation. Rather than investing in social transformation, this distinct multiculturalism discourse has produced the ideology-praxis of 'the difference for the sake of difference.' Indeed, multiculturalism discourses contribute to the recognition of rights of the marginalised groups. Yet, they do not transform such differences for building a common agenda for advancing radical and emancipatory agendas. Like the global trends of multiculturalism and tolerance discourses, the dominant practices of multiculturalism in Indonesia are overwhelmed by the issues of recognition (identity-cultural dimension). Their practices rarely link multiculturalism advocacy with the issues of redistribution (political-economy dimension) (cf. Brown, 2006; Modood, 2019). Thirdly, the multiculturalism discourses have further brought about the culturalisation of Islamism. Accordingly, the category of tolerance is constituted as a new signifier to define the different nature and trajectories of Islamism. However, the culturalisation of Islamism that produces two camps of moderate-pluralist and radical-tolerant Islamists has ironically become a new basis for defining electoral constituency. As such, the multiculturalism discourse has instead contributed to the prevalence of identity politics that characterise contemporary democracy practices in Indonesia.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter explains the diverse articulations of Islam within the democratisation agenda in the post-New Order era. Here, democratisation is constituted as a master signifier—a new terrain for various efforts to transform New Order authoritarianism. Indeed, social groups, including Islamists, appropriate and articulate democratisation with their different interests and agendas, especially to improve their social position in the post-Soeharto era. The chapter has examined the dynamics of diverse articulations of Islam in Indonesian politics through three central nodal points of post-New Order democratisation agendas, that is, political liberalisation, decentralisation and multiculturalism.

It is postulated here that the functioning of democracy in post-New Order Indonesia is not primarily determined by the presence of necessary rules and institutions. Rather, it is contingent on the ability of social subjects to expand the chains of equivalences linking together diverse democratic demands. While political liberalisation and decentralisation, adopted in the early years of democratisation, had facilitated the Islamists to seek a more significant role in state and society, the logic of difference overwhelmed their political struggles. But, they failed to build a coherent political vehicle when the momentum to do so was widely opened. Instead of being a hegemonic force capable of offering alternative to the post-New Order politics, the practices of Islamism in the three areas mentioned above resulted in its further fragmentation.

The failure of Islamist hegemony in democratisation era brought about far-reaching consequences. Besides triggering the rapid emergence of Islamist vehicles claiming to represent the *ummah,* the fragmentation of Islamism also paved the way for competing elites—primarily those associated with oligarchs nurtured during the New Order era—to fill political voids that emerged through democratisation and decentralisation. This fragmentation also prompted Islamic parties to build a consensus and political compromise. Hence, the *reformasi* discourse that built the political frontiers between the forces representing reform versus those of status quo is replaced by the search for compromise and consensus. Rather than demonstrating the completion of a democratic transition and entering the period of its consolidation as claimed by the proponents of transitology theories, this condition showed that the momentum for hegemonic struggles to form a clear break with the New Order was lost.

This chapter has demonstrated that the hegemonic struggle of the Islamists for a post-Soeharto political order has been also shaped by the multiculturalism discourses, initially projected as a central component for democratic consolidation and for sustaining peaceful and harmonious societies. Situated in the context of the GWOT and the global promotion of neoliberal democracy, the dominant articulations of multiculturalism had effectively produced the culturalisation of Islamism. Here, the category of tolerance became a new parameter to define the different natures and trajectories of Islamism, and constructed the antagonistic form of Islamism: the moderate-pluralist versus radical-intolerant Islamism.

Undoubtedly, all these developments have influenced the post-Soeharto political changes that maintain the technocratic logic of governing a depoliticised society. In fact, since the end of the Cold War and especially after the GWOT, the depoliticisation of social conflicts has become a global trend for the reconfiguration of the neoliberal global order (Brown, 2006; Mamdani, 2004). As such, the notion of tolerance, instead of being equated with equality and social justice, increasingly becomes a key term for 'describing and prescribing conflicts rendered as cultural' (Brown, 2006, 299). In the post-New Order, the absence of a relatively hegemonic political project with cross-cutting representation of the broader society have made democratisation an arena for mobilising identity politics, which is seen as the viable basis for electoral contestations. These trends, which significantly characterise contemporary Indonesian politics and the practices of Islamism, will be further elaborated in the subsequent chapter.

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CHAPTER 6

Neoliberal Hegemony and the Populist Moments: Whither Islamism?

As we saw in Chapter 5, Islamism in the post-New Order democratisation era has not led to the creation of a chain of equivalence that links together cross-cutting demands and political agendas among diverse Islamic groups under the banner of the *ummah*. Instead, Islamic politics has been characterised mainly by further fragmentation in electoral politics and civil society. Such fragmentation takes place against two inter-related backdrops. Firstly, the hegemony of neoliberalism and its depoliticising effects on democracy and development practices. Secondly, the securitisation and culturalisation of Islamism in the aftermath of the GWOT campaign. This chapter investigates the convergence of neoliberal hegemony and post-New Order democratisation in constituting distinct practices, institutions and imaginaries of democracy. The questions to be addressed in this chapter are as follows: How have these transformations prevented Islamism from building a hegemonic bloc in Indonesian politics? What are the implications for the workings of Indonesian democracy and the practices of Islamism?

In the aftermath of the Cold War and especially after 9/11, democratisation projects worldwide have been undertaken in the context of the hegemony of neoliberal globalisation (see Brown, 2015; Tar, 2009; Volpi & Cavatorta, 2007 for the case of Africa). While the degree of neoliberal hegemony may differ across the globe, its complex articulations

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in the political arena are mainly constituted through the depoliticisation of social conflicts and promotion of a technocratic governing model (Brown, 2015; Mouffe, 2000). In democracy studies, the dominance of economic rationalities has not only resulted in market-oriented policies but also influenced the workings of political representation. As such, democracy is increasingly depoliticised and, in turn, signified by the logic of market competition as mere electoral politics. Within this depoliticised democracy practice, individuals and social groups are reduced to abstracted voters, without having political agencies and different political projects. Consequently, neoliberal-driven democratisation does not create 'the people' or demos as ultimate subjects in controlling public affairs.

From the lens of hegemony analysis as developed in the Political Discourse Analysis (PDA), the absence of the terrain of social conflicts and the confrontations between different projects for the betterment of societies has made the political dimension of democracy disappear. Hence, democracy only allows people to vote without the possibility of choosing between political alternatives (Mouffe, 2018). In the case of Indonesia, as discussed in Chapter 5, this condition takes place when there are no coherent political forces capable of representing cross-cutting alliances for a post-Soeharto social order and when the elite-based consensus and pragmatism dominate the political sphere. How has this condition—labelled post-political situation by Mouffe (2005a, 2005b, 2018)—shaped post-New Order democratisation?

This chapter argues that the depoliticisation effects brought about by neoliberalisation of democracy and development have created a favourable terrain for the articulations of such categories as religion and ethnicity that claim to represent those who feel neglected and unheard in the existing representative system. Islam, therefore, becomes a viable political discourse to construct 'the people' based on *ummah* identities, appealing to those who are peripheralised by small groups of rapacious elites. From this vantage point, the advent of so-called Islamic populism as a form of the construction of the people through the language of Islam is not antithetical to democracy. But, it directly springs from the actual practices of democracy in the post-New Order era. Therefore, the prevalence of Islamist political discourse in current Indonesian politics is symptomatic of the dislocation of democracy rather than something that inherently threatens it.

Democratisation discourses have indeed facilitated Islamists to construct the forms of the people around the signifier of the *ummah* to

advance their social positions and agendas in the post-New Order political settings. Such processes constitute distinct forms of agency, subjectivity, institution and relations of power, characterising the current practices of democracy and Islamism. It is demonstrated here that the primacy of Islamist discourses in struggles over power does not necessarily indicate the *Islamisation of politics* that is often seen as fundamentally threatening to Indonesian democracy. Conversely, it is also not a mere *politicisation of Islam* by the competing elites or political parties to maintain their positions of power. But, both Islamists and contending elites and political parties—as distinct political subjects—are conditioned and shaped as a result of the confluence of the practices of democracy and Islamism. Such relations are evident in the making of what this study calls the electoral *ummah*, whose features and consequences will be discussed in more detail in this chapter.

Like other forms of populist politics, Islamists' construction of the people often has a right-wing character in that it brings together a multitude of social demands among Muslims by using xenophobic rhetoric. Mainly due to such exclusionary propensities, the mainstreaming of Islamic populism as a threat to pluralist democracy and the unity of Indonesia's nation-state has currently gained more traction. However, the attempts to counter Islamic populism by politicising and mobilising other forms of communal identity, mainly around the markers of nationalism and pluralist Islam, have sharpened existing antagonistic relations. More importantly, it has shaped the playing field for contestation and coalition between Islamists and beyond. Regarding Islamic populist politics, it is argued here that the ultimate challenge for democracy is not defending or deterring one form of identity over others. The issue at stake is how to transform the existing antagonistic relations by undertaking a hegemonic politics which links together multiple others in a search for the creation of a more inclusive unity, in the form of *demos* or democratic citizenship.

Democratisation Without Hegemonic Forces

By utilising the parameters of transitology approaches, such as civil-military relations, democratic institutions and free elections, one can too quickly conclude that the democratic transition in Indonesia has been completed, moving towards a new stage of democratic consolidation (see

Liddle & Mujani, 2013; Mietzner, 2009). While admitting the significant progress made in transforming authoritarian rule, scholars from the critical political economy approach (for example, Hadiz, 2017a; cf. Robison & Hadiz, 2004) contend that the workings of democracy in Indonesia are still flawed, indeed have experienced severe setbacks. For them, democratisation agenda has not fundamentally changed the existing political structures. On the contrary, they argue that democratic mechanisms and institutions have been instrumentalised and hijacked by the powerful elites nurtured since the Soeharto era in their efforts to maintain control over state power and resources. While sharing the concerns raised in these political economy perspectives when comprehending the democratisation trajectories, this section sheds light on the constitutive roles of the political—i.e. the spaces of social conflicts and differences—for the workings of post-New Order democratisation.

Over two decades of *reformasi*, democratisation agenda has not facilitated the emergence of coherent political blocs that allow vibrant confrontations between different political projects to define post-New Order Indonesia's nation-state. Instead, the political differences resulted from democratisation tend to be structured and dominated by the ideology of consensus that effectively eliminates the frontiers between friends and enemies of change. Consequently, democratisation agenda becomes elite-driven in nature. Such conditions have led to the impossibility of political alternatives and created a terrain for populist articulations—claiming to represent the people against the uncaring political establishment. In relation to the practices of Islamism, these dynamics constitute distinct forms of agency, relationships and subjectivity, which ultimately contour contemporary Indonesian politics. This is particularly the case in the formation and development of the 'electoral *ummah*,' understood here as a form of Islamist identification of the people in the current context of electoral politics. Specifically, this phenomenon emerges from the confluence between the actual practices of democracy and the fragmented Islamism in the aftermath of the New Order.

Post-Democracy and the Disappearance of the Political

Since the fall of the authoritarian regime in May 1998, the nature of Indonesian democracy has been vigorously debated (for example, Ford & Peppinsky, 2014; Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Schulte-Nordholt, 2004;

Schulte-Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007; Törnquist, 2013). By the mid-2000s, dominant views on Indonesian democratisation propagated by transitology and institutionalist approaches were widely criticised. For example, Schulte-Nordholt (2004, 29–50) argues that introducing democratic frameworks, including local autonomy and decentralisation, does not necessarily mark the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule or from a strong state towards a strong society. Utilising the notions of 'changing continuities,' he shows that democratisation has provided long-entrenched local elites, historically developed from the colonial era to the New Order period, with the opportunities for expanding patronage networks organised primarily around ethnic and religious identities. Furthermore, Robison and Hadiz (2004; Hadiz, 2010; see also Winters, 2011, 2013) argues that the post-New Order politics has been hijacked by Soeharto-linked oligarchs and enabled them to reconsolidate their power in a more dispersed and decentralised structure of power. The points of these critics are that democratisation trajectories are not linear nor determined by the imperatives of democratic institutions. Instead, they are primarily shaped by the conditions of political forces historically rooted in sociocultural and structural circumstances.

Drawing upon the hegemony analysis, this study approaches democratisation trajectories in post-New Order Indonesia by looking at the confluence between diverse articulations of democracy and actual political practices. Such processes are mutually interpenetrating in their struggles to redefine interests, identities and agencies. In so doing, it emphasises the political contingency of democracy as an empty signifier—through which social groups attempt to signify it with different interests and agendas (cf. Lefort, 1988; Laclau, 2001, 3–14; Little & Lloyd, 2009). Through this signifying process, the identities and interests of social groups are (re)constituted. In this theoretical tradition, the democracy project is not merely about crafting institutions and mechanisms. But, more importantly, it is 'a profound transformation of the existing relations of power' to establish a new hegemony, by constructing the people (*demos*) that is articulated through political struggles to change unjust and unequal power in socio-political and economic relations (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, xi).[1] These processes always entail drawing political frontiers between *demos* and antagonistic others. Without the dimension of

[1] In agreement with Lefort's conception of democracy as 'the empty place of power' (1988), Laclau further states that:

the political, democratic politics is reduced to mere administration. As we shall see, the very nature of the political is thus constitutive to the forms and trajectories of democracy.

Many recent studies show that the disappearance of the political has increasingly become a global phenomenon in current democracy practices. Such a trend is closely associated with the hegemony of neoliberal globalisation—even if its manifestation differs from one conjuncture to another (Brown, 2015; Mouffe, 2018; cf. Rodan, 2018 for the context of Southeast Asian countries; Wolin, 2008 for the case of the US). For example, Mouffe (2005a, 2005b, 2018) shows the disappearance of the political in European politics is associated with the so-called consensus of the centre, developed since the early 1990s. This development is influenced by Anthony Gidden's Third Way ideology articulated by Tony Blair's New Labour in the United Kingdom and Schröder's Social Democratic Party in Germany (SPD). This ideology claims that the adversarial models of politics—the Left and Right oppositions—has become obsolete and that politics should be about the management of public affairs.[2] Crucially, the disappearance of such oppositions has naturalised the dogma that there is no alternative to neoliberal globalisation and that political problems are reduced to technical issues.

These transformations have influenced the quality of the workings of democracy and created a new political formation that democracy theorists like Mouffe (2018) and Rancière (1999) call a post-democracy situation.[3] They argue that post-democracy is primarily characterised by the disarticulations of two idealised democratic pillars—equality and

In order to have democracy we need a particular force that *occupy* the empty place of power but do not identify with it. This means that there is only democracy if the gap between universality and particularity is never filled but is, on the contrary, ever reproduced. Which also means that democracy is only possible on a *hegemonic* terrain. However, the latter implies, as we have seen, that relations of power is also constitutive of it, from which we can deduce that power is also constitutive of democracy (Laclau, 2001, 7-8).

[2] For a critical discussion on the Third Way discourse and how it shapes European politics, see, for example, Bastow and Martin (2003), Hale et al. (2004).

[3] Rancière defines post-democracy as 'the government practice and conceptual legitimation of a democracy *after* the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests' (1999, 102).

popular sovereignty—from democracy discourses.[4] From this viewpoint, the rise of populist politics, that seem to give back the 'voice' or popular sovereignty to unrepresented people against the political establishment, has been an expression of resistance emerging from the disappearance of the spaces of the political in current democracy discourses (cf. Mouffe, 2005a, 2005b, 2018; Panizza, 2005).

In Indonesia, the disappearance of the political in the democratisation era is, at least, constituted from two crucial directions. Firstly, the unbroken tradition of depoliticisation and technocratic governance throughout New Order developmentalism. As discussed in Chapter 5, the democratisation agenda in post-authoritarian Indonesia, articulated through the nodal points of political liberalisation, decentralisation and multiculturalism, has failed to create democratic subjects supported by organised and representation-based social movements. More importantly, such a condition creates a distinct consciousness and normalises the idea that politics is exclusively a government affair while the people are an object of intervention for the bureaucratic-technocratic regime. Secondly, the failure of democratisation in building a hegemonic bloc, representing cross-cutting alliances to establish an alternative to the post-Soeharto political order. This is particularly the case with the dynamics of pro-democracy movements since Soeharto's fall and, in particular, Islamic politics. While democratisation has facilitated Islamists to have a more significant role in the state and society, the political spheres are more dominated by the ideology of consensus and pragmatism. These dynamics have resulted in the increased discrepancies, if not disjuncture, between diverse Islamist movements in civil society and their representation in the political arena. Such a condition brings about far-reaching consequences for the workings of democracy and the practices of Islamism, as further discussed in the remaining part of this chapter.

The hegemony of neoliberalism in democratisation agendas constitutes a distinct political formation that tends to negate social conflicts further and favour a technocratic governing logic. The issue at stake is

[4] Beyond merely a form of government, theorists like Mouffe comprehend democracy as 'a specific form of organising politically human coexistence' which is constituted by the articulations of two different traditions—political liberalism (e.g. rule of law, individual rights) and popular sovereignty' (Mouffe 2000, 18). In this sense, the forms of democracy are not static but depend on the hegemonic struggles between these contending articulations in creating the certain conditions of democratic regimes throughout history. See also Macpherson (1977), Lefort (1988).

not merely that democratic institutions are increasingly instrumentalised and occupied by politico-business elites. Rather, neoliberal articulations, ubiquitous in almost all aspects of our lives, have fundamentally converted political logic, meaning and imaginaries of democracy into economic ones (Brown, 2015, 17; Foucault, 2004). Within such economic rationality, democracy is increasingly signified merely as electoral competition to control state power. At the same time, individuals and social groups are constructed as statistical abstracts for the electoral votes. Moreover, the economisation of democracy also replaces political concepts with market-oriented ones, such as 'representation' with 'electability,' 'governance' with 'management,' and so forth (Brown, 2015; Mouffe, 2005a).

Although political participation and the strengthening of civil society may be endorsed under the banner of good governance, the neoliberal discourse has fundamentally undone vibrant deliberations when well-trained technocrats and the so-called best practices are mainstreamed as a benchmark for managing public affairs (Abrahamsen, 2000; Hadiz, 2010; Harris et al., 2004). This is particularly salient in the debates on decentralisation in Indonesia in the last two decades, which has been previously celebrated as a turning point for strengthening civil society, people's participation and democratic processes at local levels (cf. Aspinall & Fealy, 2003). Crucially, by undermining the possibilities for confrontations and social conflicts that may result in the changing relations of power, neoliberal discourses promote an anti-democratic model of participation that negates representative-based politics—or, to put it more succinctly, participation without democracy (cf. Rodan, 2018).

Apart from the disappearance of the political, the post-democracy situation is also a result of the growing oligarchisation of societies (Mouffe, 2005a, 2018). Indeed, this phenomenon occurs following the prolonged processes of capitalist development, which have often gone hand in hand with the exacerbation of inequality and facilitated politico-business alliances to control state power and resources.[5] With the prevalence of technocratic rationalities in economy and politics—previously conditioned and sustained through the hegemony of developmentalism and then neoliberalism—the people are continuously excluded from democratic and development processes. Significantly, oligarchisation has eliminated

[5] For the historical genesis on the oligarchisation of Indonesian politics and the broader discussion on this issue, see Robison and Hadiz (2004), Robison (2009), Winters (2013), and Ford and Pepinsky (2014).

the democratic ideal of defending equality in the contemporary discourse of democratisation. Often, the issues of economic inequality are only addressed partially by the government through 'reactive' economic policies like *Bansos* (*Bantuan Sosial,* Social aid programs), whose practices have, in fact, generally become immediate strategies to expand patronage networks, corruption, or to boost electability. These developments, as Crouch argues, have fundamentally rolled back democracy as they created a new form of politics that 'once again becoming an affair of closed elites, as it was in pre-democratic times' (2004, 104).

Indeed, the hegemony of neoliberalism in democracy and development practices has not exclusively been imposed through the international financial institutions-driven economic rearrangements, notably the World Bank and the IMF. Equally important, it is been achieved by social groups' practices that otherwise reproduce and sustain neoliberal hegemony. In fact, neoliberal ideology is articulated by most post-New Order pro-democracy movements, which, for example, persistently criticise the state as a hindrance to the autonomy of civil society (cf. Hadiwinata, 2003; Prasetyo et al., 2003). Like the strategies of pro-market proponents who advocate privatisation and deregulation policies, these pro-democracy movements also call for the simplification of politics to mere instruments of the rule of law to protect civil and political rights.

Furthermore, neoliberal ideology promotes a distinct conception of civil society as an aggregation of collective identities and interests, conceived as already-fixed entities and ready to be mobilised and consolidated vis-à-vis the state (cf. Carroll & Jarvis, 2016). While continuously imagining the state as a 'Leviathan,' the assumptions of civil society as the sum of social groups with fixed identities and interests have led pro-democracy movements to become fragmented particularities, confined and isolated within their respective issues and social groups. Such fragmented tendencies prevent them from establishing a political linkage and cross-cutting alliance—by creating a 'collective will' in Gramscian terms—to represent the multitudes of demands in the form of a 'new' political bloc to reshape the given structure of power (see, Martin, 2009, 92–111; cf. Savirani & Törnquist, 2015).

The practices of Islamism are, in fact, also not immune from the social transformation brought about by neoliberal globalisation. Specifically, the mainstreaming of the dangers of Islamist articulations in politics, as strongly endorsed by neoliberal discourses and prescriptions, has gained

more traction as part of the post-Cold War global trend of the culturalisation of social conflicts. This has been more so in the aftermath of 9/11 (see, for example, Mamdani, 2002, 2004). Through the distinct discourse of multiculturalism and tolerance, for example, religious articulations are channelled through the non-political sphere of culture. At the same time, social conflicts are confined and depoliticised under tolerant-intolerant slogans. This strategy primarily aims at culturalising social conflicts, in which they are seen as mere moral and ethical problems of living in coexistence, rather than structural questions associated with social injustice and inequality issues (see, for instance, Brown, 2006; Sen, 2006; Zizek, 2008). It is not surprising that neoliberal ideology fits comfortably with the GWOT discourse in securitising and re-orienting the relationship between Islam and politics to produce a theology and subjectivity of anti-politics. Such a development also explains why multiculturalism projects were dominated by cultural and 'rule of law' approaches, yet disconnected from efforts to address the structures underpinning oppression.

As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the fragmentation of Islamic politics in the democratisation era is partially rooted in the different power relations between Islamists and the state during the New Order. This fragmentation has been even worse in the democratisation era. These developments have led to a failure by Islamists' to build a chain of equivalence representing their diverse demands under the banner of the *ummah*. Yet, the hegemonic failure of Islamism is constitutive to the workings of democracy, and this mainly relates to the following tendencies. Firstly, the vast discrepancies between diverse Islamist movements and the practices of representation in the political arena have resulted in the proliferation of Islamist groups claiming to represent the *ummah*. Secondly, with the absence of a relatively viable vehicle, the Islamists are increasingly vulnerable to pragmatism and are even instrumentalised and captured by competing elites in electoral politics. Thirdly, Islam has increasingly become a 'floating signifier' that can be appropriated and signified by various social groups with different purposes and interests.

The preceding discussion highlights the extent to which the depoliticising effects of neoliberal hegemony have transformed the practices of democracy and Islamism. It has been argued that post-New Order democratisation agendas have increasingly aligned with neoliberal discourses that fundamentally shape democracy and development practices, and which tend to eliminate the nature of the political. As such, democracy is often articulated as a mere electoral competition among

elites, followed by the negation of social conflicts and the strengthening of a technocratic governing model. In this situation, the election does not offer the possibility of choosing different political projects primarily because the political sphere—as a result of the negation of social conflicts—is then dominated by consensus and compromise.

Notwithstanding the different historical conditions of its emergence and development, Indonesia's democratisation in the last two decades fits quite comfortably with the category introduced by theorists like Chantal Mouffe and Jaques Rancière as the post-democracy situation. Focusing on European politics, both comprehend post-democracy as a situation associated with the hegemony of neoliberal globalisation over three decades, which have made possible the disarticulation of two fundamental pillars of democracy, that of equality and popular sovereignty. From this viewpoint, the disappearance of the political from current democratisation discourses in Indonesia creates a favourable terrain for an Islamist political discourse and its mobilisation for power struggles. Islam becomes the available praxis-ideology that provides Islamists with ways of interpreting the socio-economic dislocations and crisis experienced by the *ummah*, organising dissent and giving hope. Meanwhile, without a solid social base of representation, contending elites and political parties have no other strategies but politicising and mobilising communitarian-based identities as an instant route for electoral politics. Significantly, the confluence between Islamism and democracy practices, characterised by the crisis of political representation associated with neoliberal globalisation, has been influential in the current workings of democracy and Islamism in Indonesia.

The Making of the Electoral Ummah

While there have been no significant groups that have seriously attempted to overthrow the democratic regime in Indonesia in the post-New Order period, it does not necessarily mean that democracy effectively becomes 'the only game in town'—as propagated by the proponents of transitology (see Künkler & Stepan, 2013). On the contrary, what is happening is the merging of diverse political practices rearticulated through the democratisation discourse. In the post-New Order, democracy has become a master signifier, opening terrain for social groups to articulate and reconstitute their interests, identities and agencies. They often mobilise different available modalities (such as religion, culture or *adat*, region, and so

forth) to organise collective demands to improve their social positions in the new structures of power. Hence, there is always a confluence, or even clashes, between these different political practices. Political formations that emerged following Soeharto's fall such as bossism in local politics (e.g. Sidel, 2004), clientelism (e.g. Schulte-Nordholt & van Klinken, 2007), *adat* revivalism (e.g. Tyson, 2010) or Islamic politics (e.g. Abuza, 2007), are not necessarily a deviant or disorientation from democracy. Instead, these formations reveal a relative outcome of the confluence between diverse practices among social groups in appropriating the democratisation discourse to improve their positions to control state power and its resources. In a nutshell, the very forms of democracy are always contingent and contested.

Like other political forces, the Islamists have articulated Islam in the democratisation era to organise their collective demands under the banner of the *ummah*. There are multiple, often contradictory, Islamist articulations of democracy that prioritise different practices and orientations. As discussed in Chapter 5, these different articulations and strategies have also been influenced by the characters of their respective social bases and relations of powers. By looking at the confluence between the practices of democracy and Islamist articulations, it is evident that the prevalence of Islamist political discourse for power struggles in the democratisation era is neither a culmination of the *Islamisation of politics* nor merely the *politicisation of Islam* by contending elites or parties. Instead, this results from complex processes through which the forms of agency, identity, interests and relationships of the Islamists and competing elites are constituted.

The political formation that emerges from the confluence of democracy and the practices of Islamism is particularly shown in the construction of the electoral *ummah*. Specifically, it is defined here as a form of Islamist identification of the people developed in a democracy that is increasingly signified as mere electoral competitions among the elites and the failure of Islamists' hegemonic struggles. Crucially, the current rise of Islamist political discourse and its mobilisations for struggles over power are set against the backdrop of a post-democracy situation, as discussed above. Its emergence marks the dislocation of democratic politics that opens new terrain for the articulation of Islam in the political arena. Islam becomes the praxis-ideology to reorganise the interests, identities and demands articulated by constructing the *ummah* as a political imaginary of the people. In this sense, the construction of the *ummah* is a form of Islamist

articulations of democracy—by redefining the political agencies of the 'unrepresented' people. Nevertheless, such a political formation could be more democratic or otherwise, depending on how the *ummah* is articulated and the type of politics constructed through distinct configurations of contestation and coalition.

Two central conditions have influenced the emergence of the electoral *ummah* in contemporary Indonesia. Firstly, the dominance of economic rationalities which signified democracy as mere electoral competition. When democracy is perceived as being limited to selecting governmental officeholders, the elections become crucial for contending elites to compete over control state power and resources. With the dominance of depoliticisation ideologies and the absence of organised and representation-based movements, political struggles are then preoccupied with the mobilisation of identity politics. Such a mobilisation model becomes the primary way for contending elites and dominant social groups to win elections. Therefore, electoral politics is no more than a marketplace where elites, political parties and dominant social groups make short-term and pragmatist contracts for (re)developing patronage networks should they hold the state power.

Such relationships have significantly redefined the ways these political subjects behave. For example, both the elites and the people realise that the elections, especially the local election (*Pilkada*), are only a political 'ritual' to build or strengthen patronage networks.[6] Through the moment of elections, the subjects of 'patron' and 'client' are continuously redefined or maintained. In such a context, the elections become zero-sum competitions that determine the rise and fall of the structure of patronage networks among the competing groups. Often, intense contestation involves such murky practices as money politics, violent mobilisation and multicultural fragmentation (see Hadiz, 2010, Ch 5). A senior PKS politician, for example, summarises the challenges of electoral competition as follow:

> It is not easy to do political works (*kerja politik*) to build and strengthen the party's social bases. This is particularly the case in *Pilkada*, when we sometimes have to create a coalition with other parties not because we

[6] Discussion with Professor Mohtar Masoed, political scientist (Yogyakarta, 2 September 2016) and Frans Djalong, political sociologist (Yogyakarta, 15 September 2016) Universitas Gadjah Mada.

> have the same platforms or political agendas but simply because of the possible chance to win the election... Although *kerja politik* is necessary, we cannot rely on it exclusively because the elections become more competitive while *kerja politik* cannot be easily converted into electoral votes… Even the potential voters we have consolidated in certain areas can be easily destroyed by other parties with greater resources during the election periods.[7]

The second condition for the rise of the electoral *ummah* is associated with the fragmentation of Islamism. This relates particularly to the failure of the Islamists to establish chains of equivalence in the form of a cross-cutting alliance that represents the multitude demands of the *ummah* in the post-New Order era. Such fragmentation is constitutive of the practices of political representation among the Islamists, which are characterised by two trends. Firstly, practices of political representation are more deeply rooted in Islamist movements with broader social bases in civil society. In addition to their different historical conditions of emergence, the absence of Islamic forces capable of representing a wide array of demands among Muslims has prompted the proliferation of Islamic vehicles—including those that articulate violent means (cf. Hadiz, 2014a, 42–65). Therefore, the struggles for building collective agenda among the Islamists, as a new political bloc, will be increasingly challenging when the practices of Islamism in democratisation era tend to be divisive and fragmented.[8]

Secondly, the rapid increase of popular distrust of the existing representative system through political parties, including the Islamic ones. The scepticism towards Islamic parties stems not only from the fact that fellow Islamists see these parties as no different from 'the secular' ones—embroiled in corruption practices, internal frictions and incapable of offering alternative policies.[9] But the crisis of representation is also a consequence of the disappearance of the political, within which the current practices of democracy are primarily characterised by consensus

[7] Interview with a senior PKS politician (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

[8] For discussions on hegemonic struggles in the civil society arena, identity construction and democratic politics, see, for example, Martin (2009) and Mouffe (1992, 2006).

[9] Interview with Professor Mohtar Maso'ed (Yogyakarta, 2 September 2016), Professor Syafii Maarif, former Muhammadiyah chairman and Muslim intellectual (Yogyakarta, 25 September 2016).

and compromise on the one hand and the depoliticisation of 'the people' on the other. These two trends have paved the way for the growing disjuncture between the multitude of demands within the civil society arena and political parties tasked to represent them in the political arena. It has made it possible to articulate populist articulations under the banner of the *ummah,* constructed as an alternative mode of representing the people.

Furthermore, such circumstances have also influenced the distinct features of the electoral *ummah*, which are primarily anti-democratic. It is worth noting that these characteristics are more associated with the fragmentation of Islamism than stemming inherently from Islam. While the electoral *ummah* is a form of Islamists' identification of 'the people' in current democracy practices, it tends to be more divisive than uniting the diverse demands of social groups. In Indonesia, the frontiers in making this *ummah* are not drawn as a vertical battle between the *ummah* against the rapacious elites but mostly established in horizontal lines and for the limited purposes of the elections. Due to the fragmentation of Islamic politics, the contestations among Islamist groups in signifying the *ummah* identity have also prompted the escalation of the 'conservative turn' (cf. van Bruinessen, 2013). In such a competition, Islamist groups often claim themselves as being better holders of the 'truest Islam' and defending the interests of the *ummah* than others.

The *ummah* identities have also been constructed by excluding various forms of antagonistic others, often articulated in the sentiments of anti-communism, anti-Chinese, anti-Christianisation, anti-LGBT, anti-Shia and other minority groups. Crucially, such exclusionary and xenophobic practices are exacerbated when the *ummah* identities are mobilised for (re)building patronage networks through electoral politics. Therefore, the mobilisation of this distinct form of the *ummah* has very little chance to alter the existing structure of power that is seen as responsible for the continued marginalisation of the *ummah.* For example, although the Islamists are aware that neoliberalisation of development policies has resulted in acute inequality, organisations like HTI, PKS and KAMMI, which the government does not accommodate, often frame this issue narrowly as their resentments towards the current regime.[10] Therefore, their responses against the growing inequality and neoliberalism are

[10] Interview with Ismail Yusanto, HTI Spokesperson (Jakarta, 7 November 2016), Kartika Nur Rokhman, KAMMI national chairman (Jakarta, 16 December 2016).

then articulated in the rhetoric of *anti-asing* and *anti-aseng,*[11] which is characterised by xenophobic sentiments.

The fragmentation of Islamic politics also contributed to the pragmatic tendencies of the electoral *ummah*. For example, when asked about the form of alliance and the importance of parties to represent the *ummah* in the political arena, the leader of a popular *Majelis Dzikir* (Islamic congregation) in West Java states that:

> Building alliances with them [political parties] is only a method, not the essence. The parties are only a vessel.… These days, we cannot depend only on Islamic parties to represent us in politics. In fact, many of them are not struggling for *dakwah* and the *ummah*—yet they still use Islamic flags. In many cases, as you know, it is the secular parties that support shariah implementation.… I don't care if this is part of their political strategy. The baseline is this: we can collaborate with and support individuals or parties in the elections insofar as they give assurances to accommodate the ummah's interest, provide a role for ulama (religious leaders) and combat the enemies of Islam.[12]

Although the articulations of the *ummah* seem to provide the Islamists with a sense of resistance against what they see as the dominative power structure, they could not expand their struggles by linking themselves with the multitude of demands articulated by wider social groups. As such, the struggles in the name of the *ummah* are only directed at a short-term objective of winning the elections instead of broader socio-political change. In the context of the crisis of political representation, both the Islamists and the competing elites see the mobilisation of Islamist discourse as a shortcut strategy for developing patronage networks through the moment of elections. Therefore, Islamist groups

[11] The narrative of *anti-asing* and *anti-aseng* had been circulated since the 2014 Presidential election, especially among the Islamists outside Jokowi's coalition. The narrative is employed to frame the Jokowi administration as only serving the interests of foreign investors, especially the capital coming from China. Such a narrative has become more pronounced following Jokowi's infrastructure megaprojects which involved massive investment from China. By using media reports and the social media, the Islamists circulate and fabricate the influx of Chinese workers in infrastructure and mining projects, constructed as a proof that the regime has marginalised the positions of the *pribumi* and the *ummah* (*Kompas.com,* 8 August, 2018).

[12] Interview with Mahdi Assegaf, a leader of the Majelis *Syababul Kheir* (Bogor, 12 November 2016).

which were previously only on the fringe, now occupy a strategic position as an electoral machine.[13]

Through building an alliance with Islamist groups, the identities of the parties or contending candidates are modified, which are then promoted and 'sold' like a product brand to appeal to the market of Muslim voters. Therefore, the model of political representation conducted through the electoral *ummah,* to use Hanah Pitkin's typology of representation (1967), is not a substantial one. Rather, it is merely a descriptive and symbolic representation. Significantly, the agencies and subjectivities of the electoral *ummah* are constructed by 'temporarily' transforming the identities of the *ummah* into the electoral constituency. It is temporary because the creation and the politicisation of the *ummah* are narrowly projected in the moment of elections, not as a sustained 'democratic' movement that continuously struggles to reshape the unjust structures of power. Without a hegemonic agenda and solid social bases, the mobilisations of the electoral *ummah* can be easily instrumentalised and captured by contending elites (cf. Hadiz, 2017a).

The discussion in this section has shown the contingent and contested character of the workings of democracy by specifically giving greater attention to the practices of Islamism. It argues that the prevalence of Islamist political discourse and the mobilisation of the *ummah* do not mark a linear process of the Islamisation of politics. Rather, these phenomena have been made possible by the dislocation of democratic politics, characterised by the crisis of political representation. While the construction of the *ummah* is significantly a response of the Islamists to the crisis of the representative system, the struggles waged under this banner do not necessarily bring about more substantial changes. This is particularly revealed in the practices of the electoral *ummah*. Moreover, the mobilisation of Islam in electoral politics is also not a unidirectional form of the instrumentalisation of Islam by the contending elites. But, it is a constitutive process by which the interests, identities and relationships between the *ummah* and contending elites are also continuously reconstituted and modified throughout the formation and development of the electoral *ummah*.

[13] Interview with Dr Hidayat Nur Wahid, PKS senior politician and MPR deputy speaker (Jakarta, 15 December 2016).

Islamism and the Populist Moments: Representation and the Politics of Inequalities

The rise of populist politics and identity-based mobilisations can be understood as an expression of resistance against a post-democratic situation (see Mouffe, 2005a, 2018). These phenomena, taking place in both developed and developing countries, have marked the dislocation of democratic politics that opens a new terrain to launch new forms of struggle. For sure, the politicisation and mobilisation of the people can be conducted through various discourses and may take many forms of expression. Nevertheless, due to the relative absence of confrontations of political projects resulting from the depoliticisation of social conflicts, the discursive construction of the people in the current era is prominently filled by, in particular, religious articulations. By explicitly focusing on Islamism and democracy in Indonesia, this section discusses the emergence and contradictions of resistance waged by the Islamists through the populist articulations of the *ummah*.

Islamism and the Politics of Populism

Crucially, populist politics here should not necessarily be defined through with derogatory meanings, such as forms of political irrationality or indefinite loyalty to particular leaders (e.g. Coniff, 1999), or as essentially anti-democratic (cf. Mietzner, 2018). Populism is not just 'an ideology' or rhetoric that promotes the practice of politics as conflicts between the people versus the corrupt elites (e.g. Canovan, 1981; Mudde, 2004). Rather, the populist label can be attached to a variety of ideological concepts and movements, ranging from the rise of far-right parties in Europe (Lazaridis et al., 2016), progressive left political groupings like the Podemos in Spain (Iglesias, 2015; Errejón & Mouffe, 2016) and Syriza in Greece (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014; cf. Mudde, 2017), to those which utilise religious banners (Marzouki et al., 2016; Hadiz, 2016). It is also inadequate to conceive of populism as a type of political regime (e.g. Eatwell, 2017) because populist politics can be compatible with diverse institutional frameworks, whether democratic or otherwise.

In Political Discourse Theory (PDT), populist politics is understood as politico-discursive practices of constructing a political frontier by building chains of equivalence that divide the people from the establishment

(Laclau, 2005; Panizza, 2005, 2017; Stavrakakis, 2017).[14] Therefore, what is at stake is how the people are constructed and how the political frontiers in these processes are drawn. Populism emerges as a response to, and an attempt to signify, a given dislocated order. From this vantage point, linking the politico-discursive with distinct socio-political settings, in order to comprehend the relations between the construction of a popular subject and the nature of a dislocated political order, is crucial (cf. Hadiz, 2016; Barros, 2005; Panizza, 2005). Indeed, although constructing the people becomes the main task for every radical political struggle (Laclau, 2005), not all populist politics have egalitarian and democratic trajectories.

Like in many parts of the world, the current emergence of populist politics in Indonesia is set against the dislocations of neoliberal practices of development and democracy. As a hegemonic global paradigm for restructuring politics and society, neoliberalism has currently experienced a fundamental crisis associated with inequalities and the problems of representation. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the World Bank (2016) shows that the country experienced an unprecedented record of unequal wealth distribution between the wealthiest 10% and the rest of the population, where the four richest tycoons are wealthier than the poorest 100 million Indonesians (*The Guardian,* 23 February 2017). Yet, Indonesia is not unique because neoliberal practices of capitalist development across the world have generated an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth globally—albeit at a different scales and speed (e.g. Alvaredo et al., 2018; Hadiz, 2016).

But, the most pressing issue is that the depoliticisation effects of neoliberalism have made it impossible for the people to seek an alternative order and articulate the demands for equality and social justice through conventional democracy discourses.[15] These tensions have contributed to

[14] Laclau asserts that:

[W]e only have populism if there is a series of politico-discursive practices constructing a popular subject, and the precondition of the emergence of such a subject is, as we have seen, the building up of an internal frontier dividing the social spaces into two camps. But the logic of that division is dictated, as we know, by the creation of an equivalential chain between a series of social demands in which the equivalential moment prevails over the differential nature of the demands (2005, 43).

[15] Harvey, for example, shows that neoliberalism always bears internal contradictions and tensions between its articulations for maintaining a free market, individual rights and political legitimacy on the one hand and the depoliticisation of social conflicts and

the dislocations of neoliberal hegemony in democracy and development practices while also triggering the emergence of various struggles to challenge its political formation. Gonzales-Vicente and Carroll aptly describe the dislocation of neoliberal hegemony as follows:

> The combination of techno-logistical transformations in production and pro-market policy sets that facilitated the globalisation of capital, and which dealt a death blow to national development strategies, was met by elites with intensified efforts to dislocate politics from society through the process of 'depoliticisation' that in turn allowed for further marketising efforts. However, this dislocation has dovetailed with a formidable social crisis characterised by unprecedented levels of inequalities and vulnerability amid immense wealth, calling into question the elite consensus around neoliberalism. (2017, 991)

More specifically, the growing disparities experienced by the Muslim majority population like Indonesia have accentuated the sense of perpetual marginalisation. They perceive the *ummah* has continually been sidelined economically and politically from the era of colonialism to the secular nation-state formation until the current period of neoliberal globalisation (cf. Hadiz, 2014a, 2016). For the Islamists, the cultivation of such a sense of deprivation has persistently accompanied the emergence of various Islamist vehicles, including those that exercise violent means. Furthermore, neoliberal campaigns for domesticating Islamism in the presumed 'non-political' domain of culture, especially through multiculturalism discourses in the aftermath of 9/11, cannot prevent the Islamists from reconstructing and politicising the *ummah* as a response against the current dislocations associated with neoliberal globalisation and the crisis of political representation.

Against this backdrop, the anti-establishment narratives that frame the *ummah* as 'the marginalised majority in its own country'[16] find broad appeal among economically vulnerable Muslims, particularly the urban poor and precarious middle classes. This is particularly salient in the context of the unequal access and distribution of wealth, uncertain

the politics of inequality on the other (2005, 79-80). See also Steger and Roy (2010, 119-137), Duggan (2003).

[16] Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016), Dr Dwi Condro (Solo, 15 December 2016), Abu Ridho, senor PKS politician and the party's co-founder (Jakarta, 2 November 2016).

and precarious working conditions, and, more importantly, the absence of viable political vehicles to articulate their demands.[17] Depending primarily on their respective ideological visions and the characteristics of their social bases, the Islamists have adopted a wide variety of populist responses and struggles under the banner of the *ummah*.

For example, developed within the slum areas of Jakarta, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) has attracted local Muslim youths, generally unemployed and less educated. Its followers see the FPI can offer 'solidarity networks' and a sense of security and certainty in their daily life (see Wilson, 2015).[18] A more ambitious way of articulating demands for the *ummah* is arguably shown by the *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI). As a branch of the transnational Islamist movement, its purveyors politicise the *ummah* through the aspiration of a global caliphate, constituted as the 'solution' for the crisis of democracy and neoliberal capitalism (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009). Typically, HTI criticises Indonesian electoral democracy because it only strengthens the status quo and produces counterproductive legislation for the interests and positions of the *ummah*.[19] HTI also attacks the existing democratic system due to its failure to bring welfare and the people's sovereignty. For its proponents, the democratic system has only paved the way for the domination of politico-business alliances and resulted in continuous marginalisation of the *ummah*.[20]

Another central aspect of populist politics is the role of passion in the construction of the popular subject and its mobilisation (see Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2005a). In mobilising the *ummah*, the Islamists often frame their struggles as a political movement and *ibadah* (religious-motivated activities). They also cultivate the *ummah* identities through routine religious activities run by various *majelis* (Islamic congregations) in many urban centres. For example, many participants—those even coming from such islands as Sumatera and Kalimantan—joined the *Aksi Bela Islam* (Actions for Defending Islam) rallies in Jakarta. For them, the main motive was beyond the interests of the Jakarta gubernatorial election. But, they saw

[17] See, for example, *Al-Wai,* 20 August 2010; *Al-Wai,* 25 April 2014.

[18] FPI members, who are unemployed, stated that they joined the organisation because its networks provide them with jobs in informal economic sectors and prevent them from doing *maksiat* (vice) as they are regularly involved in *pengajian* (Islamic gatherings). Interview with FPI members (Jakarta, 15 November 2016).

[19] See, for example, *Al-Wai,* 25 April 2014; *Al-Wai,* 4 January 2008.

[20] See *Al-Wai,* 7 July 2014.

their participation as a religious duty; some even declared it as their *jihad* to defend Islam.[21] Therefore, the notion of *ibadah* that is integrated into the construction of *ummah* identities has played a central role in the mobilisation of some Islamist groups.

In fact, passion is always crucial, historically and theologically, in the relations between Islamist discourses and the construction of the *ummah*. In constructing the *ummah*, as Sayyid argues, Islamist discourse has not only functioned 'to unify a particular community with respect to this signifier, but it is also the name by which the Muslim community identifies and actualises itself' (1997, 44). For the Islamists, the *ummah* is a subject constituted for political struggles and hopes of their imagined political community. In a nutshell, the *ummah* is a political and theological vision of the Islamists.

Nevertheless, the manifestation of populist politics across the world varies greatly. Such differences are constituted according to the nature of dislocations, the constructions of popular subjects and their political struggles (see Mouffe, 2018; Panizza, 2005; cf. Gonzales-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). In Indonesia, the problems of representation brought about by democratisation projects have influenced Islamist populist politics. As discussed in Chapter 5, these problems can be summarised as follows. Firstly, while Islamist political discourse has increasingly become a praxis-ideology and an expression of resistance to neoliberal globalisation among Islamist groups, there is a growing disconnection between the multitude of Islamist movements and Islamic parties. The fact that Islamic parties are embroiled in corrupt practices and have no long-term Islamic agenda beyond electoral politics has contributed to the public's increasing distrust. Partly forced by electoral pressures, Islamic parties build a consensus and compromise. While often celebrated due to the inclusion-moderation process required for democratic consolidation (see Bubalo et al., 2008; Buehler, 2012; Tomsa, 2012), these developments have fundamentally distanced Islamic parties from Islamist groups, which see that their parties have no differences with the 'secular' ones.[22] Secondly, the failure of the Islamists to build chains of equivalence in the post-New Order era has contributed significantly to the

[21] Interview with S and M, participants of *Aksi Bela Islam* from West Sumatra and East Kalimantan (Jakarta, 4 November 2016).

[22] Interview with Abu Ridho (Jakarta, 2 November 2016). Ridho argues further that the transformation into an open party, as advocated by some groups within the PKS,

further fragmentation of Islamic movements in the civil society arena. This fragmentation has led to the proliferation of a wide array of Islamic vehicles and strategies, which ultimately characterise the formation of, as well as the contestations between social coalitions among the Islamists and beyond in current Indonesian politics.

Against this backdrop, rather than representing a long-term alliance and shared agenda, Islamist populist politics primarily manifests in constructing the *ummah* that is limited to the creation and sustaining of patronage networks. Its populist articulations are mostly reactionary in characters, cultivated through the accumulation of public distrust against the government's failure to address the problems of inequality and social injustice. Without being a hegemonic force, this populist form can be easily captured by contending elites for their purpose of struggles for power rather than becoming a political force to challenge the structure of domination that has produced social injustice and marginalised the *ummah*. As a paradigmatic case, these tendencies are best exemplified in the case of the 2017 Jakarta election.

Aksi Bela Islam and the Ahok Saga: Competing Forms of the Electoral Ummah

The prevalence of Islamist political discourse in power struggles through the formation of an electoral *ummah,* manifested itself vividly throughout the race for the 2017 Jakarta governorship. Considered as the most divisive and polarising local election in Indonesia's history (e.g. Hadiz, 2017a), a series of Islamist mobilisations under the banner of *Aksi Bela Islam,* or Actions for Defending Islam, was a turning point that saw a dramatic defeat of the incumbent and seemingly undefeatable governor—a Chinese-ethnic and a Christian—Basuki Tjahaja 'Ahok' Purnama. Installed as governor for a short tenure after his former running mate, Jokowi won the 2014 presidential election, and Ahok's technocratic-style leadership had, in fact, enjoyed high approval rates. This was especially the case among the urban middle classes who saw him as producing concrete and tangible results in urban planning and management during his period as governor (*Jakarta Globe,* 15 December 2016). As part of his uncompromising efforts to resolve endemic problems in the capital

would make the party lose its selling point. Instead of expanding the party's social base beyond Islamist groups, this transformation would upset its traditional constituents.

city, he pursued controversial policies, including aggressive campaigns of evictions and forced displacements. These policies brought about massive anger and a sense of marginalisation among the affected groups, especially urban poor communities and the Islamists at the grass-roots level.[23]

The relative absence of Islamic parties credibly voicing dissent and opposition through democratic institutions[24] made Islamist vehicles, especially the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), more appealing to the urban poor. Sense of injustice and marginalisation, as results of Ahok's development agenda, were mobilised as new political bloc against Ahok's technocratic developmentalism. In fact, the making of antagonistic relations between the Islamists and urban poor versus Ahok and his camps intensely involved xenophobic sentiments. This is particularly because of Ahok's strong connection with ethnic Chinese conglomerates for infrastructure and property projects, especially the widely reclamation project in North Jakarta (e.g. Wilson, 2016). The culmination of Ahok's political demise was when his fateful words about the Koranic verse Al-Maidah 51 (which concerns whether Muslims can support non-Muslim leaders) in a speech during his visit to Seribu Island of North Jakarta went viral on social media.[25] It was alleged that his statement was blasphemous against

[23] While there is no exact data for the evictions, the Jakarta Legal Aid Foundation (LBH-Jakarta) estimates that more than 16,000 poor and working-class families were affected by Ahok's policies. In contrast, only 30% of them have been offered alternative accommodation. Ahok's eviction policy magnified these resentments, especially when he continued the eviction process even after the Jakarta Court issued decision that favouring the people of Bukit Duri regarding their legal status to live in the area. Consequently, they and their advocates saw the eviction process as illegal (*Tirto.id*, 6 January 2017). See also Wilson (2016).

[24] For example, the PDIP that proclaimed itself as the party of *wong cilik* (little people), had decided to nominate Ahok for the 2017 Jakarta election. PDI-P had previously won the 2014 election in Jakarta. NU-linked parties of PKB and PPP, whose main constituency were urban poor and low-middle class Muslims, joined PDI-P coalition. However, their political rival also failed to offer a credible alternative for representing the marginalised Muslims and anti-Ahok movements. For example, Gerindra Party lost its legitimacy after the anti-corruption agency arrested M Sanusi (a member of the Jakarta provincial parliament) due to his involvement in the corruption scandal in Ahok's megaproject of North Jakarta reclamation. Meanwhile, PKS was experiencing internal friction after its new leadership sidelined other camps within the party.

[25] The Ahok case was triggered by the circulation of a controversial video of his speech on YouTube, claimed by some to have been edited. The uploader, Buni Yani, was also sentenced to 18 months in prison under the Electronic Information and Transaction Law for inciting religious or ethnic hatred (SARA). See Butt (2017). In fact, many survey polls

Islam, and his statement became a pretext for the FPI-led mobilisation and the construction of the anti-Ahok movement.

Utilising the *fatwa* of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI),[26] Islamist groups under an ad hoc grouping called the *Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI* (GNPF-MUI, National Movement to Safeguard the MUI's fatwa) held mass demonstrations against Ahok, demanding his removal from office and his imprisonment (Fealy, 2016).[27] Previously, a campaign called '*tolak pemimpin kafir*' (lit. reject infidel leaders—narrowly defined as non-Muslim) was launched by Islamist groups like HTI.[28] But, it was the discursive-framing of Ahok as a blasphemer (*penista agama*) that effectively constructed the anti-Ahok movement, becoming a nodal point for diverse resentments and demands. Not only had Islamist mobilisations paved the way for his defeat in the election, but they also influenced the court to slap him with a two-year prison sentence for committing blasphemy against Islam.[29] Despite the previous reputation of Anis Baswedan as a 'moderate' Islamic intellectual, the way he won the 2017 Jakarta election raised great concerns that Indonesian democracy was now overwhelmed by intolerant Islamists who were endangering Indonesia's plural society and global credentials as the host of moderate and democratic Muslims (*The Washington Post,* 9 May 2017).

Against the backdrop of Islamist mobilisation and exclusionary practices during the election and its aftermath, security-oriented approaches to Islamism regained currency to explain the relations between Islamism and

were confident about Ahok's electability, at least until January 2017, regardless of the *Aksi Bela Islam*. For example, *Lembaga Survei Indonesia* mentioned that his electability was 32. 6% compared to Anies Baswedan with only 21. 4% (*Kompas.com*. 17 January 2017), *Indikator Politik Indonesia* also stated the electability for both candidates were 38.2. and 23.8%, respectively (*Indonesiasatu.co,* 28 January 2017).

[26] While there are various interpretations of this verse, MUI issued a fatwa that Ahok had committed blasphemy against Koran, the *ulama* and Muslims. The fatwa was signed on 11 October 2016 by its chairman, Ma'ruf Amin.

[27] GNPF-MUI comprises several Islamist organisations, including FPI, HTI, many *Majelis Dzikir* and Salafi-modernist networks (IPAC 2018). The anti-Ahok rallies were held on 4 November (attended by 150,000-250,000) and 2 December 2016 (500,000-750,000 participants), making these events probably as the largest religious-based rallies in Indonesia. See, for example, Fealy (2016).

[28] Interview with Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016); Iffah Nur (Jakarta, 9 November 2016).

[29] For the discussion on legal aspects of this issue, see, for example, Butt (2017).

Indonesia's democratic consolidation. The proponents of this approach framed the electoral democracy as the battle between intolerant versus tolerant Islamism. For example, Andreas Harsono, a renowned Indonesian human rights activist, warned that the rise of Islamic extremism would threaten Indonesia's democracy and the rule of law. He stated that the Ahok case became a precedent that the Koran must not be interpreted by non-Muslims, which essentially would endanger freedom of expression. He further described Ahok's imprisonment as opening 'the door to fear and religious extremism' and paving the way to move Indonesia 'from a secular to an Islamic state' (*The Guardian*, 10 May 2017).

Beyond the lens of security approach, however, Wilson (2017) argues that Ahok's fall was mainly associated with socio-economic factors, particularly the culmination of antipathy and resentment among Jakarta's poor who were affected by his vision of urban renewal. Other scholars emphasise the role of religious identity, especially the belief that Ahok had insulted Islam, as the determining factor for Ahok's loss (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2017). By situating the Ahok case within 'the evolution and mechanics of broader oligarchic conflicts,' Hadiz (2017b, 266) contends that the Islamist mobilisations were not about the rise of Islamic radicalism. Rather, it was about the capacity of contending oligarchs to instrumentalise and exploit social divisions and people's frustrations through religious-political languages.

While recognising the importance of linking socio-economic conditions and identity politics, the hegemony analysis puts more emphasis on the importance of Islamist political discourse in constructing a different form of the *ummah,* culminating in the contestations between anti-Ahok and pro-Ahok movements. This is particularly salient following the blasphemy issue, which then reshaped the discursive battles in the elections, from 'technocratic populism' versus 'Islamic populism', to 'pluralist-tolerant Islamism' versus 'populist-intolerant Islamism' (*Majalah Tempo,* 17–23 April 2017). Beyond the apparent reassertion of the dichotomic categories of 'moderate' and 'radical' Islamism, it is shown here that Islam functioned as an empty signifier to which both pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok movements sought to articulate their electoral interests. Indeed, electoral politics transformed Ahok into a historical figure around which multiple narratives had constituted different electoral subjects, and shaping contestation and coalition during and after the election. Therefore, it is instructive to deconstruct the Ahok case by examining the dominant narratives and the ways different forms of interest, identity

and subjectivity of the contending forms of the electoral *ummah* are reorganised.

Significantly, there are four inter-related discursive narratives through which the Ahok case is signified and contested.[30] The first one is undoubtedly the blasphemy narrative. Instead of being a mere technical-legal problem, this narrative became a trojan horse for articulating other issues and demands among multiple groups. This narrative had made possible the mass mobilisations led by the Islamists within GNPF-MUI groups, culminating in the peaceful rally of *Aksi Bela Islam*. The fact that Ahok was well connected to President Jokowi and the parties behind him subsequently prompted the GNPF-MUI purveyors to see this alliance as the defender of the 'blasphemer,' and this drove them closer to the parties outside the national coalition (i.e. Gerindra, PKS, PAN, PBB).[31] Moreover, the magnitude of the mobilisations had also forced President Jokowi to seek counterbalancing forces, including approaching NU and Muhammadiyah in his bid to limit the GNPF-MUI influences (*Majalah Tempo,* 14–20 November 2016).

Although there was speculation that Jokowi's circle would protect Ahok from the blasphemy charges, Ahok could not avoid being found guilty in the face of the pressures from GNPF-MUI masses (see Fealy, 2016). In fact, the blasphemy issue did not end up in court. It had also brought about a severe polarisation at the grass-roots levels within the 'moderate' Islamic organisations, especially Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Not only had many of its members joined the rally, NU's position towards Ahok's case and its close relations with Jokowi put this organisation under severe criticism. In turn, due to its long traditions and credentials as an advocate of pluralism, NU cultivated pluralist Islam identities to negate other forms of Islam articulated by GNPF-MUI camps. As a result, there was a growing reconsolidation of Christian and other non-Muslim factions alongside NU and Jokowi's party coalition, constituting a pro-Ahok movement against the rest.

The second one is political economy narratives. One variant of this narrative is the elite capture thesis that explains the Ahok case as a

[30] This part is a result of an extensive discussion with Frans Djalong, Department of Sociology, Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta, 15 December 2017).

[31] PKS did not join the anti-Ahok rally from the beginning. Subsequently, PKS openly supported the movement and its leaders appeared on the stage during the *Aksi Bela Islam* rally.

symptom in which the mobilisation of identity politics by contending oligarchs became the 'salient feature of conflict over power and resources' (Hadiz, 2017a, 2017b, 262). This narrative is relatively dominant because both Ahok and Anies Baswedan camps were, in fact, well connected with Soeharto-nurtured contending elites, and there was a sense that the Jakarta race would determine the outcome of the 2019 presidential election. Another variant of the political economy narrative centred on the politics of the urban poor (e.g. Wilson, 2016, 2017). In this view, strong support from Jakarta's working class and urban poor in the anti-Ahok movement was an expression of resistance against his urban development policies. In other words, contrary to the elite capture thesis, the latter saw a popular dimension in the anti-Ahok movements.

The third narrative is organised around political identity issues, namely the racialisation of politics and the Islamisation of political leadership. Not only because of Ahok's background as a Chinese Indonesian, but also his collaboration with Chinese-ethnic tycoons in many urban development projects had sharpened the racialisation of Jakarta's politics (e.g. Sulaiman, 2017). This racialisation narrative had constituted contentious subjects between 'the Chinese,' perceived as dominating the Indonesian economy, and the marginalised *pribumi*. In the Jakarta election, this narrative merged with urban poor politics in which the rhetoric of 'victimisation of the Muslim majority' by 'non-native Chinese' became a rallying point for constituting the anti-Ahok movement. The GNPF-MUI masses also voiced the politicisation of the *pribumi* categories in their rally just before the election, which considerably raised concerns about the dangers of racial conflicts (*BBC Indonesia,* 31 March 2017). Controversially, the Governor-elect Anies Baswedan was seen as capitalising on such racial sentiment during his inauguration speech when he stated, '[i]n the past, we *pribumi* were the conquered. Now, it's time for us to be the hosts in our own land' (*The Jakarta Post,* 17 October 2017; *Reuters,* 17 October 2017).

Furthermore, the narrative of Islamisation of political leadership following the Ahok case had broader implications for issues of national integration. The rhetoric of 'rejecting the infidel leader' that was initiated by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI),[32] for example, had sharpened

[32] Yusanto claimed that HTI was the first group to denounce this slogan, shortly before the issue of blasphemy became a public debate. Interview, Ismail Yusanto (Jakarta, 7 November 2016); Iffah Nur, HTI senior activist (9 November 2016).

the tensions between the pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok movements. The anti-Ahok camps questioned the cultural legitimacy of non-Muslim leadership in the Muslim-majority province of Jakarta. Undoubtedly, this narrative had exacerbated the tensions between a 'tolerant' versus 'intolerant' opposition, by which the latter is considered as endangering the unity of the nation-state. For example, following the imprisonment of Ahok, there were mass rallies in non-Muslim-majority provinces, especially in Eastern Indonesia, supporting Ahok and articulating multicultural aspirations (*Kompas.com,* 10 May 2017).

The fourth narrative is associated with the rhetoric of the return of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This narrative was mobilised by the anti-Ahok camp and the military officers who continuously utilise anti-PKI sentiments, as their strategy to play a role in political affairs and build an alliance with anti-PKI Islamist groups. Having been framed as endangering Indonesia's unity, the anti-Ahok movement found anti-PKI narratives a counter-strategy to recalibrate their ultra-nationalist faces by building an alliance with some sections of the military. In fact, General Gatot Nurmatyo, the then military commander, frequently warned of the danger of a proxy war associated with geopolitical dynamics during the 2017 Jakarta election (*The Jakarta Post,* 22 December 2016, *The Economist,* 20 December 2016; *Tirto.id,* 27 September 2017). While the anti-Ahok camp often exaggerated the proxy war rhetoric by associating it with the rise of China—supposedly behind Ahok—in the region, the pro-Ahok camp was concerned with the ambition of the military to re-enter the political arena.[33]

Clearly, the competing forms of the electoral *ummah,* as manifested in the battles between the pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok movements, were constructed by various discourses with less attention given to how justice and equality could be articulated through a socially cross-cutting alliance. Through the four main narratives, in fact, the electoral politics had constituted the Ahok case as an empty signifier. As an empty signifier, the Ahok case were defined by conflicting groups with diverse interests and agenda which resulted in antagonistic electoral subjects: pro-Ahok versus anti-Ahok camps. With regards to Islamism, the Ahok case had

[33] Before the election, a report written by Alan Nairn (*The Intercept,* 29 April 2017) was circulated that exposed the planning of a coup (*makar*) by ambitious military officers. While the report was generally seen as less than reliable, it became a cause for public concern, especially in the pro-Ahok camp (*Asian Correspondent,* 22 April 2017).

significantly transformed the existing antagonistic relations between the moderate-tolerant and radical-intolerant Islamism, previously constructed through democracy and multiculturalism discourses, into electoral blocs. The introduction of popular religious movements, i.e. moderate-tolerant Islamism and radical-intolerant Islamism, for the elections took place in the context of the growing public distrust towards political parties. Therefore, their coalitions with the parties in the elections did not necessarily reflect shared ideological platforms and interests. But, they were primarily superficial and pragmatist in character.

These developments would substantially affect the workings of democracy and the practices of Islamism, at least for the following reasons. Firstly, the mobilisation of Islam for electoral purposes would strengthen the prominent role of Islamist political discourse in constructing a distinct form of the people. Of course, this trend indicates the poor performance of political parties in building their bases of political representation and offering distinct ideological platforms. Secondly, it is improbable that these forms of the electoral *ummah* would shape development agendas for the interests of the *ummah*. This is because the alliance on which it hinges is not the product of hegemonic struggles representing the multitude of demands and advancing a particular project for reshaping the existing power structure. Even if the anti-Ahok camp claims the anti-establishment mantle, they are, in fact, linked to other groups of oligarchs, including no less than the Soeharto family and an ethnic Chinese billionaire and media mogul, Hary Tanoesoedibjo (Hadiz, 2017a). Thirdly, the different forms of the electoral *ummah* had exercised Islamist political discourse for an exclusionary logic of doing politics. The ultimate difference between pro-Ahok and anti-Ahok movements was only in their strategies of articulating Islam. The former, also labelled as populist Islam,[34] exploited Islam for majority rule. Meanwhile, the latter, labelled as tolerant or pluralist Islam, articulated an Islamist discourse to celebrate cultural differences (*rahmatan lil-alamin*, Islam as the blessings for all) that neatly converged with the nationalist articulation of Pancasila-based *kebihinekaan* (plurality). But, they fiercely excluded the populist Islam group and labelled them as intolerant groups.

[34] The category of populist Islam here does not necessarily correspond to Laclau's category of populism (Laclau, 2005). But, it is a general term used by media pundits and the public to capture a phenomenon of the mobilisation of Islam for electoral politics.

Politicising Identity, Depoliticising Citizenship: Islamism and Democratic Challenges

In the aftermath of the Ahok saga, scholarly debates on the current state of democracy and Islamism in Indonesia have been dominated mainly by pessimistic views. For example, Lindsay (2018) argues that Indonesia is now retreating from democracy due to the growing expression of intolerance. From a political economy approach, Hadiz (2017b) portrays the democratic setbacks and the deepening illiberalism as the result of the mainstreaming of conservative Islamic morality and reactionary nationalism, which increasingly becomes the salient feature of the intra-oligarchic competition. Meanwhile, Mietzner (2018) explains democratic deconsolidation by looking at the ways Jokowi's administration—whose victory in the 2014 election was seen as saving Indonesia's democracy from an immediate take over by his 'hard-line populist' contender, Prabowo Subianto—deals with the challenges of populist politics. Using a combination of criminalisation strategies with politico-legal instruments and patronage-oriented accommodation policies, he argues that the regime's efforts 'to protect the democratic status quo from populist attacks turned into a threat to democracy itself' (2018, 261). In a rather different way, this section discusses the challenges of democracy in relation to the practices of Islamism by linking them to the absence of hegemonic forces and the continued depoliticisation of *demos*.

Dealing with the Islamists: Politicisation of Identities and Its Contradictions

In response to the socially divided society resulting from the Jakarta election, fears of the mobilisation of identity politics have been expressed by observers and Jokowi's circle, who seek to protect the president's political fate. In fact, many analysts (see Busch, 2017; Hadiz, 2017a) have asserted that Islamist mobilisations during the Jakarta election were a rehearsal for challenging Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election. Before the elections, Jokowi had navigated a situation to secure his fortune by disorganising socio-economic dissent articulated through Islamist discourses and politicising a 'new identity' organised around nationalist rhetoric. He offered a different kind of narrative to signify the current democratic dislocations and to mainstream the dangers of 'sectarian' and 'intolerant' Islamism for the unity of Indonesia's nation.

Nevertheless, responding to political polarisation by politicising another form of identity would only exacerbate antagonistic relations and thus postpone the making of inclusive and democratic citizenship. From the lens of hegemonic politics, the threat to democracy is not essentially coming from Islamism in itself but lies primarily in the actual practices of democracy that cannot constitute democratic subjects (*demos*). In so far as democracy practices are dominated by the struggle for state power and the hegemonic forces capable of representing cross-cutting demands and interests among the multitude of social groups are absent, the politicisation of identities and depoliticisation of citizenship will continue. These developments can easily lead to two anti-democratic situations: technocratic-authoritarian rule and communal-sectarian societies.

Since the early phase of anti-Ahok rallies, there had been speculation that the ultimate target of Islamist mobilisations was to undermine Jokowi and his allies, seen as the protector of a 'blasphemer' (e.g. Fealy, 2016). Such a view is quite understandable, given the anti-Ahok movement had built an alliance with the parties outside the national coalition which were eager to challenge Jokowi's presidency in the 2019 election. To undermine the Islamists, Jokowi's government had attempted to pre-empt mass mobilisation. The police detained several politically peripheral figures and accused them of planning a coup (*makar*) on the eve of the 2 December rally—albeit this was proven to be ineffective, if not counterproductive (*Majalah Tempo,* 12–18 December 2016).[35]

To deter the challenges from the Islamists, Jokowi attempted to politicise a new identity associated with the nationalism discourse. On many occasions and in public statements, he often re-emphasised the sanctity of the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI). He also introduced a new national holiday, Pancasila day, on 1 June (see Hadiz, 2017b, 269). In addition, he established a new institution called the Presidential Working Unit for the Implementation of the State Ideology of Pancasila (UKP-IP) in 2017, resembling the now-defunct New Order model of Pancasila mainstreaming (*The Jakarta Post,* 7 June 2017). In

[35] The police detained several figures such as Kivlan Zein (anti-communist retired general and closed to Rizieq Shihab), Sri Bintang Pamungkas (senior activist and lecturer), Ahmad Dhani (musician), Rachmawati Soekarno and other less known individuals like Hatta Taliwang, Firza Husain, Rijal Ijal and Alvin Indra. The police publicly accused these individuals of planning a coup by showing unconvincing evidence, including the money transfer they made for the 2 December rally ranging only from 3-300 million rupiahs (*Majalah Tempo,* 12–18 December 2016).

the following year, this institution was transformed into a more politically powerful body, *Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila* (BPIP, Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education). Megawati Soekarnoputri, the PDIP chairwoman, was appointed as its steering committee head.

In the post-New Order Indonesia, politicising nationalist discourses also meant providing a channel for the greater involvement of the military in politics. For some, this was seen as a strategy to counterbalance the military under politically ambitious commander General Gatot Nurmantyo who built strong ties with and was popular among anti-Ahok Islamists (*Reuters,* 9 January 2017; *Tirto.id,* 29 September 2017). Since the early New Order era, as discussed in Chapter 4, restructuring the relationships between the state, military and Islamism has always been conducted by politicising communist revival narratives—constructed as the 'big Other' in Zizekian terms. In a bid to increase his leverage before the conservative military and the Islamists, Jokowi ultimately raised anti-communist sentiments when he declared that he would 'crackdown on the communists' (*Tempo.co,* 3 June 2017). As such, he disappointed human rights activists who had previously supported and praised him for promising to comprehensively resolve the 1965 issues and other human rights violations.

Anti-Democratic Turn and the Impasse of Islamism

The efforts to disorganise the Islamists associated with the anti-Ahok camp continued and expanded as a means to consolidate Jokowi's power and to maintain his regime. Soon after the Jakarta election, for example, Jokowi and top government officials often claimed that democracy in Indonesia had 'gone too far' and left the door wide open to the extremists to mobilise Islamist sentiments (*The Jakarta Post,* 22 February 2017; *Kompas.com,* 22 February 2017). The BPIP chief, Yudian Wahyudi, subsequently declared that 'Pancasila's biggest enemy is religion,' which sparked public outcry, especially from some Islamist groups (*The Jakarta Post,* 12 February 2020). The newly appointed minister of religious affairs, Yaqut Qoumas of NU, also blatantly stated his primary mission was to diminish populist Islamists and prevent them from flourishing in Indonesia (*CNN Indonesia.com*, 28 December 2020).

As such, the efforts to 'othering' Islamism had become integral to the reconsolidation of power. Through the securitisation of Islamism, for example, Pancasila has been predominantly articulated by promoting

tolerance and inter-community harmony. The so-called populist Islamism camps are considered antagonistic to Pancasila, threatening multicultural societies and national unity. Therefore, if the GWOT discourse had once divided Islam between moderate and radical categories based on security and ideological parameters, the tolerance-based Pancasila discourse polarised Islam into populist and tolerant camps. Instead of depoliticising Islamism, the making of contending Islamist subjects had neatly converged with the reconsolidation of power by the current regime. In turn, this strategy has indeed politicised Islamism for the narrow purpose of the elections.

In the aftermath of the Jakarta election, the Jokowi regime decisively undermined the proponents of so-called populist Islamism. Not surprisingly, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the largest Islamist group in this camp, was severely affected. In 2017, the police investigated FPI leader Rizieq Shihab in relation to several accusations, including the infamous sex-related chatting scandals that saw him charged under the anti-pornography law that his organisation had previously heavily endorsed. When the case was made public in May 2017, Rizieq flew to Saudi Arabia and left FPI in limbo. However, it took several years for the Jokowi government to deal with Rizieq and the FPI. They realised that banning FPI before the 2019 presidential election was too risky as this decision could be instrumentalised to prove his 'anti-Islam' credentials (Hadiz, 2017b, 269).

Nevertheless, it is very likely that the regime also saw that Rizieq was beneficial for their upcoming electoral purposes. Such a decision was not surprising if one looks at the FPI's history and Rizieq's connection with General Wiranto, Jokowi's Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security. Wiranto was a former military commander during Soeharto's last years who worked closely with FPI and other militias in countering anti-government student demonstrations (Wilson, 2015). In fact, it was reported that Palace envoys, including the Chief of National Police, Head of the Intelligence Agency and PDIP politicians visited Rizieq in Saudi in mid-2018. While the meetings were never made public, a PDIP politician revealed that these were related to the 2019 election (*Kumparan,* 28 May 2018).

More defenceless than the FPI in the face of such political pressure is the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). After much speculation regarding the plan to clamp down on organisations deemed to be anti-Pancasila, the government ultimately enacted the Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu)

2/2017 in July (2017?), providing a new legal basis to ban mass organisations (*Ormas*) without judicial process (*The Jakarta Post,* 14 July 2017). Among dozens of anti-Pancasila organisations on the government list, HTI was, in fact, to become the only organisation that was banned by this new legal framework. Ismail Yusanto, an HTI national spokesperson, believed that the government's decision was inseparable from its position in the anti-Ahok movement. He stated that the anti-Pancasila label is only a strategy to discredit Islam, the same strategy once used by Soekarno in the late 1950s and Soeharto during the New Order era (*Kompas.com*, 8 May 2017; personal correspondence). Since HTI's primary bases are within university campuses, lecturers and students known to be its members were scrutinised and threatened with sackings or suspensions (*The Jakarta Post,* 9 June 2018; *BBC Indonesia*, 21 July 2017). Nevertheless, the banning of HTI was welcomed and supported by nationalists and the proponents of 'pluralist-tolerant' Islamists, especially NU. For quite a long time, the tensions between HTI and NU escalated not only because of their ideological differences but also the fact that the former had set its feet at NU's traditional strongholds (Hadiz, 2017b, 270).

Subsequently, Indonesia's political discourse of democracy has been increasingly dominated by the politicisation of the battles between the anti-Pancasila and anti-Islam identities, which are expected to define electoral constituencies. This trend was particularly salient before the 2018 simultaneous local elections (*Pilkada,* held on 27 June 2018)[36] and the 2019 presidential election. For example, in May 2018, the '#2109GantiPresiden' (2019 ChangeThePresident) movement, previously started from *WhatsApp* groups and social media, became a trending topic and was instrumentalised by candidates in the Pilkada to attract Muslim voters (*Detik.com,* 4 July 2018). More importantly, the politicisation of identities for electoral contestation led to the ascendancy of conservatism and sectarian politics in Indonesia's democracy discourses. For instance, a veteran politician and the founder of PAN, Amien Rais, stated that:

[36] Half of the country's 34 provinces held elections on this date, including the densely populated East, Central, and West Java, South Sulawesi, and North and South Sumatera. The *Pilkada* was also conducted in 115 regencies and 39 cities.

> At this moment, we need to mobilise all national forces to join in a grand coalition. Not only PAN, PKS, Gerinda but all groups that defend the religion of Islam, that is *Hizbullah* (God Parties). Against whom? To struggle against *Hizbusyaitan* (Parties of Satan). (*Tirto.id,* 17 April 2018)

The Islamists, who vaguely call themselves the 212 alumni, referring to those who participated in the *Aksi Bela Islam* rally of 2 December 2016, also actively influenced local elections. For example, FPI leader Rizieq Shihab called for his followers to support all candidates nominated by PKS, Gerindra and PAN—the parties that were outside of the Jokowi coalition. Moreover, several candidates visited and sought support from the FPI leader in Saudi Arabia (*Tempo.co.* 28 March 2018). Yet Rizieq's call never materialised among the Islamists in the local context. There are at least two crucial reasons why building an Islamic bloc for the *Pilkada* is almost impossible. Firstly, there was little correspondence between the patterns of coalitions at local and national levels. Due to pragmatic alliances, as discussed in Chapter 5, the party coalition in the *Pilkada* did not necessarily reflect the political configuration at national level. Secondly, the competing forms of the electoral *ummah* within the Islamist groups tended to build campaigns based on different individual candidates—not based on parties.

The failure of building an Islamic bloc in the elections was well demonstrated in the *Pilkada* in Bogor regency. With the largest number of voters in West Java province (3.3 million), Bogor regency became a highly competitive arena for district and provincial elections. Here, the party-coalition pattern in Bogor's election differed significantly from the national-level dynamics, where PKS and PAN built a coalition with Golkar and Nasdem (both are pro-Ahok parties) to nominate Ade Ruhandi-Ingrid Kansil as running mates against Ade Yasin-Iwan Setiawan who were supported by an alliance between Gerindra, PPP and PKB (*Pikiran Rakyat,* 4 January 2018). This polarisation expanded to the grassroots level and the organised Islamists when many 212 leading figures supported different electoral candidates. For example, Al-Khaththath's FUI (*Forum Umat Islam*) and his group took sides with non-party candidates (Ade Wardhana-Asep Ruhiyat), while Mahdi Assegaf's *Syababul*

Kheir gave political support to Ade Yasin-Iwan Setiawan (*SuaraIslam,* 2 March 2018).[37]

In efforts to pre-empt Islamist mobilisations in the *Pilkada*, the so-called Pancasila camps, in turn, also appropriate Islamist identities. For instance, the incumbent governor from PDI-P, Ganjar Pranowo, partnered with Taj Yasin, the son of Kyai Maimoen Zubair (a senior and respected *kyai* in Nahdlatul Ulama) for the *Pilkada* in Central Java province (*Kompas.com,* 9 January 2018). Meanwhile, Ridwan Kamil (nominated by PPP, PKB, Nasdem, Hanura parties) ran with a conservative Islamist figure and Tasikmalaya district head, Uu Ruhzanul Ulum, for the West Java provincial election. The latter was the grandson of Kyai Choer Affandi, a senior figure of the Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam in West Java (*Tempo.co,* 7 January 2018; cf. Solahudin, 2013). Typically, the proponents of this camp argued that such combinations were complementary—combining the 'nationalist' and 'Islam' identities. Indeed, this did not reflect that they had built cross-cutting representation among these social forces but had merely created symbolic branding. From the lens of hegemonic politics, these practices further promoted the disappearance of the political by imagining a reconciled society (cf. Duile & Bens, 2017).

The swinging pendulum towards Islam had prompted the Islamists associated with the anti-Ahok movement to stage a national gathering of Islamic scholars (*Itjima' Ulama*) in July 2018. They attempted to select presidential vice-presidential nominees under the banner of the *Koalisi Umat* (lit. the *ummah* coalition). They proposed Prabowo Subianto of Gerindra as the presidential candidate, paired with a non-politician and conservative preacher, Abdul Somad or Salim Segaf Al-Jufri (the top leader of PKS) (*Tirto.id,* 8 August 2018). However, after a long process of negotiations within the party coalition of Gerindra, PKS, PAN and

[37] Both groups mobilised their masses for anti-Ahok rallies, but they have different social bases in Islam. Al-Khaththath's groups are associated with more 'modernist' Islam (linked to ex-Masyumi and HTI), while Mahdi's groups are close to 'traditionalist' Islam (related to NU and FPI). During the election campaign, pamphlets were circulated containing a political contract between *Syababul Kheir* and Ade Yasin-Iwan Setiawan. The former put forward demands, including support for the implementation of sharia and anti-LGBT demands. Ultimately, these candidates won the election despite Ade Yasin being a sister of the former Bogor regent(district head), who was imprisoned in 2014 for corruption scandals.

later the Democrat Party, Prabowo Subianto ultimately ran with a businessman, Sandiaga Uno, who had recently been inaugurated as Jakarta's vice-governor (*The Jakarta Post,* 10 August 2018).

Meanwhile, there had been rumours that Jokowi would pick Mahfud MD, a former chairman of the Constitutional Court, as his vice-presidential nominee. Even though Mahfud was popular among Jokowi's supporters, the latter made a last-minute cancellation. After being pressured by his coalition parties and NU, he announced that Ma'ruf Amin, the 75-year-old MUI Chairman, would be his vice-presidential running mate. Ma'ruf Amin is considered to be an NU conservative *ulama* responsible for MUI's conservative *fatwa* against LGBT, Ahmadi and Shia communities. He was also responsible for issuing the *fatwa* stating that Ahok had blasphemed against Islam, which became a pretext for the *Aksi Bela Islam* (Fealy, 2016). Indeed, this decision disappointed many of Jokowi's supporters, especially the pro-Ahok advocates and human rights activists.

Subsequently, the political narratives of the election in public became overwhelmed by the struggle to determine which candidates were legitimately 'more Islamic' than others. Superficial debates (e.g. which candidates are more pious, better at reading Koran, etc.) dominated the public sphere, further polarising society and increasing conservatism. A senior PKS politician, Hidayat Nur Wahid, vaguely defended his candidates by declaring that Sandiaga Uno could be categorised as '*ulama*'—despite his lack of credentials in Islamic knowledge (*CNN Indonesia,* 17 September 2018). The incumbent was inclined to maintain the status quo and political compromise throughout the campaigns, while the contender mobilised sentiment of general dissatisfaction towards the government without offering a viable alternative.

As predicted, the 2019 presidential election was, again, characterised by polarisation among the Islamists. Jokowi—Ma'ruf defeated Prabowo—Sandiaga with a slight margin of 55.50 to 44.50%, respectively (*Kompas.com,* 21 May 2019). In the parliamentary election, the party coalition that supported the Jokowi-Ma'ruf partnership won the majority of seats in the parliament, with 349 out of 575 seats (*Katadata.com,* 25 October 2019). The future of so-called populist Islamists was then in limbo when the Jokowi regime appointed its previous rivals, Prabowo Subianto, a political patron of the Islamists and a former conservative military general—as the defence minister in October 2019. This was followed by the appointment of Sandiaga Uno as the minister of

tourism and creative economy a year later (*CNBC Indonesia.com,* 22 December 2020). Indeed, this manoeuvre altered the political configuration in parliament, securing a larger majority coalition with 427 out of 575 seats, leaving only PKS, PAN and the Democrat Party outside the Jokowi coalition.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit the country in early 2020, it had far-reaching impacts on the workings of Indonesian democracy and the practices of Islamism. During the pandemic time, the ascendancy of emergency logic had gifted the government discretionary powers and facilitated political-economic reconsolidation with little political control from the parliament or the public (Hakim et al., 2021). Under the banner of budget refocusing and reallocation, the government slashed the budgets for many ministries and governmental institutions, except the health and education ministries, in order to respond to the pandemic. However, when all governmental institutions were directed towards post-pandemic recovery, the budget of the Prabowo-led defence ministry increased by 13.28%—gaining the largest budget allocation of all ministries (*Tempo.co.,* 17 August 2021). Mega corruption scandals also marked the government's response to the pandemic. The Minister of Social Affairs and PDIP politician, Juliari Batubara, was arrested by the anti-corruption body over a bribery case related to social assistance (*bansos*) programs for the poor, enriching himself by more than one million US dollars. Through witness testimonies, the court revealed that the money was also disbursed to finance political consolidation for the 2020 local elections (*Kompas.com,* 24 August 2021; *Republika,* 14 June 2021).

Under cover of the pandemic, and in the name of accelerating economic recovery, the government and the parliament passed the Law on Job Creation (*Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja,* UU Ciptaker) in October 2020. Without adequate public consultation and debates, this new law sparked massive demonstrations among university students, workers and environmentalists in urban centres across the country, considered to be the largest mobilisations since the anti-authoritarian movements in 1998 (*The Jakarta Post,* 22 October 2020). For these activists, the Law was a reversal of development policies as it provides a figurative 'red carpet' for foreign investors at the expense of, for example, the interests of workers, farmers and the environment. Hence, the protesters opted to use the acronym of the Law as UU *Cilaka* (lit. disaster). Interestingly, the role of the Islamists in these nationwide protests, that the state had responded to with repression, was virtually absent.

Having consolidated political power in the parliament and gained public support from so-called moderate Islamists, the government disbanded the Islamic Defender Fronts (FPI) in December 2020—without significant resistance. Its leader, Rizieq Shihab, who had just returned home from Saudi Arabia a month earlier, was caught by the police and imprisoned. He was charged with failure to comply with COVID-19 health protocols when holding a mass gathering and disseminating a hoax regarding the results of his COVID-19 PCR (*Polymerase Chain Reaction*) test. The East Jakarta district court sentenced him to four years in prison, which was later reduced to two years by the Supreme Court (*Republika,* 15 November 2021). In fact, he became the only person to be charged and imprisoned in relation to COVID-19-related protocols in Indonesia. Hence, the notorious FPI, which had emerged from the fringes of Indonesian politics as a militia group in 1998 anti-*reformasi* mobilisations to become a major vehicle to represent the so-called populist Islamists, was effectively paralysed.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the prevalence of the Islamist political discourse and its mobilisations for power struggle in Indonesia. In fact, the overwhelming role of identity politics in contemporary democracy practices has increasingly become a general phenomenon, as reflected in the rise of populist politics across the globe. The chapter argues that this phenomenon is not essentially threatening democracy but it directly springs from broader dislocations associated with the hegemony of neoliberal globalisation. As a hegemonic discourse in constituting global order, neoliberalism has brought about the depoliticising effects for democracy and development practices, labelled as a so-called post-democratic condition. This is a circumstance signified by the disappearance of *the political* or the absence of vibrant contestation among diverse political projects and the oligharcisation of societies.

In Indonesia, the post-democracy condition primarily emerged out of the post-New Order democratisation that results in the depoliticisation of *demos* and the failure of hegemonic struggles, either from Islamists or secular-nationalists, capable of representing cross-cutting demands and advancing collective agendas in post-New Order Indonesia. With the absence of democratic forces and contending ideological platforms, Indonesian democracy has been increasingly signified as an elite-based

contest for controlling state power and resources. Democracy discourses are, therefore, limitedly articulated as struggle to win elections. Without grass root-based hegemonic forces and the failure of political parties in building their social bases of representation, contending elites and political parties tend to politicise and mobilise identity politics especially through Islamist political discourses as an instant strategy to garner electoral support. Often, the politicisation and mobilisation of Islam exacerbates the exclusionary practices along sectarian lines.

Nevertheless, the primacy of Islamist political discourse is not necessarily a manifestation of the Islamisation of politics, nor inherently a result of the 'intolerant Islamism' in taking over democracy. Neither is it merely the instrumentalisation of contending elites that utilise Islam for their interests. Instead, it is a result of the confluence of the actual practices of democracy and Islamism, which are constitutive for the reorganisation of the interests, identities and relationships among the Islamists and contending parties or elites. This also marks the contingent characteristics of democracy, in which its dynamics and trajectories are always contested rather than unfolding in some form of linear evolution. In Indonesia, the strange confluences of the practices of democracy and Islamism have manifested themselves in the so-called electoral *ummah,* exemplified in the polarised 2017 Jakarta election and its aftermath.

This chapter has revealed that countering the prominence of Islamist discourse by politicising other forms of identities organised around the political discourse of nationalism and pluralist Islamism is counterproductive. Such strategies only exacerbated the existing polarisation, especially among Muslims in the form of populist versus pluralist Islamists. Moreover, the strategy of politicising identities has only maintained the status quo in the Indonesian political sphere which is dominated by endless societal polarisation. Therefore, democratisation that is overwhelmed by such politicisation of identity and societal polarisation has had no impact on more substantive socio-political transformation. This was particularly salient after the 2019 presidential election and the pandemic period where political elites move to decisively consolidate their power while the social movements, including those from Islamic forces, were severely fragmented. From the lens of hegemony analysis, the ultimate challenge for democracy is not defending or deterring one form of identity over another. Rather, what is required to revitalise democracy is a political project that can transform antagonistic relations into a common struggle for emancipatory politics by creating a more inclusive unity.

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CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Despite a much-praised successful democratic transition in Muslim-majority societies, scholars have recently suggested that Indonesia is now experiencing a democratic setback and regression (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2018; Hadiz, 2017; Hefner, 2018; Lindsay, 2018). One of the major concerning issues is the mobilisation of Islam for power struggles that is accompanied by an increase in conservatism and intolerance. Contrary to the institutionalist thesis, the inclusion and participation of Islamist organisational vehicles in democratic processes have not resulted in the moderation of Islamic politics (cf. Bubalo et al., 2008; Buehler, 2012; Ufen, 2011). Instead, Islam has increasingly become a prominent discourse for power struggles in Indonesia's present-day democracy, articulated and mobilised by so-called Islamic parties and beyond. Amidst the global promotion of liberal democracy and multiculturalism, democratic practices have also been, rather ironically, overwhelmed by identity politics. As a result, instead of class or ideological platforms, identitarian categories have been a central category in defining and constituting political constituencies.

Following the core argument already put forward in this book, the central explanations on Islamic politics in current Indonesia are less associated with the intrinsic relationship between Islam and democracy or merely a consequence of either *Islamisation of politics* or *politicisation of*

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Islam. Instead, the dynamic of Islamism has unequivocally been conditioned within discourses that shape Indonesia's socio-political history from the colonial to the postcolonial era. By situating Islamism within broader socio-political changes, this book has shown that the nature and trajectories of Islamic politics are less rooted in a particular interpretation of religious contents, cultural norms or institutional imperatives. Rather, they are contingent on socio-political changes and political contestations involving multiple forces within and beyond Islamists throughout the historical periods.

The book begins with the postulation that Indonesia is a political construction whereby Islam has become a prominent discourse for defining and transforming the nation-state. In so doing, it examines Islamism as a hegemonic struggle in each discursive period that constitutes diverse Islamist articulations as they deal constantly with other political forces within the changing political configuration. Inspired by the tradition of Political Discourse Theory (PDT), the analysis of this book employs the concept of hegemony that has two intertwined functions (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Laclau, 1990, 1996, 2000; Sayyid, 1997). Firstly, hegemony, as the ontology of the social, comprehends social formation and transformation as ultimately a contingent result of endless political struggles. Secondly, it refers to the practices of building up a cross-cutting alliance, linking together the multitude of demands, by projecting a specific political project to challenge and reshape a given social order. Such an approach renders it possible for disclosing and debunking knowledge production on Islamic politics in Indonesia as contingent results of the interplay between national and global dynamics.

By emphasising the praxis of Islamism, the book has examined the social conditions and contradictions that make possible diverse articulations of demands and dissent through variety of Islamist projects. Such different projects, performed through rather distinguishable narratives, have been sociologically rooted in their specific social bases, driven by ideological traits and cultural encounters. Using the hegemony approach, the analysis of this book focuses on how their political projects, pursued by either collaboration or fierce contest, have contributed to the reinvention of their respective interests, identities and strategies. It is through articulating such projects, their identity and interests are constantly reinvented as they represent distinct political agencies. Equally, the approach explains the extent to which social and power relations have characterised

the practices of Islamism and Indonesian politics in historical conjunctures. In a nutshell, the book offers a narrative of socio-political history from the study of Islamism as a central discourse in the formation and transformation of Indonesia's nation-state.

Beyond Liberal Epistemology of Islamism

With a few exceptions (e.g. Hadiz, 2016; Hefner, 2000), contemporary studies on Islamic politics in Indonesia have conceived Islamism exclusively as a post-Soeharto phenomenon associated with the demise of the authoritarian regime. These studies have generally emerged and developed within two inter-connected discursive settings, the post-New Order democratisation and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The interplay of these two settings has characterised the contradictory nature of Islamism in Indonesia. While democratisation enables Islamists to play a more significant political role and becomes a leading vehicle to articulate popular demands, the global liberal order has been suspicious of Islam's role in politics. Within these trends, the securitisation of Islam as part of GWOT imperatives goes together with the depoliticisation agenda wherein Islamism is contained into cultural domain under strict ideological scrutiny.

Dominant studies on Islamism in Indonesia have generally resurfaced and been developed within liberal epistemology, prescribing Islamism as an object of securitisation and culturalisation. Following 9/11, therefore, Islamism studies have been dominated by security and ideology-oriented narratives, as Islamist projects performed by certain groups, are associated with both violent-terrorist acts and 'anti-secularism' interpretations of Islamic doctrine (Barton, 2004; Bubalo & Fealy, 2005; Fealy, 2004; ICG, 2002; Ramakrishna & Tan, 2003; van Bruinessen, 2002). Meanwhile, the debate on Islamism in democracy, particularly among proponents of cultural and institutional approaches, revolves around the dangers of the intrusion of religion in politics (see Abuza, 2007; Bubalo et al., 2008; Künkler & Stepan, 2013; Ufen, 2011). Driven by such epistemological underpinnings, Islamism is conceived as mere culture and ideology, wherein 'peaceful Islam' is promoted and propagated as a beacon of liberal democracy while 'the radical Islam' is treated as an emerging threat to democracy. Consequently, such debate often answers misleading questions as to whether Islam is compatible or incompatible with democracy

by employing proxy parameters of violence, intolerance and threat of state sovereignty.

In contrast to culturalist and ideological approaches, this book advocates an analysis that situates Islamism in specific historical conjunctures, shaped by dynamics of political economy and changing discursive formations. In doing so, our hegemony approach shares basic understanding on Islamism with the critical political economy approach (e.g. Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz & Robison, 2012). Our shared understanding lies in taking into account the structural dislocations and the changing social base in explaining diverse articulations of Islamism. Yet, our analysis does not depart from how such structural crisis and social change have shaped distinct forms of Islamism and their trajectories. Instead, the emphasis is on their hegemonic struggles or the practices of organising demands among diverse social groups under the banner of Islam to restructure power relations in both the state and society. By highlighting the logic of political contingency, as presented in Chapter 2, the hegemony approach conceives social formation and its transformation as results of constant political struggles. Within these processes, the contestation and coalition are continuously evolving and, in turn, characterising Indonesian politics and Islamism itself.

By envisaging Islamism as a hegemonic struggle, this study has also underscored the importance of the state. Here, the state is seen as the space and, at the same time, a contingent outcome of the political struggles (see, for example, Finlayson & Martin, 2006; Laclau, 1975). The nature of the state consequently depends to larger extent on diverse and contentious articulations of political forces seeking to hegemonise the state. In contrast to post-hegemony proponents who advocates the withdrawal from the state, our approach treats the state as a pivotal and strategic arena for hegemonic struggles out of which Islamist projects are made historically possible (cf. Mouffe, 2009, 230; Tormey, 2015). By stressing the interplay of Islamism and the state, the book unveils the ways different forms of Islamism contribute significantly to nation-state formation and transformation. In this light, it is understandable how Indonesia's state ideological foundation, Pancasila, has continuously been reinterpreted and national strategic issues are fiercely contested through Islamist hegemonic struggles and other diverse political projects.

The hegemony approach is particularly relevant as the analysis addresses three central components of Islamic articulations as a political project in Indonesia. Firstly, Islamist political discourse has become the

very element, along with communism and nationalism, in the making of Indonesia's political community from the periods of colonialism, nation-state formation to the present day. Hence, Islamism is deeply entrenched in political contestations with other two discourses to signify Pancasila as the foundation of Indonesia's nation-state.

Secondly, struggle for controlling state power has been strategic, determining the survival and expansion of Islamist projects. As discussed in Chapter 3, Islamist projects, its relative success and failure, are conditioned by the legacies of colonial and postcolonial capitalist development. Since the Independence, however, Islamist projects have failed to sustain its hegemonic articulations as it confronts with economic centralisation and solid domestic bourgeois class. As Robison (2009) and others (e.g. Booth, 2007; Lindblad & Post, 2009) argue, postcolonial capitalist development granted the importance of the state for resource and political accumulation. Islamists' failure to achieve better standing of the *ummah* in the formative period of nation-state building had often left a sense of economic marginalisation and political disempowerment. It is equally true in post-New Order era against which the Islamist keeps advancing its causes for control over state power and authority either through electoral politics or through even violent non-parliamentary means.

Thirdly, Islamist projects are conditioned by the interplay of national and global discourses in course of Indonesia's socio-political history. The Islamist's projects, reflected in its articulations of identities, interests and strategies, have been greatly influenced and shaped by global discourses which prescribe the way how state should be governed and its relations with society are organised (e.g. Duffield, 2001; Hadiz, 2006; Hameiri, 2010). For example, the hegemony of New Order developmentalism, as detailed in Chapter 4, is understood as a mode of governing conditioned by the Cold War dynamics and dominant discourse of economic modernisation. Developmentalism discourse has resulted in the depoliticisation of society, treated as presumed requirements for the uninterrupted workings of national economic development and smooth integration into global markets. The current debate on Islamism and multiculturalism is also the case to illustrate the persistent merging of national and global discourse. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the debate has also been fashioned and promulgated by the dominant discourse of neoliberal democracy within the GWOT framework. Here, Islamism is disciplined and reoriented to be functional, as mere cultural talks, for the supposedly unchallenged liberal global order. Emphasising national-global discursive nexus in the

making of Islamist projects is central to unmask specific 'regime of truth' in different historical settings (cf. Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1991; Larner & Walters, 2004).

Islamism and Indonesia's Nation-State: Three Discursive Formations

It has been argued that Islamism is integral, and thus constitutive, to Indonesia's nation-state formation and transformation. As explained throughout the book, Islamism has contributed to various discursive formations of the nation-state within national-global dynamics. The arguments and analysis developed in this book have been mainly directed towards comprehending contemporary Islamism by genealogically looking at the changing relations between Islamism and the state in Indonesia's political history. In doing so, the analysis in this book identified three central discursive formations that have conditioned and transformed such relationships. These are, respectively, anti-colonialism and early nation-state building (the 1900s–1965), modernisation and developmentalism (1965–1998) and democracy (1998–present).

As shown in Chapter 3, broader socio-political changes in the late nineteenth century resulted in the rapid construction of anti-colonial subjects and movements. Such anti-colonial forces were organised around three central discourses: Islamism, communism and nationalism. As argued by such scholars as Anderson (1983; cf. Bhaba, 1994), the antagonistic relations between these anti-colonial subjects and the colonial power were also constitutive for cultivating consciousness and solidarity for a new collective identity and imaginary: Indonesia. Yet, the hegemonic link constructed under the banner of anti-colonialism did not necessarily transformed the internal tensions and contradictions among the particularities of its elements. As early as the 1930s, the hegemony of nationalism in anti-colonial movements had instead resulted in two contentious subjects that subsequently characterised the debates on Indonesia's nation-state formation, the Islamic-nationalists versus secular-nationalists. As it had occurred in many other postcolonial Muslim-majority countries, decolonisation projects opened a new terrain for competing articulations that sought to 'define' this newly formed nation-state (cf. Mandaville, 2001; Sayyid, 2014). The issue at stake was whether the postcolonial state should be organised around the signifier of the '*ummah*' or '*bangsa*' (nation).

In stark contrast to Malaysia's experience of accommodating Islam in its state formation period,[1] the nationalism discourse had relatively sidelined Islam in postcolonial Indonesia. Yet, unlike Turkey's Kemalism project,[2] the making of a new nation in Indonesia was not undertaken by a systematic disarticulation of Islam and constructing it as the 'antagonistic other.' When Indonesia ultimately adopted Pancasila as its ideological foundation in 1945, it was seen as a political consensus for accommodating differences. Within this framework, Islamism was only a particular element. Accordingly, political history of postcolonial Indonesia was about maintaining the hegemonic order for the unity of a nation-state based on Pancasila by politically managing its diverse elements and dealing with its antagonisms. The manner in which the regime managed these particularities and antagonisms during this era significantly transformed the state and society relations.

In the early nation-state building projects, Islam could not be smoothly accommodated into state power but through political contestations in the framework of Parliamentary Democracy (1949–1957). The contestations for controlling state power did not only vigorously revive old rifts between Islamism, communism and nationalism. It also disclosed diverse forms of Islamism with different social bases and political articulations. The practices of representative politics and the consolidation of power which were primarily Java centric resulted in regionalist insurgencies in the outer islands. The forms of these insurgencies were often merging with religious and ethnic markers. Regardless of their initial demands for equality and justice, the central government saw these movements as new antagonisms that endangered Indonesia's nation-state's unity.

Soekarno's move to the so-called Guided Democracy (1957–1965) was a turning point in managing antagonisms and political differences for the nation-state building projects. Gaining support from the military, he terminated the Parliamentary Democracy, a system that provided him with limited power. He discredited and undermined the representative-interest politics, which were seen as the source of political instability and disintegration. In turn, he promoted a corporatist governing model by

[1] For discussions on Islam and the making of Malaysia's nation-state, see for example Liow (2009) and Noor (2014). For a comparative view of Islam and nation-state building in Southeast Asian countries, see Hamayotsu (2002, 353–375) and Liow (2016).

[2] See, for example, Uzak (2010) and Cagaptay (2006) for the historical account of the relations between Kemalism, Islam and nationalism in Turkey's nation-state building.

picking up the forces of nationalism, Islamism and communism as his new power base. Under the banner of NASAKOM (nationalism, religion and communism) corporatism, Soekarno sought to manage political differences and antagonism without the process of elections. However, internal competition among its elements, especially between the Islamists, communists and the army, became increasingly uncontrollable, leading to a political catastrophe that cumulated in the 1965/1966 massacre. Circumscribed in the Cold War global politics and Guided Democracy's social conflicts, the army-Islamists alliance was at the forefront for purging the communists and initiating a regime change. Out of such a complex crisis, the so-called New Order emerged and presented itself as an antithesis to Soekarno's political order.

Throughout the New Order period, the relations between Islamism and the state were not monolithic but had continuously altered depending, for instance, regime's accommodation and exclusion. Once a central element in the anti-communist coalition in the New Order's formative period, the new regime subsequently forced out some forms of Islamism, such as Masyumi and later NU, as response to their pursuit of different strategies of power consolidation. Heavily influenced by the dominant policy paradigm of modernisation that linked economic growth and state-planned development to political stability, developmentalism discourse became new governing rationality of the New Order to restructure state-society relations. Its ultimate objective was to create a condition to accelerate development agenda, by imposing a technocratic model and backed up by militarism (cf. Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003; Dhakidae, 2003; Moertopo, 1972).

The hegemony of the New Order developmentalism, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, was achieved by constituting Pancasila democracy as a new master signifier. It became a terrain for the diverse articulations of demands for welfare, political stability and social harmony. These three signifiers were seen as the central elements to reverse the discredited Old Order. Specifically, the developmentalist articulations of Pancasila promoted a technocratic regime by disorganising representative-based politics and differences. Therefore, Islamism was depoliticised and domesticated in the domain of culture, whose agencies were reoriented to promote the appeal of development agenda. By introducing an anti-politics framework, as vividly seen in the anti-SARA (*Ethnic, Religion, Race and Inter-group*) policies, the New Order sought to sterilise the political arena from the articulations of identity politics. Rather than

depoliticising Islamism, New Order developmentalism had politicised it by prescribing new subjectivities and agencies required to sustain its hegemony.

The resistance against the New Order hegemony began in the 1980s, including those organised through more assertive Islamic articulations. Following the end of the oil-boom era, the economic crisis and the subsequent liberalisation policies disrupted the hegemony of New Order developmentalism (Hadiz, 2016; McVey, 1983; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). The Islamists perceived that developmentalism discourse had deprived the *ummah* and, in turn, benefited Christian and Chinese-ethnic tycoons, Soeharto's business partners. From this period, Islamists' resistance against the New Order was often expressed through xenophobic sentiments. Hence, the *pribumi* (the native) identity had been increasingly constituted as referring to Muslims, by which the ethnic Chinese was constructed as its antagonism.

Nevertheless, such resistance could not be converted into a hegemonic force to challenge the New Order under the banner of Islam. One of the reasons is that, due to the regime's strategies of accommodation and exclusion, the Islamists had different subject positions and power relations within the New Order's structure of power. Especially after introducing the doctrine of Pancasila as the *asas tunggal* (sole ideological foundation), which forced all political entities to adhere to Pancasila as their only ideological platform, Islamism in this era was manifested in three different forms, namely, the accommodationist, the confrontationist and 'social movement.' While showing their different subject positions and power relations, their diverse articulations of Islam had also constituted different identities and strategies to cope with the New Order developmentalism.

From the very outset, modernist Islamists that had been accommodated and become a key pillar to the New Order became the main supporter of the *asas tunggal* doctrine. Rather surprisingly, traditionalist Islamists of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had also decided to finally accept this doctrine. Being excluded by the New Order regime and seen as its adversaries since the late 1960s, such a move can be seen as NU's bid to improve its bargaining position and terminate its political marginalisation. Meanwhile, confrontationist Islamists were generally made up of the Islamist groups associated with the off-shoots of the Darul Islam (DI) and the reminiscent of conservative Islamists associated with Masyumi. Some elements of this group even took violence as its political strategy. While essentially rejecting the *asas tunggal*, the 'social

movement' Islamists took non-confrontation strategies but focused on building their new social base. Unlike the modernist and NU Islamists, the purveyors of 'social movement' Islamism primarily comprised of young educated Muslims who drew inspiration from the global Islamic movements. They revived the idea of *sumuliyatul Islam* (Islam as religion and political ideology) and, thus, promoted the agendas of Islamisation of the state and society. Crucially, these different articulations of Islam significantly shaped the contestations and coalitions in the later period of the New Order.

Prompted by internal rivalries, the New Order regime attempted to balance political forces by courting the urban Muslim middle-class and modernist Islamists under the Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI).[3] Instead of bringing all the Islamists behind the New Order coalition, this strategy led to further polarisation, which ultimately contributed to the crisis of the New Order hegemony (cf. Dhakidae, 2003; Latif, 2008). For example, it triggered NU to articulate different forms of Islamism based on signifiers of cultural diversity to increase its bargaining position with the regime. NU also built an alliance with other forces, notably nationalists, Christians, human rights activists and military groups that were sidelined by Soeharto and concerned with ICMI's sectarian tendencies. Ultimately, such polarisation resulted in a severe internal fracture in the New Order regime, culminating in its organic crisis following the 1997 Asian economic crisis and Soeharto's resignation. While the social bases of opposition groups against New Order authoritarianism expanded rapidly, democracy discourse could not facilitate the creation of a chain of equivalence among these pro-democracy groups to direct the *Reformasi* agenda in the post-New Order.

After Soeharto's fall and following the global promotion of liberal democracy in the post-Cold War era, democratisation discourse became a master signifier, a terrain for diverse demands, for transforming Indonesia from authoritarianism to democracy. Crucially, such transformation was undertaken in three main areas, namely, political liberalisation, decentralisation and multiculturalism projects. As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, the trajectory of democracy is less determined by new institutions and mechanisms, and it does not necessarily follow a linear path of democratic

[3] For discussions on Islamic politics, ICMI and political dynamics in the late years of the New Order, see, for example, Liddle (1996), Hefner (1993, 2000), Raillon (1993) Schwarz (2000), Ramage (1995) and Porter (2002).

transition and consolidation. Instead, it is contingent on complex contestation and coalition among social groups who articulate democracy to reorganise their demands, interests and identities. Hence, the competing articulations of democratisation, especially between those that signify it as an elite-driven process and as the 'will of the people,' have brought complexities that ultimately characterised post-New Order Indonesia.

It is noteworthy that the GWOT and liberal democracy promotion have greatly influenced the dynamics of Islamism and its political struggles in the post-Soeharto era. Within such convergencies, democratisation discourse has elicited different and even contradictory Islamist articulations and agencies. While political liberalisation and decentralisation have provided Islamists with a more significant role in the state and society by establishing political parties and social organisations, they failed to build a vehicle capable of representing a sociologically diverse *ummah*. Furthermore, the dominant articulations of multiculturalism projects in the post-Soeharto era have even contained Islamism as a cultural category. Developed through such categories as radical-intolerant and moderate-tolerant Islam, the democratic moment disclosed by the authoritarian regime's fall, had only been followed by the securitisation and culturalisation of Islamism.

From the other direction, the failure of Islamists to build a hegemonic project in the political arena had prompted the rapid emergence of Islamist vehicles, claiming to represent the *ummah* with diverse strategies, including those which employed violent means. With a relatively weak and fragmented social base, Islamic parties have tended to build the so-called consensus of the centre. Instead of offering an alternative order or policies, they sought political compromise with the old elites. As a result, the political sphere has subsequently been overwhelmed by imagining a 'reconciled' society under the nationalist religious banner. Hence, the hegemonic sphere signified by a clear separation between the forces of reformers and the status quo that once characterised the post-Soeharto era had utterly disappeared.

Such consensus and compromise have significantly erased the fundamental differences between the political parties, especially the Islamic and 'secular' ones. Worse, the failure of the Islamists in building a hegemonic project had constituted Islam as a floating signifier, by which any political forces could appropriate it with different interests and agendas. Such tendencies are particularly salient in sharia-by-laws (*perda shariah*) politics, adopted by many local governments in the decentralisation era.

Contrary to liberal approaches to Islamism, *shariah* politics is not necessarily associated with the Islamists' increased role in *Islamising* local politics. Instead, it becomes a new avenue for contending elites to control the state power by building an alliance with dominant social groups. In fact, the leading advocates of *shariah*-oriented politics at the district and provincial levels are not primarily coming from Islamic parties (e.g. Buehler, 2016; Bush, 2008). Rather than uniting Islamism, *shariah* politics has significantly divided if not exacerbated the existing antagonism within Islamist groups. Indeed, the *shariah* issue is more a symptom of Islamist hegemonic failure than an indicator of its strength or coherence.

Implications

The findings and arguments presented thus far have brought about further theoretical and political implications. The book has explained how the hegemonic struggles of Islamism have shaped the configuration of power in Indonesia's nation-state formation and transformation. Applying Political Discourse Theory (PDT) as its analytical framework, the book offers a non-essentialist reading of the relations between Islam and politics and, by extension, Islam and democracy. It emphasises the constitutive nature of how Islamism transforms and being shaped by the contestations and power relations throughout its struggles in Indonesia's political history. Such a position differs significantly from the theoretical construction of Islamism found in the *Islamisation of politics* thesis as propagated by cultural and ideological-oriented approach or the *politicisation of Islam* thesis generally advocated by the proponents of political economy approach.

Crucially, the dynamic relation between Islamism and the state in the present time has been conditioned by the merging global context of neoliberal imperatives and GWOT legacies. The former decisively promotes the depoliticisation of democracy and development practices by favouring a technocratic governing logic. As such, it tends to dissociate politics from society and erase the political dimension of democracy (Brown, 2015; Mouffe, 2018). As a result, democratic politics has been increasingly overwhelmed by elite compromise and pragmatism, instead of facilitating diverse political forces to continuously offer different political platforms and policy choices. Regarding Islamism, such neoliberal-driven depoliticisation fits comfortably with the GWOT's campaign for securitising and culturalising Islam. Operating through the neoliberal

discourse of multiculturalism and tolerance, political agency of Islamism is confined into cultural categories in the antagonistic forms of moderate and radical Islamism (cf. Brown, 2006; Mamdani, 2004; Sen, 2006). These tendencies have altered the structures of social conflicts for radical changes, from class and interests-based articulations to merely a politicisation of identities for electoral mobilisation. Scholars (cf. Mouffe, 2018; Rancière, 1999) aptly portray these phenomena as a post-democracy situation, characterised mainly by the oligarchisation of societies and the disappearance of the political in democracy practices.

Nevertheless, the containment of Islamism in the cultural domain cannot prevent the Islamists from politicising it when neoliberal development brings about inequality and further marginalisation (cf. Gonzales-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). This is especially the case when Islamists found no representative channels to articulate their dissent and demands. This condition results in a populist moment in which identity politics has increasingly become a new strategy in reclaiming the dimension of people sovereignty that is persistently neglected within neoliberal democracy. Such a neglect has increasingly globalised and normalised in developed and developing countries, with differing degree and manifestation. This populist articulation has indeed become a response to the current crisis of neoliberal hegemony (Mouffe, 2005, 2018). Therefore, the advent of the so-called Islamic populism, as a form of the construction of 'the people' based on Islamist political discourse, in current Indonesia is not antithetical but springs precisely from the actual practices of democracy. In other words, the prevalence of Islamist political discourse and mobilisation mark the dislocation of democratic politics in the neoliberal era, characterised by the dysfunction of political representation.

While the construction of the *ummah* is indeed a response of Islamists to the problems of representation, their political struggles do not necessarily bring about substantial change. Mainly due to the fragmented nature of Islamism, the Islamists' populist practices, at least until this moment, cannot be transformed into a cross-cutting alliance for representing the diverse demands of the *ummah*. To comprehend this trend, the book utilises the 2017 Jakarta election and its aftermath as a case study. By analysing this cases, it is evident that the construction of *ummah* subject is only directed at winning electoral politics and maintaining patronage networks with the contending elites, a phenomenon called by this study the electoral *ummah*. Consequently, such a fragmented populist politics can be easily captured by competing elites in their power contests

rather than becoming a political force that challenges the existing structure of domination that, in the eyes of the Islamists, has marginalised the *ummah*.

Therefore, the book's theoretical standpoint opens up the possibilities, if not challenges, for the reinvention of democracy and Islamic politics in present-day Indonesia. By discarding the perspectives built on the premise of inherent relationship between Islam and democracy, this study allows investigation into the conditions of possibilities for the mobilisation of Islam for power struggles. This is particularly relevant against the backdrop of the neoliberal-driven culturalisation of politics. It is more often than not that conceiving Islamism and democracy in terms of a battle between tolerant and intolerant forces has obscured that such differences are conditioned by a distinct power structure that produces inequality and social injustice. Understandably, neoliberal-led multiculturalism projects prioritise the politics of recognition by politicising identities but disconnect them with the politics of redistribution (cf. Brown, 2015). Hence, essentialising Islam and democracy relations through binary categories has reasserted the clash of civilisation narratives and effectively constituted Islam as a distinct subject that is functional for the reproduction of neoliberal hegemony.

With this in mind, countering the practices of Islamic populism, often seen as intolerant and anti-democratic, by further politicising other identities organised around the hyper-nationalism and pluralist Islam rhetoric is also counterproductive. Such strategy would only exacerbate the existing antagonistic relations among the Islamists, leading to a further 'conservative turn' that claims to represent the 'truest' Islam. From the lens of hegemony analysis, it has been argued that the ultimate challenge of contemporary democracy in Indonesia is to transform such antagonistic relations into a common struggle for emancipatory politics by creating inclusive and democratic citizenship or *demos* (cf. Little, 2002; Mouffe, 1992).

As early as the 1930s, in his short manifesto-like book entitled *Imagining a Free Indonesia,* Soekarno had imagined Independence from the colonial power as a 'golden bridge' (*jembatan emas*). He described anti-colonial movements as a product of the politicisation and mobilisation of diverse identities in their struggles for decolonisation (Soekarno, 1964, 257–324). By imagining a *jembatan emas*, it was expected that the competing forces and diverse identities within anti-colonial movements

would be transformed into a common political bloc for a more prosperous and just society in postcolonial Indonesia. Indeed, Soekarno's political project is still relevant today, if not more urgent than ever. More than seven decades after the Independence, Indonesian politics remains predominantly characterised by the mobilisation of identities for contests over state power, oligharcisation of politics and continued depoliticisation of citizenship.

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Glossaries

AKKBB: National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith; *Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan*

AKP: Justice and Development Party, in Turkey

***Aksi Sepihak*:** Unilateral Action, PKI's strategies to foster agrarian reform in the early 1960s

AMD: Military Enters Villages; *ABRI Masuk Desa,* New Order's policies of surveillance and control over population in the early 1980s

BAMUSI: House of Indonesian Muslims; *Baitul Muslimin Indonesia,* Islamic wing of the PDIP, founded in 2007

***Bansos*:** Social Assistance Programs; *Bantuan Sosial*

BKS: Cooperation Bodies; *Badan Kerja Sama,* a functional group under the army's control to challenge Soekarno-PKI alliance in the late 1950s

BKUI: Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community; *Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam*

BMK: Campus Mosque Religious Supervision; *Bina Masjid Kampus,* linked to the DDII

BPIP: Agency for Pancasila Ideology Education; *Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila*

BPUPKI: Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence; *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*

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BTI: Indonesian Peasant Front; *Barisan Tani Indonesia,* linked to the PKI

CIDES: Center for Information and Development Studies, a think-tank linked to the ICMI

COVID-19: Coronavirus Disease of 2019

CSI: Sarekat Islam Central/Headquarters; *Centraal Sarekat Islam*

CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank established in 1971

DDII: Indonesian Council for the Islamic Predication; *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, established in 1967 and led by Mohammad Natsir

DI/NII: Abode of Islam/Islamic State of Indonesia; *Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia,* declared by Kartosuwiryo in West Java on 7 August 1949 then expanded to such areas as Aceh of Northern Sumatra and South Sulawesi

EU: European Union

***Fatwa*:** Religious opinion

FPI: Islamic Defender Front; *Front Pembela Islam,* founded in 1998 under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab

FS-LDK: Forum of Coordination of Campus Predication; *Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*

FSPPI: Goodwill Forum of Islamic Parties; *Forum Silaturahmi Partai-Partai Islam*

FUI: Forum of Islamic Society; *Forum Umat Islam,* founded in 2005 as an umbrella for various Islamist groups like HTI, FPI, and MMI

GAM: Aceh Independent Movement; *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*

GAPI: Indonesian Political Federation; *Gabungan Politik Indonesia*

Gemsos: Socialist Student Movement; *Gerakan Mahasiswa Sosialis*, linked to the PSI

***Ghazwul fikr*:** The invasion of ideas; the praxis-ideology of the Islamists to maintain the 'purity' of their identity by rejecting the antagonistic others, expressed, for example, in anti-Western sentiments

GMKI: Protestant Indonesian Student Movement; *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia*

GNPF-MUI: National Movement to Safeguard the MUI's Fatwa; *Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI*

Golkar: Functional Group Party

GUPPI: Association for the Improvement of Islamic Teaching; *Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan Pendidikan*

GWOT: Global War on Terrorism

HMI: Association of Muslim Students; *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, linked to the Masyumi Party
HTI: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICG: International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based NGO for violent and terrorism studies
ICMI: Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals; *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*
IMF: International Monetary Fund
ISDV: Indies Social-Democratic Association; *Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging*, the precursor of the PKI
ISIS/ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq in Syria/the Levant
JIL: Islamic Liberal Network; *Jaringan Islam Liberal*
KAMI: Indonesian Student Action Front; *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*
KAMMI: Action Committee for Indonesian Muslim Students; *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia,* linked to the PKS
KISDI: Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World; *Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam*
KPPSI: The Committee for the Preparation of Formalisation of Sharia; *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam*, in South Sulawesi
***Kyai*:** Islamic scholars, leaders of *pesantrens* especially in Java.
***Lakpesdam*:** NU's Institute for Human Resource Studies and Development; *Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia*
LDK: Campus Predication Institute; *Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
LMD: Training of Preacher Combatants; *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah,* linked to the DDII
***Majelis Dzikir*:** Islamic congregations
Masyumi: Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims; *Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*
MIAI: Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia; *Majelis Islam A'laa Indonesia*
MMI: Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly; *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*
MPR: People's Consultative Council; *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*
MPRS: Provisional People's Consultative Council; *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara*
MUI: Council of Indonesian Ulama; *Majelis Ulama Indonesia,* established in 1975

NASAKOM: Nationalism, Religion, Communism; corporatist framework under the Soekaro's Guided democracy era

NEFO: New Emerging Forces, representing newly independent nations—opposed to OLDEFO

NEP: New Economic Policy, in Malaysia

NKK/BKK: Normalisation of Campus Life/ Campus Coordination Board; *Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kampus;* New Order's policies issued in 1978 for depoliticising campus and student movements after the *Malari*. Yet, it then opened up the space for Islamisation activities in universities

***Malari*:** Catastrophe of 15 January; *Malapetaka Limabelas Januari,* bloody demonstration involved university students, intelligentsia, and Muslim business groups against foreign capital and state's business management

NKRI: Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*

NU: The Awakening of Muslim Scholars; *Nahdlatul Ulama,* considered as the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia with its main social base in rural areas especially in East and Central Java

OLDEFO: Old Established Forces, opposed to NEFO

OPSUS: Special Operation; *Operasi Khusus,* military intelligence unit led by Ali Moertopo

PAN: National Mandate Party; *Partai Amanat Nasional,* established in 1998 under the leadership of Amin Rais and linked to modernist Islamist organisation, Muhammadiyah

***Pancasila*:** The Five Principles; state ideology professing belief in One God, Humanism, Indonesian unity, democracy, social justice

***Pangkostrad*:** Commander of Army Reserve Command; *Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat*

Parmusi/PMI: Indonesian Muslim Party; *Partai Muslimin Indonesia*

PBB: Crescent and Star Party; *Partai Bulan Bintang;* established in 1998 and led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, linked to the DDII

PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction, COVID-19 test

PDI: Indonesian Democratic Party; *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia,* founded in 1973

PDIP: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,* established in 1999 led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, a splinter from the PDI

***Perda syariah*:** Sharia-by-laws

Permesta: Universal Struggle; *Perjuangan Semesta*
***Persis*:** Islamic Union; *Persatuan Islam*
***Pesantren*:** Islamic seminaries
PII: Islamic Student Movement; *Pergerakan Islam Indonesia,* linked to Masyumi Party
***Pilkada*:** Local Elections, *Pemilihan Kepala Daerah*
PK/PKS: Justice Party, later changed to Justice and Prosperity Party; *Partai Keadilan/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*
PKB: National Awakening Party; *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa,* established in 1998 and linked to the NU
PKI: Indonesian Communist Party; *Partai Komunis Indonesia*
PKU: Party of Awakening of the Muslim Community; *Partai Kebangkitan Umat*
PMII: Indonesian Islamic Student Movement; *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, linked to NU
PMKRI: Union of Catholic University Students; *Persatuan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia*
PNI: Indonesian Nationalist Party; *Partai Nasional Indonesia*
PNU: Muslim Community's Awakening Party; *Partai Nahdlatul Umat*
PPMI: Federation of Indonesian Students; *Perhimpunan Perserikatan Mahasiswa Indonesia*
PPP: United Development Party; *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,* established in 1973
PRRI: Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic; *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*
PSI: Indonesian Socialist Party; *Partai Sosialis Indonesia*
PSII: Indonesian Islamic Union Party; Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia
PUI: Party of the Muslim Community; *Partai Umat Islam*
RIS: Republic of the United States of Indonesia; *Republik Indonesia Serikat*
RMS: Republic of South Maluku; *Republik Maluku Selatan*
SARA: Ethnic, Religion, Race and Inter-groups; *Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan*
Sekber-Golkar: Joint Secretariat of the Functional Group; *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya*
***Shumuliyatul Islam*:** Comprehensive nature of Islam as religion and the state
SI: Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912

SIDIK: Studies and Information of Contemporary Islamic World; *Studi dan Informasi untuk Dunia Islam Kontemporer*

***Sipilis*:** Secularism, Pluralism, Liberalism; FPI's rhetoric

SUNI: Solidarity of the Indonesian National Union; *Solidaritas Uni Indonesia*

***Tritura*:** Three demands of the people (dissolution of the PKI, reorganisation of the government, lowering prices of basic goods); *Tiga Tuntutan Rakyat,* a slogan anti-Soekarno rallies in 1966

***Turba*:** 'Go Down' Strategies; *Turun ke Bawah,* PKI's strategies to mobilise grass-root masses in the early 1960s

UKP-IP: Presidential Working Unit for the Implementation of the State Ideology of Pancasila; *Unit Kerja Presiden Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila,* established in June 2017

***Ulama*:** Islamic scholars/clerics; see *Kyai*

US: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

***Usroh*:** lit. denoting a family, from Arabic *usra*

VOC: (Dutch) East India Company; *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie,* founded in 1602

***Volksraad*:** Dutch-made People Council, set up in 1916

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FAKULTAS ILMU SOSIAL DAN ILMU POLITIK

UNIVERSITAS GADJAH MADA

YOGYAKARTA – INDONESIA

CONTESTATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA
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This book examines the failure of Islamic politics in becoming a hegemonic force in Indonesia and the far-reaching consequences for current practices of democracy and of Islam itself. In contrast to the thesis of compatibility between Islam and democracy following the dominant discourse of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and neoliberal democracy, this study situates Islamic politics in broader social settings by examining its nature and trajectories throughout Indonesia's modern political history. The book thus investigates how the practices of Islamic politics, or Islamism, have shaped and been transformed through political contestations and the formation of coalitions of multiple forces in constructing Indonesia's socio-political landscape.

Using the concept of hegemony from poststructuralist discourse theory, the analytical framework applied in this book goes beyond liberal epistemologies of Islamism that prescribe the separation of religion from politics and treat Islamism as an object of intervention. Instead, the book is premised on the contention that Indonesia is a political construction, in which Islam has become one of the major discourses that have defined and transformed Indonesia's nation-state throughout history. In this view, it is argued that the nature and dynamics of Islamism are not driven primarily by different interpretations of religious doctrines, cultural norms or by the imperative of institutions. Rather, the struggles of different Islamist projects in their quest for hegemony are contingent on the outcomes of socio-political changes and contestations that involve multiple political forces, both within and beyond the Islamists, in specific historical conjunctures.

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